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Plaintiffs/Appellants Joseph Kitchen and Richard
Phillips, through their legal counsel, James R. Black and
Susan Black submit the following brief in support of their
appeal:

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court improperly grant defendant Cal

Gas1 motion for summary judgment?
2.

Were there genuine issues of material fact in this

case regarding defendant Cal Gas1 negligence that should
have been submitted to the jury for determination and not
resolved by the trial court as a matter of law.
3.

Does the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor in relation

to the actions of defendant Cal Gas apply in this case?
4.

Should this matter be remanded and set for trial

as to defendant Cal Gas.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiffs filed this suit to recover damages they
suffered on February 6, 1986, when the tractor-trailer they
occupied overturned 600 feet west of Milepost 19 on
Interstate 80 in Tooele County.

Immediately prior to the

time plaintiffs' vehicle overturned, a Cal Gas tanker
overturned 800 feet west of milepost 19 on Interstate 80.
Plaintiff Kitchen was the driver of an ANR Garrett tractor
with two trailers.

It is his testimony that he saw the

defendant Cal Gas tanker truck overturned ahead of him on
the roadway.

The tanker was blocking 1% lanes of the two

eastbound lanes so plaintiff began to slow his truck
anticipating he could stop prior to coming into contact with
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the Cal Gas tanker.

Traveling immediately behind the

plaintiffs was a CR England tractor and trailers.

It is the

testimonies of the plaintiffs that as their truck slowed
down, the CR England truck hit them from behind causing them
to roll over.

There was no contact between the ANR Garrett

truck and the Cal Gas truck.
were taken.

The depositions of plaintiffs

The deposition of Richard Foreman, C R .

England's driver, was taken.

The driver of the Cal gas

vehicle, Blaine Beckstead, died of causes unrelated to the
accident shortly after it occurred.

Various expert

witnesses' depositions for the parties were taken as well.
These depositions plus the pleadings constitute the record
in this appeal.

Plaintiffs reached a settlement with

defendant C R . England prior to trial so no issues on appeal
deal with C R . England.
Defendant Cal Gas filed a motion for summary judgment
claiming there was no proximate causation between the Cal
Gas truck accident and the ANR Garrett truck accident.
trial court denied that motion.

The

Defendant Cal Gas then

filed a motion for summary judgment claiming there was no
evidence of negligence on the part of the Cal Gas driver.
The trial court granted Cal Gas' Motion.

Hence, this appeal

was filed, since it is plaintiffs' position there are
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clearly disputed factual issues that should be determined by
a jury,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs, Joseph Kitchen and Richard Phillips

were drivers for ANR Garrett Freight lines as of February
1986.

On February 6, 1986, they were transporting freight

from the Los Angeles, California area to Salt Lake City,
Utah.

The tractor they were operating had a sleeping

compartment so one of them would drive while the other
slept.
2.

At about midnight on February 6, 1986, they pulled

into the Wendover, Utah Weigh Station.
to drop their third trailer.

They were instructed

They were told the road

further ahead had patches of black ice all the* way to Salt
Lake City.
3.

(Kitchen deposition p. 43 and p. 44.)

After the ANR Garrett truck had left the Wendover

Weigh Station, it was passed by the defendant Cal Gas tanker
at a rapid rate of speed.
east as well.

The Cal Gas truck was heading

Plaintiff Kitchen testified in his deposition

on pages 48 and 49:
Q.

Did any trucks pass you?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Where did it pass you?

A.

Coming out of the scales.

Cal Gas tanker truck.
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Q.

Right out of the scales?

A.
Well, I had been out of the scales
I guess five minutes.
Q.
You'd been out of the scales and
then it passed you?
A.

Out on interstate 80.

Q.

Driving 20 to 25 miles an hour?

A.
I didn't even get up in the higher
gears yet.
Q.
Did it pass you on the wet but not
slick portion of the freeway?
A.
yeah.

Yeah.

On the left side of me,

Q.
And you'd barely pulled out of the
Wendover weigh station?
A.
It's what I call barely pulling out
of there.
Q.

How far out?

Less than a mile?

A.
Yeah. I'd say that.
was going, he was in a hurry.

Wherever he

Q.
Did you keep the Cal Gas truck in
sight between the mile out of the weigh
station and the time of the accident, the
place of the accident?
A.
I didn't keep him in sight.
blowed out of sight. He was gone.

He was

He further testified on this point at page 74 of his
deposition.
Q.

But I mean before the accident?

A.

I wasn't talking to him, no.
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Q.

All right.

A.
Well, when I was leaving port I
made comment about this Cal Gas truck going
around me, figuring he was in a hurry.
Because I just barely got out on the
Boulevard when that sucker passed me. Other
than that, I didn't have nothing to say to
him.
Plaintiff Phillips verified what plaintiff Kitchen had said
in his deposition on pages 35 and 36:
Q.
Tell me about everything you said
to him and everything he said to you?
A.
Well, he said, "There goes the Cal
Gas truck rocky mountain doubles".
Q.
sleeper?

That was after you'd got into the

A.
sleeper.

That's after I'd got in the

Q.
said?

Tell me everything else that he

A.
And I said, "What?" And he mumbled
something else. And that's when I pulled the
curtain back a little bit to where it wasn't
snapped where my head is, and he said, "There
went the Cal Gas truck lickity splitting".
And I couldn't even see it. It was going.
4.

Plaintiffs proceeded east on 1-80 in the right lane of

the roadway at 20 to 25 miles per hour up to the point in the
road where the accident occurred.

There were two eastbound

lanes of traffic (Kitchen deposition, p. 49; Phillips
deposition, p. 32, 33).
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5.

In the area where the accident took place, the roads

were icy and slippery,

(Kitchen deposition, p. 46; Phillips

deposition, p. 10, 13.)
6.

In the area of milepost 19, a white Toyota Pickup truck

was traveling ahead of the ANR Garrett truck in the left-hand
lane of traffic.

In the Toyota's headlights, Kitchen saw the

shadow of something blocking the left and part of the right
lanes of traffic ahead of him.

In his deposition he testified

on this point as follows:
Q.
How far ahead of you was the Cal
Gas truck when you saw it tipped over?
A.
The next time I saw that Cal Gas
truck was when I was down on the ground and
they was pulling me out of it. But I saw it
before I got down there due to a pickup truck
that was riding in my left-hand lane. He
turned on his high beam lights. So when I
was driving down the road I had a Toyota
pickup truck riding in the left-hand lane, I
was in the right-hand lane.
Q.

Okay.

A.
That pickup truck turned on its
high beams. Now, I didn't, at that time I
didn't know it was the Cal Gas truck across
the highway. All I saw was a shadow down
there.
Q.

A shadow?

A.
Yeah. It's like a glare at the
pickup from the lights hitting on the object.
(Kitchen deposition, p. 49, 50.)
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Q.
Was he slowing down at that poiirvt?
Did you see his brake lights?
A.
He never touched his brake lights.
The only thing he did when he got ahead of me
a little ways, is he turned on his high
beams. And when he turned on his high beams
we both saw the shadow across the highway.
(Kitchen deposition, p. 79.)
Q.

With him right in front of you?

A.
Right. Well, he was the one that
actually picked the tanker across the
highway.
Q.
Could you see over his pickup from
where you were?
A.

Yeah.

Q.
And it was his lights that picked
up the Cal Gas tanker up ahead?
A.

Right. Right.

(Kitchen deposition, P. 121.)
7.

The overturned Cal Gas truck was blocking the left lane

and part of the right lane on the roadway directly ahead of
Kitchen.
8.

(Kitchen deposition, p. 51 and P. 94.)
Perceiving the problem the Cal Gas tanker presented in

the roadway ahead of him, Kitchen took his foot off the
throttle, causing his vehicle to slow.

(Kitchen d€»position,

pages 123, 124.)
9.

As plaintiffs1 vehicle slowed, plaintiffs felt an

impact to the rear of their vehicle, which impact caused
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plaintiffs1 vehicle to overturn.

(Kitchen deposition page 125;

Phillips deposition pages 36-38, 50-52.)
10.

Foreman testified that the C.R. England vehicle did not

hit plaintiffs1 vehicle and that he saw plaintiffs' vehicle
overturned and blocking the roadway as he approached Milepost 19
on 1-80 and therefore drove off the roadway to avoid hitting it.
11.

The driver of the Cal Gas truck died shortly after the

accident of causes unrelated to the accident.

The wife of the

Cal Gas Driver who was accompanying her husband cannot be
located to give her testimony according to counsel for Cal Gas.
12.

After the accident, plaintiff Kitchen walked the short

distance up to where the Cal Gas tanker was to see if anyone
needed help.
13.

(Kitchen deposition, p. 55.)

Section 41-6-46(1)(e) U.C.A. states in pertinent part:
SPEED RESTRICTIONS
41-6-46. Speed regulations — Safe and
appropriate speeds at certain locations —
Prima facie speed limits — Emergency power
of the governor.
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle
at a speed greater than is reasonable and
prudent under the existing conditions, and
giving regard to the actual and potential
hazards then existing, including, but not
limited to when:
* * * * *

(e) special hazards exist
regarding pedestrians or other traffic,
or due to weather or highway conditions.
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14.

It is plaintiff's contention the Cal Gas driver was

unable to maintain proper and immediate control over his vehicle
as he was driving too fast for the conditions as they then
existed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There are genuine issues of material fact involving the
negligence of the Cal Gas driver that precipitated this triple
truck accident.

Additionally, under the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitor, defendant's negligence can be inferred.

Therefore, it

was inappropriate for the trial court to grant defendant Cal
Gas' motion for summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
Point I
There are genuine issues of material fact on the
issue of Defendant Cal Gas1 Negligence.
therefore Summary Judgment is improper
The Utah Supreme Court as well as Courts throughout the
United States have repeatedly emphasized the very restrictive
standard of when Summary Judgment is appropriate.
In Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982), the
Utah Supreme Court discussed the propriety of summary judgment
and the approach courts must take to motions for summary
judgment as follows:
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Summary judgment is proper only if the
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and
admissions show that there is no genuine issue
of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If
there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning
questions of fact, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the opposing party.
Thus, the court must evaluate all the evidence
and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn
from the party opposing summary judgment.
Although summary judgment may on occasion be
appropriate in negligence casesf it is
appropriate only in the most clear-cut case.
In Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292,
294, 431 P.2d 126, 128 (1967), this Court
stated:
Summary judgments are more frequently given
in contract cases . . . . However, when it
comes to determining negligence, contributory
negligence, and causation, courts are not in
such a good position to make a total
determination for here enters a prerogative
of the jury to make a determination of its
own, and that is: Did the conduct of a party
measure up to that of the reasonably prudent
man, and, if not, was it a proximate cause of
the harm done?
(See Case in its entirety in Attachment 1)
With the Bowen standard in mind, it is clear by its prior
ruling on defendant Cal Gas1 motion for summary judgment on the
issue of proximate cause that the trial court was of the opinion
there is disputed evidence in this case.

The court determined

that there was a jury question as to whether the overturned Cal
Gas truck was a proximate cause of the collision between the ANR
Garrett truck and the C.R. England truck.

Since the issues of

proximate cause and negligence are so intertwined it is
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illogical to find there is an issue of material facts regarding
proximate cause and no such dispute regarding negligence.

The

necessity of having a jury consider all the factual disputes in
the present case is especially clear.

When the facts of the

case are viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs.
Since these are all disputed issues of material fact,
summary judgment was inappropriately granted.

This matter

should be tried to a jury.
Point II
There is substantial evidence from which a jury
could infer defendant Cal Gas1 negligence
In earlier Memorandum on this point, defendant cited the
landmark Utah Supreme Court case of Horsley v. Robinson. 112
Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592 (1947) for the proposition that "The mere
occurrence of an accident, considered alone, does not support an
inference that the Cal Gas driver was negligent."
It is plaintiffs contention that the Horsley decision
supports their position that Cal Gas negligence is an issue for
jury determination.

The facts of Horsley are analogous to the

facts in this case in many respects.

The Utah Supreme Court in

Horsley supported the trial court's submission to the jury of
the issue of negligent operation of a bus that collided with an
oncoming automobile which skidded into its path on an icy road.
The court held that the jury could infer excessive speed for the
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existing circumstances without evidence of stopping distances.
After making the statement upon which defendant relies, the
court went on further to explain:
* * * *

But negligence may be inferred from facts and
circumstances which according to human
experience tend to show and from which
reasonable minds might be convinced that in
operating the bus as thev did under the
surrounding facts and circumstances the
defendants should have anticipated that they
were endangering the safety of their
passengers. . . .
Suppose conditions were such that the driver
could anticipate that if he moved at the rate
of 5 miles per hour he would slide 100 feet
before he could stop and that in so doing he
would be apt to slide over the side of the
highway and his bus would overturn or slide
onto a railroad track where he would be struck
by an approaching train, would anyone contend
that he could proceed even at that rate of
speed without being guilty of negligence?
Here the driver had driven more than 20 miles
under similar road and weather conditions
which he encountered at the time of the
accident. He had ample time to fully realize
the amount of control or lack thereof which he
could exert over the bus in case of an
emergency. . . . The evidence was sufficient
from which the jury could find the defendants
were negligent.
Referring to Section 57-7-113, U.C.A. 1943 the Court stated:
This statute requires that a driver shall
not drive at a speed greater than is
reasonable and prudent in view of the existing
conditions and hazards on the highway . . . .
In other words, since the greater the speed
the less control the driver has over his
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vehicle and a longer distance is required
within which to stop, and his ability to guide
his vehicle is decreased, and since his
control will also be decreased when traveling
on icv roads covered with slush when a sleet
of snow and rain is falling, he must under
such conditions according to this statute
decrease his speed so that he can drive with
reasonable safety to others using the
highway . . .
* * *

It is universally recognized that negligence
may be inferred from the happening of the
accident and the surrounding facts and
circumstances where the facts are such as to
reasonably justify such inference even though
there is no direct testimony to establish the
exact grounds of negligence which caused the
accident. (Citations omitted.)
186 P.2d at 596, 597, 599 (emphasis added).

(See case in its

entirety in Attachment 2.)
In the present case, as in Horsley, supra, there are issues
of fact which preclude summary disposition.

There can be no

doubt that based on Horsley, the jury may infer negligence on
the part of the Cal Gas truck driver.

While the mere occurrence

of an accident may not imply negligence, whether or not it is
negligent to overturn a tractor/tanker on a slippery road and
thereby block the traffic lanes is a question of fact to be
determined by a fact finder.

As in Horsley, the trier of fact

could infer from the accident and the surrounding facts that the
Cal Gas driver was driving too fast for the existing conditions
and failed to keep proper control of his vehicle.
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In the case of Kelly v. Montova. 470 P.2d 563, (Ct. of App.,
New Mexico, 1970), a multiple car accident in a severe sand
storm resulted in blocking the highway.

The plaintiff was a

passenger in a truck which collided with the last car in the
previous accident.

The trial court entered summary judgment in

favor of defendant vehicle drivers only to be reversed by the
New Mexico Court of Appeals.

The New Mexico Court specifically

stated that blocking a highway in violation of statute may cause
other persons to have accidents.

(Utah has a similar statute

embodied in Utah Code Ann. 41-6-103 (1953) as amended.)

Issues

of fact as to foreseeability, proximate cause, and negligence
were to be resolved by the trier of fact.

(See case in its

entirety in Attachment 3.)
The plaintiffs testified that Mr. Beckstead, the driver of
the Cal Gas tanker, passed him at a rapid rate of speed shortly
before the accident.

The next time the plaintiff saw the Cal

Gas truck it was laying in the road blocking the eastbound
traffic lanes less than 200 feet ahead of plaintiffs.
Plaintiff, in an effort to avoid the Cal Gas truck also crashed.
There was snow on the ground and black ice on the road.

Thus,

there is an obvious question of fact which precludes summary
judgment, i.e.; did the accident of the Cal Gas truck, resulting
in that truck blocking the eastbound lanes of traffic contribute
to the plaintiffs' accident which resulted in their personal
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injuries?

Was defendant's negligence a contributing factor to

plaintiffs' accident?

It is plaintiffs' position that this was

a chain reaction type accident and that Cal Gas' negligence was
the initiating event.

This is a prime case for a comparative

negligence analysis for the finder of fact.
In Weber v. Sprincrville City, 725 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1986) the
Court described four elements of a negligence action.

Each of

those four elements as applied to the present facts creates an
issue for the jury.

First, does a driver of a truck have a duty

of care to maintain control over his vehicle so as not to block
the traffic lanes of the highway, especially in winter driving
conditions?

Second, did the Cal Gas truck driver breach that

duty when he overturned his truck and left it laying in the road
blocking the eastbound lanes?

Third, did the accident of the

defendant Cal Gas truck case plaintiffs' injuries in whole or in
part and fourth, did plaintiffs suffer damages as a result
thereof?

The proper body to resolve these issues is the jury.

Defendant Cal Gas, Inc. cited below a recent Utah Court of
Appeals case of Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical Inc., 769 P.2d
636.

In Reeves, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial judge

because summary judgment had been inappropriately entered in
favor of the respondents on all of the causes of action except
one.

That one dispute involved a medical question concerning

standard of care and breach of that standard which had to be
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established by expert testimony.
plaintiff.

No expert was produced by the

As shown above, the current situation is very much

different from a medical malpractice action which requires
expert standard of care testimony in most instances as set forth
in the Reeves case.

Here there was a duty and a breach of that

duty that can be inferred from all the circumstances.
As mentioned hereinabove, defendant previously filed a
motion for summary judgment on the issue proximate causation
which the court denied.

Since the issues of proximate cause and

negligence go hand in hand, it may be helpful to review the
courts decisions regarding the appropriateness of summary
judgment on proximate causation issues.
In the case of Hall v. Blackham. 417 P.2d 664 (Utah 1966),
another often cited decision, the court rendered a decision on
appeal by plaintiffs from the portion of a jury verdict in favor
of one of the defendants in the case, Deleeuw.

Plaintiffs had

alleged that Deleeuw handed a sandwich to another defendant, the
driver of the car which collided with plaintiffs1 decedent's
car, and that the handling of the sandwich to the driver
distracted his attention.

417 P.2d 15 665.

two questions regarding Deleeuw:

The jury was asked

was he negligent, and, if he

was, was his negligence a proximate cause of the accident.
jury answered both questions in the negative.
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The

417 P.2d at 667.

The decision stands for the proposition that negligence and
proximate causation are questions for the jury.

They are not

questions for the Court on a motion for summary judgment.
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority. 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983),
considered a jury instruction which directed a verdict on
plaintifffs negligence and, in effect, directed a verdict on the
issue of proximate cause.

671 P.2d at 219.

After a discussion

of the law of superseding causation, in which the Court pointed
out that it has adopted the rule stated in Restatement (Second)
of Torts, § 447, on the issue of superseding causation, the
Court stated,
In the present case, the disputed instruction
was erroneous because it failed to submit the
proximate cause issue to the jury for
determination. . . .
Where the evidence is in dispute, including
the inferences from the evidence, the issue
should be submitted to the jury.
* * *

We do not mean to imply that rulings by the
trial court which decide a factual contention
as a matter of law are never appropriate. But
the right to trial by jury is a basic
principle of our system that cannot be allowed
to be eroded by improper intrusions on the
jury's prerogative.
671 P.2d at 220 (citations omitted.)
Also, of relevance to the present case, the Harris Court
stated that a person's negligence is not superseded by the
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negligence of another if the subsequent negligence of another is
foreseeable.

The Court adopted the Restatement Rule which it

applied as follows:
The fact that an intervening act of a third
person is negligent in itself or is done in a
negligent manner does not make it a
superseding cause of harm to another which the
actor's negligent conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about, if
(a) the actor at the time of his
negligent conduct should have realized that a
third person might so act, or
(b) a reasonable man knowing the
situation existing when the act of the third
person was done would not regard it as highly
extraordinary that the third person had so
acted, or
(c) the intervening act is a normal
consequence of a situation created by the
actor's conduct and the manner in which it is
done is not extraordinary negligent.
(671 P.2d at 219)
Although the factual issues presented in Harris were
somewhat of a flip flop of the facts in the present case# the
court's discussion of intervening and/or superceding causation
is significant and instructive:
Instruction no. 14 appears to have been based
on the rule stated in Hillyard v. Utah
Bv-Products Co.. 1 Utah 2d 143, 151, 263 P.2d
287, 292 (1953); and restated in . . .
Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24
Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970).
. . . [T]he test in Hillyard is two-pronged:
(1) where a motorist sees a stationary object
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in the road and negligently fails to avoid it,
his negligence is. as a matter of law, a
superseding cause, but (2) if the motorist
negligently fails to see the stationary object
in time to avoid it, the issue of whether the
motorist's negligence is a superseding cause
is for the jury.
The strong drift away from deciding the issue
of superseding causation in automobile
accidents as a matter of law is evident in
Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Co.. Utah, 611 P.2d 363 (1980), and
Watters v. Ouerrv. Utah 588 P.2d 702 (1978).
Indeed, Jensen all but overruled the first
prong of Hillyard sub silento.
* * *

TT]he first prong of Hillvard cannot stand
analysis from a theoretical point of view.
There is no valid distinction between one who
negligently fails to keep a proper lookout and
rear-ends another car and one who keeps a
proper lookout but negligently fails to avoid
a collision. The two situations are similar
to the doctrines of assumption of risk and
contributory negligence—which are now treated
for the most part simply in terms of whether a
defendant failed to act as a reasonably
prudent person under the circumstance.
* * *

Finally, the unsound distinction made in
Hillvard serves to frustrate the purpose of
the Comparative Negligence Statute by
precluding the kind of comparison of fault
that a Jury ought to make. The
allocation of liability should be
made on the basis of the relative
culpability of both parties. To do
that the jury must assess the
reasonableness or unreasonableness
of the second driver's actions in
light of all the circumstances,
including whatever action it takes
to avoid a collision, his initial
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speed, the initial speed of the
first car, road conditions, traffic
conditions, and the like.
To avoid further confusion in the doctrine of
superseding causation in cases such as this.
we hereby overrule the first prong of the
Hillyard test as stated in Hillvard, • . . and
Anderson.
671 P.2d at 221, 222 (emphasis added.)
The Harris decision, a relatively recent decision by the
Utah Supreme Court, stands for the principle of trial by jury.
Following that tenet the issues of negligence and proximate
cause especially in an automobile accident case are within the
purview of the jury.

The jury may draw inferences of the

neglect of a party from the evidence as it sees fit.

(See copy

of the Harris decision in its entirety in attachment 4.)
In the present case, the Court ruled as a matter of law on
the issue of negligence prior to the submission of any evidence
to a jury.

The facts as elicited from the plaintiffs in a light

most favorable to the plaintiffs demonstrates negligence on the
part of defendant Cal Gas. Without question, a jury could
reasonably infer that Cal Gas was negligent by failing to drive
at an appropriate speed; by failing to maintain proper control;
by overturning and blocking almost all of the traveled portions
of the roadway.

The grant of summary judgment in these

circumstances was erroneous.
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Point III
Defendant Cal Gas is not entitled to a
Presumption of Due Care
At the trial court level, Cal Gas asserted it was entitled
to a presumption of due care since its driver had died shortly
after the accident.

Such is not the case.

Its driver died as a

result of health problems totally unrelated to the accident
therefore, the presumption does not apply.

However, defendant

cited the general rebuttable presumption that the Cal Gas driver
was exercising due care at the time of the accident relying on
DeMille v. Erickson. 462 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969).

That is a case

in which there was a headon collision between two automobiles.
All occupants of the vehicles were killed and there were
apparently no other witnesses.
excessive speed.

There was no evidence of

The only evidence of negligence was that one

of the vehicles was in the other's lane of traffic.

This was a

contributory negligence case prior to the enactment of the
Comparative Negligence Statute so has only limited application
to the case under consideration.

The court inferred that the

driver of the car in the wrong lane was negligent as a matter of
law.

The court further found that the heirs of the passenger of

the car in the wrong lane could not recover because there was no
direct or inferred evidence the other driver did anything to
contribute to the accident.
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That simply is not the situation in this case.

The evidence

is that absent a lack of control of the Cal Gas truck by its
driver while traveling at an excessive speed for the inclement
conditions on the straight, level interstate, it would not have
overturned creating a hazard for following vehicles.

Those

reasonably inferred facts preclude summary disposition.

As in

Pearce v. Wistisen. 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1985), citing DeMille,
supra., " . . . once the opposing party produces a prima facie
case as to the nonexistence of [the presumed fact of due care],
the presumption disappears."

There it was adduced from the

evidence that a drowning victim had discarded his lifejacket.
The court ruled that whether that was negligent under the
circumstances was a question of fact for the jury to evaluate.
In the present case, there is convincing evidence that the
Cal Gas driver was negligent.

He drove too fast for the snowy,

icy conditions; lost control of his tanker truck which caused it
to rollover blocking the traveled portion of the road.

Under

these facts, no presumption of due care can be sustained.
Point IV
Defendant's Negligence can be inferred
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor
The Utah Supreme Court has on numerous occasions held that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable in certain cases
and juries should be so instructed where it is appropriate.
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It

is plaintiffs' position that their case is one in which the
doctrine should apply.
In Anderton v. Montgomery. 607 P.2d 828 (Utah Sup. Crt.
1980), plaintiff brought a claim against the owners and
operators of a business whose device was used to exhibit sheet
metal samples.

The device collapsed causing serious injuries to

the plaintiff.

Neither party could demonstrate what caused the

device to fail.

The jury was instructed on the theory of res

ipsa loquitor but, still returned a verdict in defendant's
favor.

While the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's

rulings, it discussed the doctrine and its applicability which
may be insightful in reference to the case on appeal.
In Anderton, the court cited approvingly the case of Lund v.
Phillips Petroleum Co.. 10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P.2d 952 (1960)
wherein the court stated:
to permit one who suffers injury from
something under the control of another, which
ordinarily would not cause injury except for
the other's negligence, to present his
grievance to a court or jury on the basis that
an inference of negligence may reasonably be
drawn from such facts; and cast the burdem
upon the other to make proof of what happened.
(607 P.2d 833)
The Court further described the criteria under which res
ipsa loquitor could be implemented:
(1) that the accident was of a kind which, in
the ordinary course of events, would not have

- 24 -

happened had due care been observed; (2) that
the plaintiff's own use or operation of the
agency or instrumentality was not primarily
responsible for the injury; and (3) that the
agency or instrumentality causing the injury
was under the exclusive management or control
of the defendant.
(607 P.2d 833)
Of most importance in reference to this present appeal the
Utah Supreme Court emphasized that the application of the
doctrine to a given situation was a question of fact to be
determined by the jury:
It is to be noted that the weighing of
evidence presented to establish the above
elements, like all other questions of fact, is
within the province of the jury; where the
trial court determines that the evidence,
viewed in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, could establish the prerequisites
to the application of the doctrine, an
instruction to that effect is proper. It then
becomes the jury's responsibility to apply, or
refuse to apply, the doctrine based on its
factual findings regarding the circumstantial
prerequisites.
(607 P.2d 834)
The Anderton court in a footnote made comments that are
especially relevant to the present case regarding the
application of res ipsa loquitor and the principles of
comparative negligence:
This is not to say that any contributory
negligence on plaintiff's part prevents the
application of the doctrine, such that it may
not be used in those cases where plaintiff is
seeking partial recovery under Utah's
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comparative negligence statute (U.C.A., 1953,
78-27-37). The requirement here is that
plaintifffs use of the agency or
instrumentality not be primarily responsible
for the injury, not that his actions be free
from negligence of any kind. (Note that the
comparative negligence provision bars partial
recovery under any type of proof where
plaintiff's negligence equals or exceeds that
of the defendant.) See 58 Am.Jur.2d
Negligence § 481. p. 58.
(underlining added)(607 P.2d 833)(See Anderton in its entirety
in Attachment 5.)
Another recent Utah Supreme Court decision discussing res
ipsa loquitor is Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah Sup. Crt.
1980).

In Nixdorf, a patient brought a medical malpractice

action against a doctor and hospital because a surgical needle
was left in her body after surgery.

At the trial in this

matter, plaintiff did not introduce expert testimony to show
that the defendants care was below the standard of care but,
relied instead on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor.

The trial

court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict
because of plaintiff's failure to present expert testimony.

The

Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter for a new
trial.

The Court reaffirmed the proposition that in a medical

malpractice action expert testimony is not always necessary if
the standard of care owed plaintiff is within the common
knowledge and experience of a layman.
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Then, the Court surmised

the plaintiff met her burden through the application of res ipsa
loquitor.

The Court stated:

When the appropriate evidentiary basis is
presented a plaintiff may employ the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitor to carry this burden.
This doctrine establishes an inference of
negligence from the circumstances incident to
the operation. It is a procedural rather than
substantive rule of law which carries the
plaintiff past a motion for nonsuit where the
circumstantial evidence introduced by the
plaintiff is sufficient to support the
application of the doctrine and its inference
of negligence.
(612 P.2d 352)(See case in its entirety in Attachment 6.)
A key case is Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d
1232 (Ut. Sup. Crt. 1984).

The plaintiff suffered personal

injuries when the pallet on which he was standing broke causing
him to fall.
defendant.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the

Plaintiff appealed on several grounds including the

refusal to give plaintiff's proffered instruction regarding res
ipsa loquitor.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter
instructing the trial court to decide whether plaintiff made a
prima facie showing of the res ipsa loquitor elements and, if
so, the jury should receive plaintiff's proffered instruction.
The Court in Kusy reaffirmed Anderton, in its description of
the elements of res ipsa loquitor.

It noted in reference to the

third element that "The control necessary for a res ipsa
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instruction is control exercised at the time of the negligent
act."

(681 P.2d 1235)

The Utah Supreme Court also held in Kusy

that a plaintiff could sustain and be allowed instructions on
theories of res ipsa loquitor and negligence in the same lawsuit
as long as the exact cause of the accident was not known.
jury based on the circumstances could infer negligence.

The
(See a

copy of Kusy in its entirety in Attachment 7.)
In the case under consideration, plaintiffs are entitled to
present their claims under the theories of negligence and res
ipsa loquitor.

Plaintiffs can establish all the elements

necessary for res ipsa loquitor:

1) the Cal Gas tanker truck

rollover is the kind of accident that does not happen if due
care has been observed, 2) the plaintiffs had no use or hadn't
operated the Cal Gas tanker and, therefore, could not be said to
be primarily responsible for their injuries and 3) the Cal Gas
tanker was under the exclusive control of defendant.
Since the plaintiffs can make a prima facie showing of the
above elements, the jury could infer defendant Cal Gas1
negligence.

The application of the res ipsa loquitor doctrine

is a question of fact so is within the exclusive province of the
jury.

Thus, it was improper to grant defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSION
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It was improper for the trial court to grant defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the issue of negligence.

When

viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, the evidence,
both direct and circumstantial establishes neglect on the part
of Cal Gas.

There can be no argument that a jury could

reasonably infer that it was negligent for Cal gas to drive too
fast in snowy, icy conditions late at night thus causing it to
lose control of its tanker so it rolled over onto the roadway
blocking one and one-half lanes of the two lane road.

The

doctrines of negligence and res ipsa loquitor require that this
issue of negligence be considered by a jury as the fact finder
and not as a matter of law by the court.
The trial court already decided there was sufficient
evidence to put the issue of proximate cause to the jury.
Certainly the issue of negligence should be considered by the
jury as well.

Plaintiffs request that the trial court's

granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment be reversed
and this matter be remanded for a trial on it's merits.
Dated this 10th day of December, 1990.

James R. Black

rhuus^i^ W4&*^/?
Susan Black
F:\USER\SB\Bricf
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ber of years of the husband's employment
The wife is entitled to one-half of t h ^
portion pursuant to the award of the tri^1
judge in this case, which our modification *s
intended to sustain.
We therefore affirm in part, reverse Jn
part and remand to the trial court so t h ^
the order may be amended to conform wii*1
this opinion. No costs or fees are awarded*
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS atfd
HOWE, JJ., concur.
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1. Appeal and Error <®=»430(1)
Since failure to file timely notice of
appeal is jurisdictional, Supreme Court
lacks jurisdiction to hear appeal if notice
was not timely filed. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules
42(a), 73(a).
2. Appeal and Error <s=>344, 428(2)
Trial court's April 13 order, entered
pursuant to stipulation of counsel in both
consolidated actions, was final judgment in
each case for purpose of calculating timeliness of appeal, and thus plaintiffs, who on
May 12, 1981, filed notice of appeal, timely
filed appeal from trial court's grant of summary judment on January 26 for city.
3. Judgment <s=>181(2, 3)

1

Kristine H. BOWEN and Cynthia Bowe* '
an infant by Nathaniel Bowen, heT
guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs and App^*"
lants,
v.
RIVERTON CITY, a municipal corporation, Sterling R. Draper and Eno^n
Smith Sons Company, Defendants a*1"
Respondents.
No. 17732.
Supreme Court of UtaTi.
Nov. 4, 1982.
In a personal injury action, the
District Court, Salt Lake County, James $'
Sawaya, J., granted summary judgment i°r
&Yy an& s\&sfeq\>en%, pursuant \x> motic^
and stipulations in consolidated actions, dis"
missed all claims, counterclaims and ctoss
claims with prejudice except for c l ^ m
against city, and plaintiffs appealed. Th e
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (D
appeal was timely filed, and (2) wheth er
city fulfilled its duty to maintain c# v
streets in safe condition was question °
fact for jury, precluding summary judg"
ment.
Reversed and remanded for trial.

pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law.
4. Judgment <s=>185(2)
If there is any doubt or uncertainty
concerning questions of fact, doubt should
be resolved in favor of opposing party on
motion for summary judgment and thus
court must evaluate all evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from evidence in light most favorable to party opposing summary judgment.
5. Judgment o=^180
Summary judgment is appropriate * only
in the most clear-cut negligence cases, IO
6. Municipal Corporations <s=> 757(1)
City lias nondelegable duty to exercise
due care in maintaining streets withinVitsf
corporate boundaries in reasonably 'isafe
condition for travel and may be held liable
for injuries proximately resulting from its
failure to do so.
7. Municipal Corporations <s=>798
In fulfilling its nondelegable duty^^tp
maintain streets, it is necessary for cities^to
maintain traffic signals in reasonably safe
visible and working condition.
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8. Judgment <s=> 181(33)
Whether city, which was arguably negligent in not conducting immediate inspections of signs where road maintenance work
was done, and which after receiving notice
that stop sign was down sent individual to
repair sign rather than calling police to
regulate traffic until sign could be raised,
fulfilled its duty to maintain city streets in
safe condition was question of fact to be
determined by jury, precluding summary
judgment in action arising from automobile
collision at intersection.
9. Municipal Corporations <s=>798
Municipality has duty to respond in
reasonable fashion once it is on notice of
defective sign or signal.
John G. Mulliner, Orem, Gary B. Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Raymond Berry, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
STEWART, Justice:
In this personal injury action, plaintiffs
appeal an adverse summary judgment on
the ground that there are issues of material
fact which should be tried by a jury. Riverton City, the defendant, seeks affirmance
of the summary judgment and, in the alternative, argues that plaintiffs failed to file a
timely notice of appeal and that the appeal
should therefore be dismissed. We reverse
the summary judgment and remand for a
trial on the merits.
At approximately 1:08 p.m. on Saturday,
April 9,1978, two cars collided at the intersection of 12600 South and 2700 West in
Riverton, Utah. The vehicle driven by
plaintiff Kristine Bowen was westbound on
12600 South. The other vehicle, driven by
Sterling Draper, was travelling north on
2700 West. Traffic on 2700 West is required to stop and yield the right of way to
traffic on 12600 South. However, on the
day of the accident, the stop sign regulating
northbound traffic on 2700 West was lying
on the ground and the Draper and Bowen
automobiles collided in the intersection.

Prior to the accident, a passing motorist
noticed the sign was down and notified
Riverton City at 12:50 p.m., approximately
eighteen minutes before the accident A
Riverton City employee responded to the
notice of the fallen sign, but arrived after
the accident.
On November 29, 1978, the Bowens filed
suit (Bowen suit) against Sterling Draper,
Riverton City, and Enoch Smith Sons Company, a construction company that had
worked on the intersection the day prior to
the accident. On January 25, 1979, Draper
filed suit (Draper suit) against Kristine
Bowen, Riverton City, and Enoch Smith
Sons Company. The Bowen suit alleged
that Riverton City was negligent in maintaining the stop sign and in responding
negligently when it received notice of the
downed stop sign. Crossclaims and counterclaims were subsequently filed by the
defendants. On motion of Riverton City,
the trial court ordered the Bowen and
Draper cases consolidated pursuant to Utah
R.Civ.P. 42(a).
On January 26, 1981, the trial court
granted summary judgments for Riverton
City in both the Draper and the Bowen
actions. On January 27, 1981, summary
judgment was granted in favor of Enoch
Smith Sons Company, a defendant in the
-Draper action, and against all other parties.
On February 2, 1981, the Bowens, as plaintiffs in the Bowen action and as crossdefendants in the Draper action, filed a "notice
of intent to appeal" the summary judgment
entered in favor of Riverton City. On
March 25, 1981, pursuant to stipulation, the
trial court awarded Bowens a money judgment against Sterling Draper in the Bowen
action. On April 13, 1981, counsel for Sterling Draper, Florence Draper, Kristine
Bowen, and Cynthia Bowen stipulated and
agreed that all claims, counterclaims and
crossclaims set forth in the Bowen and
Draper actions could be dismissed with prejudice, except for claims against Riverton
City, since such claims, counterclaims and
crossclaims had been fully compromised and
settled. On the same day the parties remaining in the Bowen and Draper actions
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moved for an order dismissing the actions
since all matters but for the claims against
Riverton City had been compromised and
settled. On April 13, 1981, pursuant to the
motions and stipulations filed by the parties
in both actions for dismissal with prejudice
and in an order bearing the heading and
numbers of both the Bowen and Draper
actions, the court ordered that all claims,
counterclaims and crossclaims, except for
the claim of Kristine Bowen against Riverton City, be dismissed with prejudice. On
May 12, 1981, Bowens filed a notice of
appeal in the Bowen suit.
Riverton City claims that the final judgment in the Bowen suit was rendered
March 25, 1981, and since the notice of
appeal was not filed within the jurisdictional one-month period from that time, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this
appeal.1 The Bowens, on the other hand,
argue that the final judgment in these
cases was not entered until the order dated
April 13,1981. Since the Bowens filed their
notice of appeal within one month from
that date, they contend the appeal is properly before this Court.
[1] Since failure to file a timely notice
of appeal is jurisdictional, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear an appeal if notice was
not timely filed. In re Ratliff, 19 Utah 2d
346, 431 P.2d 571 (1967); Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utahr2d 277, 282 P.2d 845,(1955).
[2] Without deciding-whether 'consolidated actions should be^ treated as a single
action for purposes of appeal,2 we shall deal
with the actions in this case^as separate and
distinct for determining J3ie timeliness of
appeal. Nevertheless, we .hold the April 13
order, entered pursuant to the stipulation of
counsel in both actions, is the final judgment in each case for the purpose of calculating the timeliness of the appeal. Calculating the timeliness of the appeal as of the
entry of that order dismissing all claims,
1. Utah R Civ.P. 73(a) provides in part "[T]he
time within which an appeal may be taken
shall be one month from the entry of the judgment or order appealed from
A party
may appeal from a judgment by filing with the
distnct court a notice of appeal

counterclaims, and crossclaims in both actions, we hold the Bowens timely filed this
appeal.
The next issue is whether summary judgment was appropriately awarded to Riverton City in this action. The Bowens assert
that Riverton City was not only negligent
in maintaining the stop sign but also responded negligently upon receiving notice
that the sign was down.
[3-5] Summary judgment is proper only
if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and
admissions show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. In re Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d
83, 348 P.2d 683 (1960). If there is any
doubt or uncertainty concerning questions
of fact, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the opposing party. Thus, the
court must evaluate all the evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the
evidence in a light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment Durham v. Margetts, Utah, 571 P.2d 1332
(1977); Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16
Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964). Although
summary judgment may on occasion be appropriate m negligence cases, it is appropriate only in the most clear-cut case FMA
Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance Co.,
Utah, 594 P.2d 1332 (1979). See Preston w
Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021 (1968):
In Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292,
294, 431 P.2d 126, 128 (1967), this Court
stated:
Summary judgments are more frequently given in contract cases
However, when it comes to determining
negligence, contributory negligence, and
causation, courts are not in such a good
position to make a total determination for,
here enters a prerogative of the jury to
make a determination of its own, and
that is: Did the conduct of a party meas-2. See generally State ex rel Pacific Intermountam Express Inc v Dist Court of Second Judi;
ciai'Dist, Wyo, 387 P2d 550 (1963), 9 C<
Wright & A Miller, Federal Practice and Proce-,
dure § 2386 (1971)
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ure up to that of the reasonably prudent
man, and, if not, was it a proximate cause
of the harm done?
[6-8] In evaluating the facts of this case
in a light most favorable to the Bowens, we
hold that summary judgment in favor of
Riverton City was improperly awarded.
The city has a nondelegable duty to exercise
due care in maintaining streets within its
corporate boundaries in a reasonably safe
condition for travel, Murray v. Ogden City,
Utah, 548 P.2d 896 (1976); Sweet v. Salt
Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 (1913);
Bills v. Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 507, 109 P.
745 (1910), and the city may be held liable
for injuries proximately resulting from its
failure to do so. Nyman v. Cedar City, 12
Utah 2d 45, 361 P.2d 1114 (1961). See also
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 41-6-22 and 63-30-8. In
fulfilling this duty, it is necessary for cities
to maintain traffic signals in a reasonably
safe, visible, and working condition. Smith
v. City of Preston, 97 Idaho 295, 543 P.2d
848 (1975). Whether the city fulfilled its
duty to maintain the city streets in a safe
condition in the instant case is a question of
fact to be determined by the jury. See
Shugren v. Salt Lake City, 48 Utah 320,159
P. 530 (1916).
In Riverton City's answers to the Bowens' interrogatories, it stated that visual
inspections were made by city personnel of
all traffic signs within Riverton City on an
annual basis to msure that the jsigriswere in
place. It is arguable that Riverton City
was negligent in not conducting immediate
inspections of signs where road maintenance work was done. Reasonable persons
might differ as to whether the annual inspections conducted by Riverton City were
sufficient under the circumstances. Enoch
Smith workers present at the intersection
the day before the accident stated that the
sign was loose and blowing in the wind.
[9] Riverton City argues that the eighteen minutes between its receipt of notice
and the accident was insufficient time to
take corrective action. Of course, a jury
might so find. But clearly, a municipality
has a duty to respond in a reasonable fashion once it is on notice of a defective sign or

signal. Gaspard v. Stutes, La.App., 380
So.2d 201 (1980); Bergen v. Koppenal, 97
N.J.Super. 265, 235 A.2d 30 (1967), app'd 52
N.J. 478, 246 A.2d 442 (1968). In Lochbaum
v. Bowman, La.App., 353 So.2d 379, 381
(1978), the court stated:
[T]here was no attempt [by the highway
department] to notify law enforcement
personnel to direct traffic until repairs
could be accomplished. The Department's radio operator simply notified the
service man on call, who got dressed,
went to the office to pick up tools, and
finally arrived on the scene after the
accident had occurred.
We conclude that the Department was
negligent both in failing to properly
maintain the traffic signal at the intersection and in failing to take steps when
notified of the malfunction to alert the
proper authorities so that traffic at the
intersection could be directed manually
until repairs could be accomplished.
After notice was received in the instant
case, Riverton City responded by sending an
individual to repair the sign rather than
calling the police to regulate traffic until
the sign could be raised. Whether it
should, and if so could, have responded
more effectively and quickly is a matter for
trial.
Reversed and remanded for trial.
costs.

No

HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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HORSLEY v. ROBINSON et aU

No. 6940.

which bus could be stopped at various
SQegd& a.nd under vaxious, cit^um&tmo.^
P R A T T , J., dissenting.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 6, 1947.

Appeal from District Court, Third Judicial District: Salt Lake County; C. E.
The reviewing court is not concerned Henderson, Judge.
Action by Erma D. Horsley against B.
with preponderance of evidence, but only
with question of whether there is substan- H. Robinson and others, doing business as
tial evidence to support verdict. Const, the ' Utah Transportation Company, and
another to recover for injuries sustained in
art. 8, § 9.
a collision between the company's bus and
2. Carriers <§=s297
an automobile. Judgment for the plaintiff
The driver of passenger vehicle owes against the company and the company appassengers duty to operate vehicle within peals.
such rate of speed as a reasonable prudent
Judgment affirmed.
person would operate under the existing
Moyle, McKay, Burton & White and R.
circumstances. 1
A. Burns, all of Salt Lake City, for appellants.
3. Carriers <§=295(l)
Hanson & Hanson, for defendant.
The operator of bus must exercise a
Judd, Ray, Quinney, & Nebeker, all of
proportionate increase in care to avoid injury to his passengers where road and Salt Lake City, for respondent
weather conditions make driving hazardW A D E , Justice.
ous.
The defendant, Utah Transportation
4. Carriers <£=>32Q(I7, 21)
Company, appeals from a $5,175 verdict'in
In action for injuries received by bus favor of plaintiff Erma Horsley for dampassenger when bus collided with oncoming ages suffered in an accident while riding as.
automobile which skidded into path of bus a passenger for hire in a bus operated by
on icy highway, evidence relating to speed the transportation company between Hill
of bus and distance between bus and auto- Field and Salt Lake City. The same jury
mobile when automobile went out of con- -returned a .verdict of no cause for action
trol was sufficient for j u r y on question of in favor of-the defendant Reinhardt.
negligence in operation of bus. Utah Code
There was an aisle down the center of
1943, 57—7—113(a).*
the r bus -with seven double seats on each
side and one long seat1 for five persons*
5. Carriers <§=>3I6(4)
In action for injuries sustained by bus across the~rear end, thus seating 33 persons'
passenger when bus collided with oncoming besides the driver. In the accident plainautomobile which skidded into path of bus tiff was thrown forward causing her throat
on icy highway, where there was evidence to strike against the back of the seat in
frota which, iury could infer that bus was front of her and thereby causing injuries
traveling at excessive speed under the cir- which affected her voice.
The accident occurred about 5:25 p. m.
cumstances/ it _was unnecessary that plaintiff introduce Evidence of distances in on January 23, 1944, in Davis County i
1. Appeal and error <§=>989

-

iPaul v. Salt Lake City By. Co.', 30
Utah 41, 83 P. 563.
2Cederloff v. Whited, Utah, 169 P.2d
777; Hart v. Kerr, Utah, 175 P.2d 475;
Nikeropoulos \ . Ramsey, ^61 Utah 465,
214 P. 304; Dalley v. Mid-Western
Dairy Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P.*

[

•

-_

2d 309; <Haarstrich v. Oregon Short
Line R. Co., 70 Utah 552, 262 P. 100;
O'Brien v.. Alston, 61 Utah 368, 213 P.
791; Green v. Higbee, 66 Utah 539,
244 P. 906; Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah/
151,'l40P.2d 772.
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short distance north of the Salt LakeDavis County "Line on highway 91, the
main highway between Ogden and Salt
Lake City. T h e ! paved portion thereof
consists of four 10 foot traffic lanes with a
13 foot shoulder on each side. At the time
of the accident the shoulders were lined
with snow banks which substantially reduced their' width; the highway was covered with ice, and slush and a sleet of snow
and rain was falling, thus rendering driving conditions very hazardous. While the
bus was proceeding southward at a i speed
between 20' and 50 miles per hour in the
outside west traffic lane on the driver's extreme right-hand side of the highway in
the proximity of a long and very gradual
curve and on a slightly down hill slope, the
defendant Reinhardt was approaching driving his car from the opposite direction at
from 20 to 30 miles per hour in the east
traffic lane next to the center of the highway, when suddenly Reinhardt's car went
out of control and swung around so that it
was facing to the south in the outside west
traffic lane and directly in the course of
the oncoming bus. While the car was moving slowly toward the south the left front
side of the bus ran into the rear right side
of the car thereby shoving it down the
highway a distance of from 30 to 50 feet
where it was ^stopped by colliding with another car on the highway. By the impact
with the Reinhardt car the bus was turned
slightly to the west where (it ran into ano t h e r automobile which was parked on the
west shoulder .which deflected its_course toward the east and it finally came to a stop
in the snow bank on the east side of the
highway about 75 feet from the parked car.
The terms "between'distance" and "distance between" used throughout this -opinion to indicate* the distance between the bus
and the Reinhardt car when it first became
discernible 'that the latter was out of control, and the/term "due care speed" used to
indicate a reasonable speed in view of the
surrounding-circumstances, were suggested
by Mr. Justice Wolfe. ^The word '-"control" is used herein in its'ordinary sense to
mean the ability of the driver to stop or
reduce the speed of his vehicle within a
reasonable distance and to guide the same
in the desired course.
18(5 P 2 J - .°8
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From the .evidence it is clear that when
the Reinhardt car commenced to turn it
was within full yiew of the driver of the
bus but that he did not slacken his speed
prior to the collision nor apply his brakes
until within 5 or 10 feet of the Reinhardt
car.' From these facts one of three things
or a combination thereof must have caused
the accident: (1) the Reinhardt car went
out of control and into the course of the
bus when it was so near thereto that there
was no time for the bus driver to do anything to avoid the accident; (2) the driver of the bus, although he had sufficient
time and had the bus under sufficient control to avoid the accident failed to see that
the Reinhardt car was turning into his
course in time to avoid the accident, or
seeing it in time failed to exercise the necessary control to avoid the accident; or
(3) the bus driver, although he had sufficient time after the Reinhardt car commenced to turn into his course to avoid the
accident had he had the bus under control,
did not have the bus under sufficient control to avoid the accident.
I f the Reinhardt car went out of control
and into the course of the bus when it was
so near thereto that the driver did not have
time to avoid the accident then defendants
were not negligent and plaintiff cannot recover. Cederloff v. Whited, Utah, 169 P.2d
777; H a r t v. Kerr, Utah, 175 P.2d 475.
If the second proposition above stated v/as
the* cause of the accident then clearly the
defendants were .'negligent and,such negligence ^proximately caused the accident because-clearly the* driver owes a ^ duty to
keep-a proper lookout and see ^substantial
objects on the road in front of him and to
take" the necessary steps to avoid colliding
therewith and if he failed to do.so he is
liable for the dam *g"es resulting therefrom.
However, I am not sure that the evidence
would justify the. jury in finding that such
was the cause of the accident: If the accident -was caused -by the third set of facts
above 'set out then the jury could from the
evidence find facts sufficient to sustain' a
finding that the driver negligently operated
the bus at such a speed that he was unable
to maintain sufficient control thereof to
••avoid the accident. So it is necessary to
analyze ~ the evidence and determine what
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facts the jury could reasonably find therefrom.
The controlling facts for the jury to determine a r e : -(1) At what rate of speed
was the bus travelling at the time of the
accident? (2) How far was the between
distance ? (3) Did -the driver have sufficient control over the bus to stop it within
the between distance? And from - those
facts the jury would have to determine
whether the defendants were guilty of negligence which proximately caused the accident and-injuries. The jury had before
it evidence that the bus was traveling as
slow as 20 and as fast as 5(hmiles per hour.
From all the evidence how fast could the
jury reasonably find the bus was traveling?
The testimony adduced by the defendants
fixed its speed at from as slow as 20 to
slightly faster than 25 miles per hour, and
plaintiff fixed it at 50 miles per hour. The
fact that the bus struck the Reinhardt car
and shoved it from 30 to 50 feet where it
was stopped when it hit a parked car, and
the fact that after striking the Reinhardt
car the bus swerved to the right into another parked car and was deflected to the
left across the highway where it was stopped by a snow bank about 75 feet from the
parked car indicates that it was traveling
with considerable speed. The evidence
would sustain a finding by the jury that
the bus was traveling as fast as 40 miles
per hour.
What is i the maximum which the jury,
from the evidence, could find the -between
-distance was? Plaintiff testified that^that
distance r-was a Salt Lake~*City block (660
feet), Reinhardt'estimated it at-less-than
300 feet and the bus driver estimated it at
75 to 100 feet. These were all interested
< witnesses but six passengers on the bus at
the time of the accident were called by the
defendants who testified at various distances ranging from 30 feet to 330 feet. All
of them except one fixed it at 150 feet or
less. I The sixth witness was a Mrs. Sessions who when on direct examination fby
defendants' counsel without leading was
asked what that distance was answered
twice that it was about a half a Salt Lake
City block (330 feet). Later defendants'
counsel led her into estimating, that distance at about the width of a Salt Lake

City street (100 feet). Apparently she-di8l
not recognize that this testimony was^uP
conflict with her previous statement. From!
the position the Reinhardt car was struck
and the testimony -of all the witnesses if
had turned completely in the opposite' di%
rection and was traveling slowly toward
the south, the same direction that the r -but
was going. This would require some timel
From all of the evidence we concludettHat:
the jury could have reasonably found thatthe between distance was as far as 330 feetl
It is argued that since there is no evir]
dence of the distance required to stop tne
bus under the then existing conditions.^
any given rate of speed the evidence^Jlj
not sufficient from which the jury could;
find the defendants guilty of negligenqe
which proximately caused the accident. •; Ifi
plaintiff must, in order to make a case/
show that the driver could have stopped^
the bus within the between distance then;
her evidence is clearly insufficient to justify a finding in her favor, because the evidence does not justify such a finding.
On the contrary the evidence points defi^;
nitely to the fact that the driver did £igt
have the bus under sufficient control so thaihe could either bring it to a stop, reduce^
its speed, or steer it to one side sufficiently;
to avoid the accident within the in betweetr
distance. And this is true even though!
that distance was as far a s 330 feet.
The following facts" quite definitely point
to that conclusion: 'The icy highway*c#v-]
ered with show 'and 1 slush'-with a sleet*«fllj
snow -and rain J falling; * the * fact that^tH|
Reinhardt car went completely out of "con^
trol while traveling'from 20-to 30 r miles!
per hour; one witness testified that'as^he
approached the scene of the accident ifrom
the north he slowed his car down and : j)ut
it in intermediate gear in order to insure
that he could sufficiently control it*so{thjat
he could safely-stop and pick up passejj^
gers; the rate,of speed at which thqjjus
was traveling which the jury could^reason;;
ably, find to be as _fast as 40 miles per hour;
the slightly down hill slope of the highway;
the if act x that the* driver, ^according toxins
own testimony saw the Reinhardt car when
it commenced to turn and that thereafter,
as the jury could reasonably find, he traveled as far as 330 feet without applying
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his brakes until within 5 or 10 feet of that
car and without appreciably decreasing
his speed prior to the impact therewith,
point almost conclusively to-the fact that
the driver did not have the bus under sufficient control to bring it to a stop or to
turn it to one side sufficiently to avoid the
collision. The jury would be amply justified in so finding.
Here the jury was only required to return a general verdict and we do not know
how the jury determined the controlling
questions of fact. Had the jury been required to answer special interrogatories
covering these questions, and had they answered them in the manner we have above
indicated they reasonably could find from
the evidence no one would contend that the
evidence was not sufficient to sustain such
a finding. Since the trial court is not required to submit special interrogatories and
therefore we do not know how the jury in
fact did determine the controlling issues we
must presume that they found the facts
necessary to support their verdict if the
evidence was sufficient to sustain such a
finding. Thus we must view the evidence
in its most favorable aspect to support the
verdict which the jury has rendered and if
from the evidence the jury could reasonably find facts necessary to sustain their
verdict it must be sustained. This is true,
even though had we been the triers of the
facts we would have found them differently, or even though we may not believe
-that the jury did in fact so find or, even
though we believe that such a finding /would
be against the great preponderance-of the
evidence.
[1] Under a general verdict we cannot
be assured what facts the jury found or
that they found the facts necessary to sustain their verdict. So it is universally held
under the common law system, as it must be
in order to give stability to jury verdicts,
that the appellate court must sustain the
verdict where the evidence is sufficient to
support a finding of the necessary facts
to do so. Otherwise, the appellate. court
would be required to reverse every verdict
where in its>ropinion the-great preponderance of the evidence is against a finding of
the necessary facts to v support it, - even
though the evidence is such that reasonable
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minds might conclude from the evidence
that such necessary facts happened. To
do so would be to review the evidence no
matter what we call it.- The question of
what were the facts and where is the preponderance of the evidence is for the jury
and not for the court to determine. Our
problem is only to determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.
In doing so our standard i s : Could a reasonable mind be convinced by the evidence
of the necessary facts to support the verdict? If so, it must be sustained.
That this court is not authorized to review the facts found by the jury is expressly provided by our Constitution, Article 8,
Section 9, where it is provided "In cases at
law the appeal shall be on questions of law
alone." Since we cannot review the facts,
whatever we think of where the preponderance of the evidence is, is immaterial. If
we were to review the evidence and reverse
this case because we think the preponderance of the evidence on a material issue is
against the plaintiff, we do so in violation
of that constitutional provision. We cannot avoid violation of this constitutional
provision by holding that since we have no
assurance that the jury did find that the
between distance was 330 feet, we may assume that they found it to be much less
and reverse the judgment on that ground;
because this' requires us first to find that
the preponderance of the evidence is
against the plaintiff on this question, and
thus requires us to review the evidence
for that purpose, which the Constitution
forbids us to c do.
If the jury found the between distance
was as far as 330 feet, that the bus was
traveling as fast as 40 miles per hour and
that the driver did not have sufficient control thereof so that he could stop or turn
sufficiently to one side* so that he could
avoid the accident within that distance,
then under the existing circumstances the
jury could reasonably find that he was guilty of negligence which proximately caused
the accident.
The contention that the defendants were
not negligent if the bus could not be stopped within the between distance is based on
,the assumption that the rate of speed at
which the bus was traveling was reasonable
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regardless of whether the-driver was able
to control it under; the. existing condition's
when traveling at such rate, and that. the
question of how much control the driver
could maintain over r.the bus at such; rate
of i [speed • is -immaterial••.." in determining
whether such-rate of speed is reasonable
under t h e existing road conditions, r What
is* a reasonable' rate of speed under existing conditions must always be determined
very'largely oh how much control the driver can maintain while driving at such rate.

ditions. Where, the road and weather^
ditions are bad he must, in order-to^ay^
being negligent, reduce his- s p e e d i t o ^ r a ]
at which he" can operate it with reasonaS
safety.

Here we are only concerned with theadP
fendants' duty-to their passengers nbf^yrafjg
their duty : to -th^ public generally nor^witi?
their last clear chance duty-to ReiiiKa'fdl
The. rules:above stated apply)to theypublS
generally '•; and ••• especially - to;, .a passengif
for hire, since^a carrier owes to itspassjet
[2] The driver of a vehicle carrying gers for hire -a" duty; to. exerciseifgrep
:
passengers for hire, r owes : them a duty to care for .their safety than it.jOwes" to.'^ilB
operate his vehicle within such -rate of public generally.: . Paul : -v. ; . Salt L a k e y 3 t f l
'"
speed as a reasonably prudent person would Ry.iGo., 30 Utah 41, 83 P . 563.
operate under the existing'conditions. ^UnThe mere : 'happening of ithe'accidenfiffJH
der those conditions an increase in speed course does not prove that t h e . d e f e n d a n t
would proportionately decrease the control were negligent. • Nor does the fact that>tnej
of the operator over [ his vehicle, and in- rate of speed at which they A- travelers
crease the danger to his passengers. Rea- brought them at the scene of the a c d d a f |
sonable prudence : requires that the~ driver at the time that the Reinhardt car'-WenS
shall not foreseeably expose his passen- out of control and into the course of travelj
gers to danger of serious bodily harm. If of the bus, because that is something;dial!
the operator drove the bus-at such a fast they could not anticipate and guard against!
rate of speed that he should realize that That seems to be the point which is cleared^
he could not have sufficient control •* there- up. by the cases of Whalen v. D u n b a r ^ ^
of to avoid serious danger to his passen- R.I. 136, 415 "A.; 718; and : 0 % l a l l e y i ^ |
gers under the ; existing road and weather Eagan, 43 Wyo. 233, 2 P.2d 1063, 77 ^ f l ^
conditions then he was negligent regardless 582. - But • negligence may be inferred
of : hbw slowly' he must operate his Vehicle from facts and circumstances > w h i c h v ^ ^
in order to assure 1 reasonable" safety to' his cording to human experience tend to":shbta
passengers.and from which reasonable minds m i g h t s
convinced that in operating the bus as'dtf?
[3] Where the road, and weather condidid under : the •surrounding facts "'andi^ci;
tions ; make^driving hazardous, .reasonable
curiistances
t h e defendants should have'f
prucience requires .a. proportionate' increase
:
:
ticipated
thatthey were vendahgeringittfi
r
in the care of the driver to avoid injury to
:
-safety
of
their'
passengers.
his passengers; . Np"rate.'of speed can be
r

fixed"'which7'will vb'e Reasonable1- under all
It is argued that on an icy highway^., 7 | a
"Conditions' 'and . circumstance's. On a; clear impossible to' 'drive: so as to; avoid 'the pipssi^
dry road burdened with little traffic;;a per- bility; of all 'collisions,•";that t h e roadfanl
"soh could with;reas6na r ble prudence operate -weather conditions might be such that '"ey£m
;al vehicle much faster ihah he • could when at: 5 ,miles. per ; hour.a bus of t h e . sizer£h,<|
travelirig 'over l a ;high\vay covered 1 - with •weight of-this one might, slide 400
'slick ice on ; top of which ; was slush 'while .more: regardless -/of anything o t h e y t d d ^ S
av:'sleet: of snow and 'rairi' was "falling, and :could ido; about :it; r; Of coufse,;;if thisjj$§
where" the 1 .'highway"vwas"'burdened with • had;been: traveling,' at-the rate ;of 5j|mil&
h'eivy traffic.' ':Th'e 'duty ; o i : the operator is rper; hour the .collision with/the :Rein^ai3#
to drive his vehicle at such a rate of speeci Icar rwpuld not. have inj tired the plaintiffrbg3
that he cari'-sufficiehtly( control the-same so .'causer a t :that-.rate; the Lbu'sjpbeing $riy£!|
that he does hot-fofeseekbly jeopardize-the -against a;smalhcar moving jnithe:same#ffi
safety^of-his passengers.. = Heiismhder-this irectioh; would-:nqt create .;sufficient o j a r ' l ^
duty -regardless" of '(the';, size i and weight f of iinjure the -passengers.- - On the other{ha#3|
his • vehicle 'arid. the -road and ^'weather con- cif the. conditions w e r e such that,the; dri.^eg
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could anticipate that if he drove at the
rate of 5 miles per hour he would not be
able to stop his bus within 100 feet and
that he would thereby seriously jeopardize
the safety of his passengers then it would
be negligence for him to proceed at such
rate of speed
Suppose conditions were
such that the driver could anticipate that if
he moved at the rate of 5 miles per hour he
would slide 100 feet before he could stop
and that in so doing he would be apt to
slide over the side of the highway and his
bus would overturn or slide onto a railroad
track where he would be struck by an approaching tram, would anyone contend that
he could proceed even at that rate of speed
without being guilty of negligence ?
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Remhardt car if it came into his course
of travel 330 feet away. The evidence was
sufficient from which the jury could find
the defendants were negligent
To this effect, the law is well established
in this state: Section 57—7—113, U.C.A.
1943, provides:

"(a) No person shall drive a vehicle on
a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions
and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing In every event
speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person,
vehicle, or other conveyance on or enteimg the highway in compliance with legal
requirements and the duty of all persons to
[4] If the bus undei normal road and use due care
*
*
*
*
*
weather conditions wei e operated on a
highway burdened with heavy traffic, at
"(c) The driver of every vehicle shall,
such an excessive rate of speed that it
* * * drive at an appropriate reduced
could not be stopped or turned to one side
speed * * * when special hazard exsufficiently to avoid crashing into another
ists with respect to pedestrians or other
car which came into its course of travel
traffic or by reason of weather or highway
when the bus was 330 feet away and conconditions "
tinued slowly in the same direction the bus
This statute requires that a driver shall
was traveling, the driver of the bus would
not
drive at a speed greater than is reasonclearly be guilty of negligence in driving
able
and prudent in view of the existing
too fast
The defendants would also be
negligent if they operated the bus under conditions and hazards on the highway,
normal conditions with such defective that his speed shall be controlled so as to
steering and braking equipment, on a high- avoid colliding with other vehicles enterway burdened with heavy traffic, so that it ing or upon the highway in a lawful mancould not be stopped or steered to one side ner, and that the speed shall be approprisufficiently to avoid a collision with a ve- ately reduced when special hazards exist
hicle which came into its course 330 ieet with respect to other traffic or by reason of
away in the manner that the Remhardt car weather conditions In other woids, since
did in this case Here the driver had driv- the greater the speed the less control the
en more than 20 miles under similar road driver has over his vehicle and a longer
and weather conditions which he encoun- distance is required within which to stop,
tered at the time of the accident He had and his ability to guide his vehicle is deample time to fully realize the amount of creased, and since his control will also be
control or lack thereof which he could decreased when traveling on icy roads covexert over the bus in case of an emergency ered with slush when a sleet of snow and
The driver must know that this highway ram is falling, he must under such condiWould be burdened with much traffic, he as tions according to this statute decrease his
a j reasonable prudent man must anticipate speed so that he can drive- with reasonable
that vehicles would be constantly crossing safety to others using trie highway and, acand coming into his course of travel - Un- cording to our cases, he even owes greater
der such conditions he must anticipate that care to his passengers'
*t would be highly dangerous for him to
In Nikoleropoulos^v. Ramsey, 61 Utah
operate the bus at such a rate of } speed 465, 214 P. 304, the defendant was driving
that he could not stop or turn to one side his car at night dunng J a heavy ram storm
sufficiently to avoid a collision with the at about 12 miles per hour, in the distance
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the lights'of oncoming cars reflected on the
wet pavement into his eyes so that at the
time of the accident he was unable to see
the plaintiff walking on the^ pavement in
front of him until he was within 6 feet and
then it was too late to avoid running him
down. We held that defendant was negligent as a matter of law, no matter how
dark 1 and stormy the night or how bad the
visibility, if he drove at such a rate of
speed that he was unable to avoid running
plaintiff down within the distance plaintiff
could be seen walking ahead of defendant's
car on the highway. To the same effect
see: Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P.2d 309; Haarstrich v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 70
Utah 552, 262 P. 100; O'Brien v. Alston,
61 Utah 368, 213 P. 791.
The Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey case is in
substance a holding that it is negligence to
operate a vehicle on the highway at any
time without having it under sufficient control so that others using the highway will
not be unreasonably endangered thereby,
regardless of how slow it is required to
travel to accomplish that end. If that is
the rule where visability is involved, it
follows that the same rule applies where
the ladk of control which endangers others
is the result of slippery roads and stormy
conditions. This would be especially true
where a passenger for hire is involved.
As above pointed out, if the lack of control
which caused the danger 'to the passengers
was the result of excessije speed; or defective steering~apparatus and faulty brakes,
then he would clearly be negligent. Under
the above case the fact that the lack of control was the result of bad weather and
road conditions, would not exonerate him
from negligence.
Here the situation is slightly different
than it was in the cases cited in that the
Reinhardt car was out of control and moving from one side to the other in an uncertain manner. Under such circumstances a
driver might try to pass to one side only to
have the skiding'car swerve into his path
which he expected to be free. However,
here as in the cases'cited, the driver could
be certain to avoid the collision by stopping
the bus before it reached the skidding car.

Since the car was traveling away frornltliS
bus had the bus been stopped, no-collisr
could "have > occurred. There is also ajfc]
difference that in the cases cited, the^dri^
was traveling at nighttime, when the:drr
er's ability to see objects on the highw^B
was limited by darkness, and here there wa|»
no such limitation on the driver's f abili|ja
to see. Since his ability to see was not?
limited, his duty to keep his car under corg|
trol on that account was not so grea't.Kfclql
view of these circumstances the driver £wi
not, as a matter of law, guilty ofonegl.
gence, which proximately caused the "a&|J
dent. But in view of the fact that the^j Jsm
might have concluded that the car^con
menced to turn into the path of theribSS
when it was 330 feet away, and thatrtnl
weather conditions were such that, at^thil
rate of speed the bus was traveling it cc^lol
not be stopped, slowed down, or broughp
under control in time to avoid the accidentia
the jury could reasonably conclude frorf8
their own experience and practical judg
ment, of what an ordinary prudent persoSI
would do, that the driver was negligent*--^
driving at such a rate of speed, and thai
such negligence was the proximate ,causfe
of the accident.
> *5
> •
If the jury found that when the Rein
hardt car commenced to turn into the pat1
of the bus, it was as much as 330 feet awa:
it being clear from the evidence that (tig
visibility • was such and the highwayViw
free from obstructions so that the 'drivS
could clearly see the car when it coma
menced to turn; that the slippery condition
of the highway had been the same' all tU9
way from Hill Field to the place of the #
cident a distance of more than 20 mile
thus giving the driver ample opportunity*t(9
know how fast he could safely drive*and]
still keep it under proper control; thatitfijg
accident occurred on a main highway
where the driver must anticipate iheayjg
traffic conditions; and in view of; t h e c a l
that the transportation company bwedtcf i'
passengers a special degree of careitfqj
their safety, the jury might reasonably cotfj
elude that the driver was operating the buj
at such a fast rate of speed that he coulS
not control it sufficiently to avoid the &cci|
dent. If the jury so found they could relfe
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Sbhably conclude therefrom that he was establish one of the necessary elements of
guilty of negligence which proximately this type of negligence, .but, as previously
caused the^accident and plaintiff's injury. pointed out,'that element was amply shown
This is a finding of negligence' from the by the evidence which was introduced. No
surrounding * facts and circumstances and complaint is made that such fact was not
The complaint
not merely from the happening of the acci- sufficiently; established.
seems
to
be
that
such
fact
was established
dent alone. It is universally recognized
and
that
the
defendants
were
thereby exthat negligence may be inferred from' the
onerated
from
neglignce.
happening of the accident and the surA comparison with other distances will
help us to visualize how far 330 feet is. It
is 110 yards, one-half of a Salt Lake City
block, one-sixteenth of a mile, nearly four
times the;distance between the poles of an
ordinary utility pole line. These distances
are familiar to every one who has lived a
long time in this state. It is <a long and
dangerous distance for a bus to travel on
a highway burdened with traffic wilhout the
ability to stop or reduce its speed sufficient[5] The defendants' negligence is based,
ly to avoid a collision such as this..
not on the premise that the driver could
The distance within which the bus could
nave stopped within the between distance,
jbut on the opposite premise that by reason be stopped at a given rate of speed is an
of excessive speed under the existing con- evidentiary fact and not an ultimate one.
ditions he could not stop within that dis- The value of evidence thereon would be
tance, and has thereby foreseeably endan- that the ultimate facts which are controlgered his passengers. r Evidence of the dis- ling in this case might be inferred theretance required to stop the bus at various from. That fact would have some bearing
rates of speed would be necessary only on the^ question of what was a due care
where it supplies proof of some essential rate of speed but it certainly is not control^ , t
element of negligence which would other- ling on that question.
rounding facts and circumstances where
the facts are such as to reasonably justify
such inference even though there is no direct testimony to establish the exact
grounds of negligence which caused ^the
accident* Green v. Higbee, '66 "Utah' 539,
244 P. 906; Morrison v. PefryJ 104'Utah
*151, 140 P.2d 772; which is the last opinion
in t h a t case which supercedes the one cited
In appellant's brief.

wise be lacking. Here the essential elements necessary to establish negligence on
.account of lack of a due care rate of speed
requires a, showing that the buY was being
'6perate"d a t S u c l r a ^ a s t rate of speed that
the driver should have realized that^it was
fcut of control to such an extent as to endanger the sa-fety of his passengers/' ; Evidence of the distance required to stop the
"bus at various rates of speed would tend
to show either that the driver did or that
'he did not have the ability to stop the bus
within t h e ' in between distance. If it
showed that "'the r driver could stop the 'bus
"within the between distance then it would
'defeat-a .claim of negligence on this theory,
"but would 'conclusively establish negligence
on the" grounds that''had he. used due, care
he would Jiave stopped the bus within that
distance and thereby avoided the ^accident.
^If it showed that the driver could not stop
*the bus within that distance then it would

Here, "as above pointed out, there are
three sets of facts which were very largely
.'determinative of what was not a due care
.speedmnder the existing conditions. They
are:r. (1) How far was .the between dist a n c e ?jil (2) How/fast was the bus traveling: J .(3) .Did .the driver have sufficient
control over the bus so that his speed was
a due care speed? . Both of the first two
questions were answered by direct evidence, and the question of the distance required to stop the ;bus when 'traveling at
various (speeds would have no bearing on
^either-of them. That evidence would only
tend *to^ show whether or-not the bus was
out of control. ;Here~the evidence is ample
to show that the bus was out of control, so
that it, could not be stopped or its speed
reducedesufficiently .to avoid the accident.
Such-, evidence was not necessary in order
>for plaintiff to make a prima facie case,
and this court is not authorized to require
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the qlaiatift to grodace it
Especially is and the driver who was then operatih*g£j$M
this true where as 'here the missing evi- bus at the'time of this accident:washing
dence has no tendency to establish 'the dis- better position to know these facts^fctiH
any r one else.
puted questions of-fact in the case.
We have carefully considered .th&tfljjigg
Although the smoother the road surface
the greater the distance required'to stop tlie assignments of error and find nOjmerijKH|
bus at a given speed it does not follow that them. The judgment of the trial,cWrifjf
a driver can, without being negligent, drive affirmed with costs to the respondent
at such a rate of speed over a smooth road
that the safety of his passengers will t>e ' McDONOUGH, C. J., concurs iff tfiS
thereby jeopardized. What is due care un- opinion of Mr. Justice W A D E as elucidali
der the existing conditions is determined ed by the opinion of Mr. Justice W O I £ K 1 |
by the driver's duty to his passengers, arid
that-duty is that he must not foreseeably
W O L F E , Justice (concurring).
jeopardize their safety; h e f has that duty
I concur.
whether driving over a smooth icy road or
While there is much in the reasoning 1
over a normal dry pavement. To this effect
the statute and cases cited are positive. the main opinion with which I am in^i'
The evidence here was sufficient since tlie cord, there are a number of statements ]vvifi
jury could reasonably find that the bus w#s which I do not agree. Rather than entej
traveling at 40 miles per hour, that tlie into a critical analysis of those stateme*fii
between distance was 330 feet &nd that tpe pointing- out wherein I think they are^r
5
bus was out of control so that it could not correct, I believe a more constructive ^
be stopped or its speed reduced sufficiently tribution can be made by an elucidation^
to avoid this accident within that distance. some of the concepts applicable to 'sp$
cases and in pointing out the peculiar *nL|
It must be kept in mind that here our
ture of the bus driver's responsibilities^!!
problem is whether the evidence is sufficient
his passengers in view of the sitii
to sustain the verdict, not whether the eviwhich confronted him—that is, the su^ej
dence in question is admissible. Had deand unexpected sliding of the Reinliarl
fendants offered to prove the distance
car athwart the right of way of the'bui.,
which would be required to stop the bus
as compared to the duty of the driverfge]
under the surrounding circumstances at a
erally to drive at a due care speed when 3
given rate of speed and such offer had b^en
emergency confronted him.
rejected we would have iha d a different
'problem. Since the "evidence was sufficient , LshaH preface the main part of my»gginj
to make'a prima faciei case for plaintiff it ion by a^ brief .consideration of the .pfirr"
is sufficient to sustains verdict in her^fav^r "control of a car", or its e q u i v a l e n t s ^
and that is all we can require 'her to^do. under ^control", and its ^counterpart^'gL
She is not required to "produce evidence ofy control". I am convinced after ^som^
which will tend to defeat <her -claim.. If years in the practice and on the bench \thaj
there are other material facts which de- these phrases are often used without* su:
fendants wanted to prove they were at cient thought as to their conceptionalpCoJ
liberty to introduce 'evidence 'thereof but tent in view of the facts of the particul;
they certainly cannot defeat plaintiffs situations .claimed to involve negligence^
claim merely on the ground that s h e ' h a s - > Ordinarily the word "control" applied
failed to produce all the material evidence. the -operation of a moving m e c h a n i c a l j j ^
This is especially true where i as here the ject such as a car when used in thejptirlj||
defndants are in a better position to supply "under control" as distinguished f r o m ^ ' c | |
t h e - missing evidence than', isJplaintiff. ofo control", means t h a t ' t h e operator W&
They, no doubt, have :as their employees ^the .power t o make the car respond totfiij
many experienced drivers of buses similar "will -which in the case of an automobile
to this one whom they, could Tcall to give •means that it-will respond .to his steering
evidence on the distance ^required to '"stop . and to his action to accelerate or decelej£#J
the bus under the then existing conditions by manipulating the throttle or brakes
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''Out of control" usually means'that the car
can no longer be depended upon to respond
to the driver's efforts to guide or slow it.
I go to some pains to describe these terms
because I think that they are often used in
a different and perhaps inexact sense.
"Out of control" is the opposite of "under
control" butTexcess speed is not the counterpart of "under control". 1 r Cars "going .at
high speed may be under control in the
sense that they are not out of control. We
have an excellent example of a car "out of
control" in the movements of the Reinhardt
car. In many cases a pleader will use the
phrase "failed to have proper control of
the car" as meaning that the driver was going so fast as not to be able r to slow down
for eventualities although there was no inability of the driver to steer the car, apply
brakes or decelerate the car. The only
reason he could not do so in time to avoid
an accident was that he was going too fast.
Such allegation is synonymous with "excess
speed" which in turn may be included in the
still more inclusive phrase "driving without
due care under the circumstances" or
equivalent phrases. The'pleader tends to
multiply stigmata of delict in order to make
defendant's conduct seem *as reprehensible
as possible. For the purpose of framing issues it is well to particularize as to the nature of the failure to exercise due care. In
this case'also we must fasten on what we
mean when we use the phrases "under control" and "out }6i"control".
In his opinion Mr. Justice Wade states
definitely^ that he ruses the-word "control"
to "mean the. r ability of the^ driver to 'Stop
or reduce the speed of his vehicle within a
reasonable distance and to guide the same
in the desired course". I , take this to be
somewhat equivalent to what I shall call
"due care speed", which I define as the
speed which a driver should not exceed, in
view.of the likelihood of, eventualities—not
to avoid all collisions which no driver could
do—but to enhance t h e , possibility and
probability of avoiding collisions. "Due
care speed" is r that- speed at which a prudent and careful driver should drive in
view of the 1 prevailing weather and road
conditions, and in view of the condition and
responsiveness of the braking apparatus
186 P.2d—3Sy2

601"^

on his machine and hh duty to passengers,
and to other traffic on the highway.
It should be said at the outset that I do
not -wish to be 'understood as saying that
the jury-rnust necessarily fix upon a speed
that would be a maximum due'care speed
under a given<set of circumstances. ' T h e
speed at which a person 'was r going might
be considered as "too fast"1—to use the pop-^
ular vernacular—without the jury having
to consult and agree or even have in mind
a process or definite figure as being /the upper limit of due care speed.
Therefore, in order not to'confuse speed
with "control" used in the sense of ability
to manipulate the car, I shall use instead"
of the word "control", the phrase "due care
speed" and shall use the term "excess
speed", to mean speed in excess of due care
speed. Speed seems, even under Mr. Justice Wade's interpretation of the word
"control", to be the essence of "keeping
control" or of "control" although at one
place in his opinion he seems to confuse
the meaning with "out of control".
[5] In this case both sides introduced
testimony as to the rate of speed at which'
the bus was travelling at the time the Reinhardt car went out of control and skidded
into its path. Both' sides also presented
testimony as to the distance between the
bus and the Reinhardt car at the time the
Reinhardt' car went out of control. This
distance is hereinafter "referred v to as the
r

r

"between t distance". 'Tn-addition* } to this,
there was some' evidence of circumstances
surrounding'the collision-from which infer-'
ehces of 'speed might' have been Imade.
Neither side offered evidence of the dis- }
tances which would be required ri t o ' stop'
the bus, travelling at various speeds, under
the road and weather conditions prevailing at the time'of the • collision. * I shall
hereafter refer to such disiances as "stopping distances". ' Appellant contends that
the failure of plaintiff to introduce" such
evidence amounts 1 to a-failure of proof.
Appellant's position is'>that"without"such
evidence the jury could hot determine what
was a reasonable speed, and therefore could
not say whether -or- not the 'bus was travelling at an excessive speed. This question is fraught with considerable difficulty.
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As background, and for better understanding oi the problem involved, I be-,
lieve it would be helpful first to'Consider
the duty of the bus driver to Reinhardt.
His duty in this respect would be, purely
one of last clear chance. Even if,he were
travelling too rapidly in view of -Jthe skidding hazards his speed would not have been
the proximate cause of the accident. H i s ,
duty..would arise only when he perceived
or should have perceived the Reinhardt
car spinning toward his path and then it
would have been his duty to avoid the c o l lision if, and only if, under all the circumstances, taking into account the 4speed s±
which he was going, he had had ample op-*
portunity to stop or slow up sufficiently to
go around the Reinhardt car if there was
room for doing that without endangering
his passengers. A driver is not ordinarily
required to anticipate that another will
have gotten out of his proper path of travel and that he, the driver, must drive so as
to create for some other a last clear chance
opportunity. A driver of a car does not
carry with him an anticipatory last clear
chance obligation. Such obligation arises
only after the operator of the vehicle is
or should be aware of the position of the
other, who, being in a position of danger, is
unaware of his peril, or, if aware, unable
timely to extricate himself from it. Grah a m s . Johnson, Utah, 166 P.2d 230; on rehearing, 172 P.2d 665. Nor would he be
compelled to apply his brakes suddenly on
an^icy pavement if t there were danger of
his skidding off the road by so doing. The,
high care with which ~he was charged as
operator of a^ public transport .vehicle at
the moment of discovery might require
that he xelease the throttle and let the mo-,
mentum of the car in part deplete itself
before he applied the brakes. 4 That might
also have been the best thing to have done
for^the safety of his passengers - even in
this case. Or conditions may have been
such that; a --due *care _speed would^ be one
in which he h a d ' n o t gathered momentum
and therefore .could apply-his brakes, instantaneously. * Due care speed^may revolve
around the time it takes to run out momentum before brakes can be applied with safety. The difference between the case,of the
bus driver's duty toward Reinhardt and the

passengers lies then in this: That as^ta
Reinhardt, whose car suddenly spun in }ps*
path, the bus driver's speed cannot be ithen
proximate cause of the accident (laying]
aside the case where the oncoming driver^
was going in excess of the legal speed, a*
case which I desire to reserve until it comejfi
before us properly for consideration), buS
only failure to take advantage of the oppor-c
tunity to avoid the collision if it reasonably^
presented itself, taking into account thebuV
driver's speed; whilst as to passengers thh
bus driver has the duty to drive with : thej
care that a reasonably prudent person would
have exercised under like circumstances^
and that means a due-care speed in view ofslippery pavements and eventualities whjchj
may arise therefrom. As to passengers, if*
the driver exceeds a due-care speed he carp
ries such negligence with him although Liti
may or may not have proximately caused,
an accident. In many instances, negligence^
does not result in accidents. As to Reinp
hardt, the duty arose only after the bus
driver did or could have seen Reinhardt's
predicament. Reinhardt could not contend"'
that had the bus driver been-going slower:
there would have been more distance with^
in which to stop, for by the same token*
had the driver been going faster he might
have passed the point where Reinhardt,
spun onto his pathway before the spin bej*
gan. t No person who gets himself intq'aj
dangerous position whether by negligences
or without fault can contend that, had .the*
on coming party been going slower, nel
would have *had 'a greater last clear chaifce^
to stop. The1 last clear chance "duty is'one*
which arises out of the scene as the r de1-^
fendant finds it; it does not take into^ac-^
count antecedent conditions. If it did"th'e^
plaintiff might argue that "had the defend^
ant been proceeding at a due-care speed;tfie|
would even have arrived at the scen£*w
danger before he, the plaintiff, extricated^
himself from such danger *and thus argttfj
that in 'such wise the excessive * speed 'wa^
the proximate cause.
[2,3] But, as to, a»passenger in t h e j b u | |
the lastjdear chance doctrine is not appli^
cable as a last-clear chance concept. There|
would be the same obligation as in the. lasg
clear chance doctrine to do everything gto*
avoid the accident consistent with safetyi
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toward his passengers but that would be in
addition to the continuing duty to drive
i t i a due care speed in view of possible
eventualities and before they arose, and
.would therefore be a part of the bus driver's duty toward his passengers. The duty
Upward such passengers 1$ to exercise continuous high care that they be not injured
by the driving. And that means that the
driver must drive as a prudent person
would drive in view of his duty toward
passengers, which I have designated for
Shortness "due care driving", or "due care
^peed". This means that the speed must
be adapted to the hazards such as ice, snow,
traffic and the like and, to an extent, to
"the likelihood of eventualities. Of course,
no one can drive on an icy day so as to
avoid all possible collisions. The Rein'hardt car might have skidded directly in
front of or even into the Side of the bus no
matter how slowly it was going, or even if
it were stopped. Consequently, the collision itself does not prove excess speed.
Such conclusion must cojne from the evidence or from inferences from other facts,
although by taking into consideration
such other facts the fact of the collision,
or the force of it, may themselves be facts
from which, in view of the total picture,
inferences could be made,
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pable failure to follow the court's instructions. I " think it unnecessary to bring
those matters into this case.
Returning now to the real problem of the
case, I think it may be analyzed by breaking it into two parts. I shall first consider
the sufficiency of the evidence of between
distances to prove excess of due care speed.
I shall then consider the direct testimony
of speed, and whether or not it is sufficient
to justify an inference of excess speed.
There must be some minimum between
distance, which is so great that all reasonable minds would conclude that if a vehicle were proceeding along the "highway
at so great a speed that it could not be
stopped within such distance, then such vehicle was travelling at an excess of due
care speed. I shall call this distance x.
Let us assume that the between distance is
one mile. All reasonable minds would conclude that a bus that could not be stopped
within one mile was being driven at an excess of due care speed. One mile is either
x distance or x plus.

There must also be some maximum between distance so short that all reasonable
minds must conclude that a vehicle travelling at a due care speed would not be able
to stop within such distance. I shall call
this distance y. Let us assume that the beWhen a car, through loss^of control or tween distance is 10 feet. All reasonable
ottier reason, suddenly and~ unexpectedly "minds would say that a bus travelling at
spins away from its side of the highway in- maximum due care speed could not stop
to1 the pathway of another vehicle coming ^ ^ s u c h d i s t a n c e > T e n f e e t i s e i t h e V y
from the opposite direction, we rrn^L ^ _ d l s t a n c e £ r y m i n u s .
careful not to load onto the driver of the
Perhaps these concepts can be ^better ^exother vehicle, even as to a passenger, the
plained by a simple illustration.
duty to avoid the danger of the spinning
car unless there is some negligence on the
part of the driver of the vehicle remaining
"N
on its own right of way, which negligence M
proximately caused.the. iasuxy to the oa.sVenger.
Let the line M N represent the highway.
[1] It is conceded that it is the duty of
*he appellate court to sustain a verdict
where there is substantial evidence to support it. I shall not enter into the matter
of the appellate court's duty when the evidence is claimed to preponderate so plam1) against the verdict as to show an abuse
of discretion in the trial court m refusing
to set the verdict aside as arrived at arbitranly or through bias or prejudice or pal-

The bus is travelling from M toward N.
From point A to point Y is y distance.
JFrom point A to point X is x distance. P
represents any point between Y and X and
p is the distance from A to P. Thus P
represents every point between Y and X,
and p represents every distance greater
than y and less than x. When the bus arrives at point A, the Remhardt car skids
onto the west side of the highway into the
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p a t h . o f ^the bus. If iwhenrtheiibus -is-at
point A; the. Reinhardt b a n d s ' rat point -X
or at any point beyond X;-the bus;if travelling at a due care, speed, can-be stopped in
time,.to,.avoid collision. I f .the.jbus jcannot
be stopped : in time to avoid-the collision,, all
reasonable minds will agree that :it;-is-Iravejling at - excess of, due care, speed.

introduces no direct evidence of soeSffl
but -leaves, speed to ibe inferred by ~the|#jflB
from the - evidence :of- betweeniidist^ntai
alone.

(a) Where the evidence is concliiafoig
that the between distance was x j or 3 greaj
than x," evidence " ofJ stopping :jlii£tai
would be immaterial/ The 'defendant*,;
:
:
If-when'the-bus is at point A, the Rein- travelling at -aii excess speed as%^1nai
hafdt' c a r d s atrpoint P, reasonable minds of law.
may differ as to whether or tfiot a bus" trav(b) Where, the evidence is concjusl^gi
elling :at due care speed would .-.-be- able to that "'the*, between distance was;y..rp"r*
stop in time to avoid the collision. In than y, defendant is entitled
to^'aife
other words, reasonaable minds may dif- verdict, since.he would not be able to,ay!
fer/: as to whether or not a bus . 7 trayel- the accident' * even though'traveiling t l|H
lingr.at aljdue care speed, would-\be- able to due"" care speecL.'.' "From' this V bet^eep^d:
stop "within distance p, or stated. conversely, tan'ce alone, no reasonable mind couia.inj
whether : ..or not a bus unable; to stop with- excess of due care speed, arid .thereiS
in the distance p was travelling at a due there would be no evidence of excess spe©
care .speed.;. The closer P;is to X, or the to go to the jury'.
more closely p approximates x; the |greater
(c) Where the evidence adduced b^
the number of reasonable minds. which plaintiff tends to show that the hetw^eeB]
would conclude that a bus not able to stop distance was x or greater, and the {evM
within p;was travelling at an excess speed; dence adduced by defendant tends to s h o ^
and conversely the nearer P is to Y, or the that the between distance w a S / . , P / ^ t |
more closely that p approximates ...y, the burden is on . defendant to shpw.^tl:
fewer the reasonable.minds that v^ould con- stopping distances. -. -The .reason -ifpr^m
clude that because a bus , was not. able to rule i s : Plaintiff, haying •_ produced KeyS
stop. within p it was travelling, at an ex- dence that the .between; distance w^«?
r
cess of due care speed..
or greater has p u t in proof,: whichjif^tu
- -If:wherijthe.,bus isjat-point A,:the[Rein- contradicted, entitles him.to a directed tier*
hardt -car is at point;.Y^pryany -point .be- diet (absent contributory negligence). iJT~
tween ;:A- and -Y; if the]bus:.is;,travelling:at
ieridarit by adducing, evidence that thei
t h e maximum, due.;-carer.speed,\ all-reason- -?:•: •-/;•-;;•• rJi v.n- n> :jf>!? ?.H mov .*n;vrr m,
tween distance was.p has not completehp
able;! minds- will i agree.;-.that [the jbus.i"could
butted plaintiff s proof,-since reasonaj
not stop in'time to avoid:Ithe/collision.;^;A
minds might conclude that .even witnmiaig
bus ^travelling. .at? less f: than. ..the ^maximum •{::• xo VJ?.VI.J ^ J o:;;v i^ol o' ton unsnm
tance p a bus travelling: at due •care^speg"
due care speed ;might:; bey able:to stop;with- c6uld.be stopped. Iriother-wordsTinori:"
in y distance, and of course, it would be .to completely, rebut plaintiff's 'evidencekq;
the duty-of the driver to stojTif possible. .fendant W s t Jriot Jonly .'show that ^the&b'
A: failure to stop under such circumstances •'tween;'^distance was'less ^ a ^ ' ^ x ^ V - ' e ^ p ]
would make the operator of the bus liable "but also" that 'a bus"'traveiling at'.a'ciue carfe
:-:<; <,:, 'run 7: t-u: DVZ'T.°:J.
••^Ji^r/io^m
—*not"because"he"was "negligent"in" travel- -v.^.:
speed could not: be stopped -within distancr
ling r i n : excess - of. due care'' speed—but,Ibe- p. This does not mean that if defend;
cause ; ;hej failedoto utilizes the.»last' clear -fails-to ofterrevidence' ot^stopping^distan^
chancerto/ avoid the\collision.
-that i plaintiffs is' : entitled ^to^ a ^directed ^!^
'i' With-jthese" 'conceptsqin 1 mind; "> I *rthink diet. a W h a t U ' d o mean is:that-defendahtfp
certain%erieral>rules' can'be:laid^ r dbwn!-as •"Slimes the risk of ^failure ko 'produce slic
regards the iiecessity"\)fi'4ntroducing^evr- e videricef-ah'd Ai f * -the'^ ;j ury:^-firids-ifor^plaiSS
dence; >ofr the Various 'distances"' required to tiffi^defendant'^cahhbt'ot^
stop'*;a vehicle-travelling: at*different: rate's 'pf obf is- insufficient^ -A^di'of course;^liere
of speed 'under 'the conditions"' 'prevailing ?at "defendant ^offers-proof that the betA^eeri^dlS
the time ofUhe* Collision.. A These rules- are "tance^was p,'r but fails* to offer probf o f ' t n i
intended'to apply only where^th'e^plaintiff stopping distances; plaintiff'may " o n ^ ' b u S
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tal show the stopping distances to prove
that a bus driven at a due care speed would
be able to stop within distance p. In short,
either party may offer evidence of the shopping distances, but neither may complain
that the other failed to produce such proof.
(d) Where the evidence adduced by both
parties is that the between distance was p,
either party may introduce evidence of the
stopping distances, but neither is bound to
do so. Plaintiff may offer such evidence
to show that a bus driven at a due care
speed could be stopped within p, or defendant may offer such evidence to show that
a bus driven at due care speed could not
be stopped within distance p. However, in
the event of an adverse verdict neither can
complain that the other failed to offer the
requisite proof,
(e) Where plaintiff's evidence shows that
the between distance was p, and defendant's evidence shows that the between distance was y, the risk of failure to provide
evidence of stopping distances is on plaintiff, but failure to furnish this evidence is
not failure of proof, and plaintiff is entitled to go to the jury. And, of course,
defendant may offer evidence of stopping
distances as rebuttal to plaintiff's evidence.
This is the converse of rule (c).
(f) Where plaintiff's evidence is that
the between distance was x, or greater, and
defendant's evidence is that the between
distance was y, or less, either party may,
but neither party must, produce evidence
of the stopping distances.
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greater, or at y or less, w^ll the case be
taken from the jury. In all other situations there is sufficient evidence to go to
the jury. Either party may offer evidence
of stopping distances, either in support of
his case in chief, or in rebuttal to the evidence of the adverse party. In most cases
it will be advantageous for one side or the
other to offer such evidence. But if both
sides neglect to offer such evidence, neither
can complain that the other failed to do so.
I think we may analyze speed in the same
manner as we have analyzed between distance. Let r represent the minimum rate
of speed which all reasonable minds will
agree is in excess of due care speed under
prevailing conditions. Let s represent the
maximum rate of speed which all reasonable minds will agree is a due care speed
under prevailing conditions. And let k
represent all speeds between s and r. Reasonable minds would differ as to whether a
bus travelling at k speed was at due care
or excess speed. W e may now parallel
rules (a) to (f) announced above. Where
the evidence is undisputed that the bus was
travelling at r speed or greater, or at s
speed or less, evidence of stopping distances would be of no value since excess
of due care speed, or due care speed would
be proved as a matter of law by direct evidence of speed. But where the evidence
shows that the bus was travelling at k
speed, or where there is a conflict in evidence as to whether the bus was travelling at r speed, k speed, or s speed, evidence of stopping distances may be introduced by either party, either in support of
his case in chief or in rebuttal of the evidence produced by the other side. But neither party has the duty to offer such evidence, and neither can complain, in the
event of an adverse verdict, that the other
party failed to prove his case.

Other situations may be conceived where
some of plaintiff's witnesses put the between distance at x or greater, while others
put it at p, and where some of defendants'
witnesses put the between distance at y
or less, and others put it at p. Without
segregating all of the possible combinations
of evidence, I think it may be said that in
As heretofore noted, in this case, as in
these cases either party may offer evidence most cases, there was evidence both of beof the stopping distances, but neither is tween distances and speed. The evidence
bound to do so.
of speed varied from 25 to 50 miles per
hour.
The evidence of between distance
Summarizing briefly, there is no situation
in which the failure of either party to varied from 30 to 330 feet.
prove stopping distances will be so fatal
Most, if not all, of the between distances
to his case as to take it from the jury. testified- to would fall within the p disOnly where the evidence conclusively es- tance range, Whether the extreme estitabhshes the between distance as x or mates would fall within the x or y dis-
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tances is a question which I think we need
not now determine There was substantial
evidence that the between distance was p,
and from this the jury could infer that the
bus was travelling at an excess speed If
a bus travelling at an extremely or moderately slow rate of speed could not be stopped within the between distances testified
to, then defendants ought to have come forward with proof to that effect Not having
done so, they cannot now complain that
there was not sufficient evidence of excess
of due care speed
As to the evidence of speed, I think that
the jury might have concluded that even
the minimum speed testified to—25 miles
per hour—was an excess of due care speed,
considering the weight of the bus and the
stored energy such a heavy vehicle would
have going at a speed of 25 miles an hour
and the adverse road and weather conditions prevailing at the time of the collision Here again, defendant cannot complain that plaintiff did not produce evidence
of stopping distances
Defendant could
have come forward with evidence that a
bus travelling at 25 miles per hour could
be stopped m a relatively short distance
under the conditions then prevailing, if
such were the fact Having failed to do
so, he cannot now complain that plaintiff
as failed to prove his case
[4] I conclude that there was both direct evidence of speed and evidence of between distance from which a jury could
infer that the bus was travelling at excess
speed In addition to this, there was the
further evidence that after the bus struck
the Reinhardt car if. struck a parked automobile and then careened across the road,
and finally came to rest at a point about 75
feet from the parked automobile This was
an additional circumstance from which a
jury might infer that the bus was travelling
at an excessive speed
For the foregoing reasons, I concur.
P R A T T , Justice (dissenting)
In dissenting I'm going to write the case
as I view it in its details
The pertinent facts are these: The
plaintiff was a passenger for hire on a bus
operated by the defendant, Utah Transpor-

tation Company
On the day of the accident plaintiff boarded the defendant's bus
at Hill Field, Utah, her place of employment, for the purpose of being transported
to Salt Lake City She took a seat on the
left side of the defendant's bus about three
rows behind the driver The bus left Hill
Field at approximately 4 20 p m It was
snowing and raining at the time and the
highway along which the bus proceeded
was covered with slush and ice It was .a
four lane highway each lane being 10 feet
wide, and it was paved The road shoulders were about 13 feet wide, but cut down
considerable by snow banks
The bus
while proceeding south in the outside traffic lane on the west side of the highway
about 1,800 feet north of the Salt Lake
County line ran into the right rear of the
defendant Remhardt's automobile
Just
prior to the collision defendant, Reinhardt,
had been driving his automobile north
about 20 or 30 miles per hour on the highway in the lane of traffic next to the center line on the east side of the highway
For some unexplained reason his car went
into a spin and spun from the east side of
the highway into the outside lane on the
west side and directly into the path of the
defendant, Utah Transportation Company's
oncoming bus Remhardt's car was facing
in a southeasterly direction and still moving at the moment of impact. It was
knocked down the highway some 30 to 50
feet before it came to rest After the first
impact with Remhardt's car the bus ran
into another automobile which was parked
on the west shoulder of the highway before being brought to a full c stop t at a point
about 75 feet from where it hit the parked
automobile The bus weighed 7,000 pounds,
had a 186 inch wheel base, and was 6 feet
10 inches wide. Its capacity was 33 persons
It was in the first impact with the defendant Remhardt's car that the plaintiff
received her injury.
There is considerable variance in the
evidence presented as to how far the company's bus was from Remhardt's car when
the latter was spinning toward the west
side of the road and into the path of the
bus, and also as to the speed of the bus at
that time The defendant Reinhardt, who
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was called as a witness for the plaintiff estimated the distance to be about 300 feet.
The bus driver estimated the distance to be
between 75 and 100 feet. Five passengers
testified that they saw the Reinhardt car
prior to the impact and their estimates
ranged from 150 to 90 feet. One witness
fixed the distance from the curve where the
accident could first be seen as 200 feet.
Mrs. Horsley the plaintiff, hesitatingly testified to a much greater distance, i. e. about
660 feet, one city block, but only after her
counsel suggested she estimate by comparison with a city block. Her testimony on
this point stands by itself.
Mrs. Horsley estimated that the bus was
going 40 to 50 miles per hour. The bus
had a maximum speed governor of 38 miles
per hour which was locked at that speed.
Several other passengers estimated the
speed to be about 25 to 26 miles per hour
approximately the speed the bus driver
said he was driving immediately prior to
the accident. It is undisputed that the bus
driver did not apply the brakes on-the bus
until he was within 5 to 10 feet of the
Reinhardt car. The bus did not slow up
any appreciable amount from the time
Reinhardt's car could have been seen until the collision. The bus was proceeding
down a slight incline at the time of the accident. It had taken the bus about an hour
and 10 minutes to travel approximately
22 miles.
The real controversy in this case is one
of speed, and also as to whether or not the
speed of the bus was the proximate cause
of the injury to plaintiff. Failure to keep a
proper lookout is unsupported by the evidence. The alleged failure to slacken speed
and the alleged failure to apply the brakes
are bound up- in the question of speed and
the question of proximate cause between
speed and injury.
The question is: Did the evidence link
speed aaid injury together by a chain of
Proximate cause? I believe not. Plaintiff has failed to establish the speed as a
Proximate cause of the collision. The case
of O'Mally v. Eagan, 43 Wyo. 233, 2 P.2d
1063, 77 A.L.R. 582, at page 588, discusses
the necessity of proof of proximate cause
y
ery clearly. That court says in effect that
one should be able to point out from the
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evidence just how the defendant could have
avoided the accident by the use of proper
care—proper speed in this case. If plaintiff can point that out in the evidence in
the present case she has established a foundation for the jury's verdict. I cannot
overemphasize the fact that the jury's verdict must have support in the evidence and
such support is not found merely in the
fact that the jury may have chosen to conclude that any one of the speeds testified to
was unreasonable, simply because they believed it so, or by the fact that they chose
to believe that such speed proximately
caused the" collision. There must be evidence to support their conclusions whatever those conclusions may be. We quote
from Whalen v. Dunbar, 44 R.I. 136, 115
A. 718, at page 720, a quotation quoted and
approved in O'Mally v. Eagan, (cited
above) : "If it should be conceded that the
defendants
automobile at the time the
emergency was created was proceeding at
a rate of speed in excess of the statutory
limit, there was no testimony of probative
value showing or tending to show that the
accident would not have happened if the
defendant's automobile had been proceeding at the rate of 25 miles per hour, or
even at a much less rate of speed, or that
the speed of the defendant's automobile in
any way entered into the cause of the collision."
To arrive at the verdict it did in the
present case the jury must have found that
the defendant bus company's driver could
have stopped this bus upon the road as it
then was within the space and time available to him after Reinhardt's car first became visible in its spin, had he been going
at a reasonable rate of speed. But what
was that reasonable speed; how was it to
be determined so that it would show how
the bus could have been stopped in time?
There is no testimony as to the distance
required to stop that bus at any given
speed. Bus driving is not so common to all
of us that each of us is qualified to express
an opinion as to such a required distance.
Three hundred feet distance or 75 feet distance on an inclined icy road at 50 miles
per hour or at 25 miles per hour with a bus
weighing 7,000 pounds and an automobile
spinning toward the bus are not a set of
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iacts which on their face indicates that
the bus couJd or could not have been stopped in any particular f distance—or,~for that
matter, that the collision could or could
not have -been avoided by the bus driver.
Such circumstances leave nothing but speculation as to_ what could have been done
with the bus at such speed or at other
speeds. In the absence,of evidence of the
average human reaction time, the approximate coefficient of friction on the road under the conditions existing r on,the day of
the accident, and the braking distances of
vehicles, or in the absence of testimony of
expert drivers as to what can be done wfth
a motor vehicle of that size and weight,
the jury cannot through the application of
logic and reason determine whether or ^ot
a bus proceeding at a reasonable sp^ed
could have stopped in time to avoid a collision. Unless the jury can say from the
evidence (not just say) that the collision
would not have occurred, but for that
speed, they are not justified in returning a
verdict for plaintiff. The jury concluded
that the transportation company's negligence was the only negligence that was the
proximate cause of the collision. Even
though it be considered that Reinhar^t's
skidding was an unavoidable accident so
far as his responsibility is concerned, it
does not follow that such a skidding rr^ay
not have been an independent intervening
cause between the alleged negligence of the
transportation company and the collision.
To take it out of that classification th e re
must be evidence connecting the alleged
negligence of the transportation company
as a proximate cause, to the collision.

To hand the jury various speeds and «a*
nous distances and ask them to seloc£
which is reasonable and which .is unrea?
sonable without giving them an evidential^
standard upon which to base their selec*
tion, is to ask them to speculate. In -£h$
majority of cases, it will result in thejr
reasoning backward from the resultant ac4
cident that the speed at which they conclude the driver was going must have been
unreasonable or else the accident would
not have happened. Such reasoning byQits
very nature assumes the proximate cause
element; and the question of what was the
proper method, under the circumstances of
operating the bus upon an icy road is iust
skipped over.
What is there in the record upon which"
a comparison can be made to enable 'the
jurors to arrive at the conclusion olrex*
cess or of non-excess speed? I say again?
bus driving is not a thing of commbfl
knowledge.
It must be founded on expert
testimony—of which there is none in the
record. It can't be assumed that any speed
is excessive, and the burden placed on defendant to defeat that assumption. The
plaintiff's prima facie case calls for proof
of negligence and proof of proximate
cause, neither of which must be assumed
Proof of facts which cannot be measured,
for lack of a unit to measure them, accomplish nothing.
I am of the opinion that the motion for
a directed verdict in favor of the defendant
Transportation Company should have been
granted.
LATIMER, Justice, not f participating
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George G. KELLY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Lawrence MONTOYA, John S. Ward, Darvel D. Rlchlns, Richins Bros., Inc., and
Norbert E. O'Connor, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 429.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
May 8, 1970.

Truck passenger brought an action
against various defendants for injuries sustained in multiple-vehicle accident. The
District Court of Sandoval County, Waldo
Spiess, J., entered a summary judgment in
favor of the defendant vehicle drivers and
the passenger appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wood, J., held that depositions in action by truck passenger for personal injuries sustained when truck crashed into
vehicles of two defendants who had stopped
their vehicles at scene of prior collision between vehicles driven by two other defendants on highway during sandstorm presented issues of fact as to negligence because of violation of statute prohibiting the
leaving of vehicles on highway, foreseeability and proximate cause precluding summary judgment.

5. Negligence <§=^I0
Foreseeability is an element of negligence.
6. Automobiles <§=>I73(2)

Statute prohibiting leaving of vehicles
upon highway is for benefit of persons using highway, and since it is foreseeable
that blocking highway may cause other persons to have accident a violation of statute
is negligence per se. 1953 Comp. § 6418-49(a).
7. Negligence @=>56(l.7, 1.12)
"Proximate cause" is that which produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

Reversed and remanded for trial.

8. Negligence <§=>62(l)

Oman, J., dissented and filed opinion.

For an intervening act to be an "independent cause" the intervening act must be
sufficient in and of itself to break natural
sequence of first negligence.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

i. Judgment @=>I85(2)

In deciding motion for summary judgment, trial court must view matters
presented and considered by it in most favorable aspect they will bear in support of
right to trial on issues.
2. Trial <§=>I39(I)

Conflict in testimony of a single witness is to be resolved by trier of fact.
3

4. Judgment <§=> 185.3(21)
Depositions in action by truck passenger for personal injuries sustained when
truck crashed into vehicles of two defendants who had stopped their vehicles at scene
of prior collision between vehicles driven
by two other defendants on highway during
sandstorm presented issues of fact as to
negligence because of violation ot statute
prohibiting the leaving of vehicles on highway, foreseeability and proximate cause
precluding summary judgment. 1953 Comp.
§ 64-18-49(a).

- Judgment <§=>I86

It is not function of trial court to
weigh evidence in considering motion for
summary judgment as such motion should
be
granted only when facts are undisputed.

9. Negligence <©=>56(1.10), 61(1)

"Proximate cause" of injury need not
be last act, or nearest act to injury, but
may be one which actually aided in producing the injury, and proximate cause need
not be the sole cause but it must be a concurring cause.
10. Judgment @=>I85(2)

Party moving for summary judgment
has burden of establishing that there is no
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material issue of fact to be determined by
factfinder and is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, and burden is not on opposing party to prove prima facie case.

highway behind Ward's vehicle. Next to
stop was Richins (defendants Richins and
Richins Bros., Inc.). O'Connor stopped
behind Richins. Kenosha (Kenosha Auto
Transport Corporation and Woodburn)
stopped behind O'Connor.

Avelino V. Gutierrez, Albuquerque, for
appellant.

The second accident occurred when
Baumer (Baumer Foods, Inc. and Logan)
ran into the rear of Kenosha. Kenosha in
turn, collided with O'Connor and Richins,
and O'Connor collided with Richins.

Jackson O. Akin, Rodey, Dickason,
Sloan, Akin & Robb, Albuquerque, for appellee Montoya.
J. J. Monroe, Iden & Johnson, Albuquerque, for appellee Ward.
Frank H. Allen, Jr., Modrall, Seymour,
Sperling, Roehl & Harris, Albuquerque,
for appellee Richins.
Eugene E. Klecan, Albuquerque, for appellee O'Connor.
OPINION

Plaintiff, a passenger in the Baumer
truck, sued for personal injuries.
His
claim against Kenosha and Baumer has
been settled. The trial court granted sum r
mary judgment in favor of Montoya,
Ward, Richins and O'Connor.
Plaintiff
appeals.
When we refer to "testimony" or "evidence," we refer to that which appears in
the depositions.

W O O D , Judge.
[1] Plaintiff was injured in a multi-vehicle accident. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is not proper where
there is the slightest issue as to a material
fact. In deciding a motion for summary
judgment, the trial court must view the
matters presented and considered by it in
the most favorable aspect they will bear in
support of the right to a trial on the issues.
Perry v. Color Title of New Mexico, 81
N.M. 143, 464 * P.2d 562 JCt.App.1970).
We reverse the summary judgment discussing: * (1) statutory violation; (2) foreseeability; (3) proximate cause and independent intervening cause; and (4) the
burden of the party opposing summary
judgment.
The accident occurred on a highway east
of Deming, during daylight, but also during a sand storm. The wind was strong
and gusting. Because of the sand and
wind gusts, visibility varied from zero to
two hundred feet.
The first accident occurred when Montoya and Ward, both across the center line
of the highway, collided. There is evidence that a vehicle, or two, stopped on the

Statutory

violation.

Plaintiff says there are several issues qf+
negligence. We need consider only one of^
them. Section 64-l&-49(a), N.M.S.A.1953
(Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 2) provides in part:
"* * *
[ N ] o person shall stop,
park, or leave standing any vehicle.*
whether attended or unattended, upon
the paved or main-traveled part of the
highway when it is practicable to stop,
park, or so leave such vehicle off such
part of said highway, * * * "
There is testimony that the highway at
the accident scene had good eight foot
shoulders, that the descent from the shoulders to the bar ditch was not steep, that
vehicles drove onto the shoulder and into
the bar ditch area and beyond. There is
testimony that both the Montoya and Ward
vehicles were driveable after their "accident, and that some ten minutes elapsed between the two accidents.
Richins and O'Connor do not dispute
that a factual issue existed as to their violation of § 64-18-49(a), supra; Montoya
and Ward do. These two defendants, relying on selected testimony, assert their cars
were off the highway at the time of the
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second collision. They assert the only testimony to the contrary is that of the investigating State Police officer; they claim
this officer's testimony raised no factual
issue because he admitted to uncertainty as
to the location of the Montoya and Ward
cars when he arrived on the scene.
Contradictory inferences may be drawn
from the officer's testimony. At one place
he said the vehicles were still on the road.
At another place it is indicated the officer
had made a sworn statement that the two
vehicles were on the road. Other parts of
his testimony seem to contradict this.
[2, 3] The fact that contradictory inferences exist shows that the evidence is not
undisputed. The conflict in the testimony
of a single witness is to be resolved by the
trier of fact. Hughes v. Walker, 78 N.M.
63, 428 P.2d 37 (1967). The trial court
could not properly resolve such conflict on
a motion for summary judgment for by
doing so, it would be weighing the evidence. It is not the function of the trial
court to weigh the evidence in considering
a motion for summary judgment; such a
motion may be granted only where the
facts are undisputed. Johnson v. J. S. &
H. Construction Co., 81 N.M. 42, 462 P.2d
627 (Ct.App.1969).
[4] There being factual issues as to the
violation of § 64-18-49(a),"supra, there are
factual issues as to the negligence of each
of the four defendants. Gould v. Brown
Construction Company, 75 N.M. 113, 401
P.2d 100 (1965); Horrocks v. Rounds, 70
N.M. 7Z, 370 P.2d 799 (1962); Williams v.
Neff, 64 N.M. 182, 326 P.2d 1073 (1958).
Foreseeability.
Defendants assert that even if they violated a statute, they could not be held negligent because of a lack of foreseeability.
They rely on Anderson v. Jones, 66 111.
App.2d 407, 213 N.E.2d 627 (1966). In
that case Jones was in the same position as
Montoya and Ward in this case. There, as
here, cars had stopped on the highway after the first accident and before the second
accident occurred. Anderson was in the

last car which had stopped when Zehr's
car rear-ended Anderson's car. In ruling
the second accident was not foreseeable,
the Illinois court states:
"It is quite clear that the immediate
cause of plaintiffs' injuries and damages
was the force set in motion through the
negligent act of Zehr. The force set in
motion by Jones had spent itself. It was
in repose. It was quiescent. The incident was at an end. Plaintiffs were
home free save for the wrongful act of
Zehr. Jones, too, is home free from responsibility unless it can be said that he
should have reasonably anticipated or
reasonably foreseen these or like results
or that these or like results were reasonably probable. If they were, the causal
connection is not broken. If they were
not, Jones is effectively insulated from
responsibility and the new force of Zehr
is the sole and proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries."
Defendants state that if Jones could not
have foreseen the consequences of his negligence in Anderson v. Jones, supra, then
they, and particularly Montoya and Ward,
could not have foreseen the consequences
of their asserted statutory violation in
blocking the highway.
We agree that Anderson v. Jones, supra,
is factually similar to our case. Is the legal result from those facts in Illinois the
law of New Mexico?
[5] In New Mexico, foreseeability is
an element of negligence. Martin v. Board
of Education of City of Albuquerque, 79
N.M. 636, 447 P.2d 516 (1968); see Tapia
v. Panhandle Steel Erectors Company, 78
N.M. 86, 428 P.2d 625 (1967). U.J.I. 12.1
defines negligence in terms of foreseeability. The committee comment to U.J.I. 11.1, citing New Mexico authority, states:
"The violation of a statute which is
enacted for the benefit or protection of
the party claiming injury from the violator or for the benefit or protection of a
class of the public to which such person
is a member is negligence per se.
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[6] It seems obvious to us that a traffic statute such as § 64-18-49(a), supra,
was enacted for the benefit of persons using our highways. Plaintiff, a person using the highway, had the benefit of such
statute. Why? Because, in our opinion, it
is foreseeable that violations of a traffic
rule may cause accidents. "Foreseeability
does not mean that the precise hazard or
the exact consequences which were encountered should have been foreseen. * * *"
Harless v. Ewmg, 80 N.M. 149, 452 P.2d
483 (Ct.App.1969).
Since it is foreseeable that blocking the
highway may cause other persons to have
accidents, a violation of the statute which
prohibits such blocking is negligence per
st. The rule, that violation of the statute
is negligence per se, includes the element
of foreseeability where, as here, plaintiff is
a beneficiary of the statute violated. The
holding as to foreseeability in Anderson v.
Jones, supra, does not state New Mexico
law, and is not applicable.
Even without the foregoing, there is a
factual issue as to foreseeability in this
case. The State Police officer testified:
«* * * there's a lot of them stops on
the roadway, and we have a lot of accidents the same way." This is evidence of
the foreseeability of an accident from stopping on the highway.
There being factual issues as to a statutory violation, there were "factual issues as
to the negligence of each of the four defendants. The factual issue of negligence
includes the factual issue of foreseeability.
Martin v. Board of Education of City of
Albuquerque, supra.
Proximate
ing cause.

cause—independent

interven-

Defendants contend the act of Baumer,
in running into the stopped vehicles, intervened between any negligence on their part
and plaintiff's injuries. The result of this
intervening act, according to defendants, is
to reduce their asserted negligence to a remote cause, or to a condition which did no
more than make the second accident possi-

ble. Since, according to defendants, their
negligence is either a remote cause, or a
condition, it is not the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries. A corollary of this
premise is that Baumer's negligence is an
independent intervening cause.
The Oklahoma law, on which defendants
rely, supports these contentions. Haworth
v. Mosher, 395 F.2d 566 (10th Cir. 1968);
Beesley v. United States, 364 F.2d 194
(10th Cir. 1966); Evans v. Caldwell, 429
P.2d 962 (Okl.1967); Transport Indemnity Company v. Page, 406 P.2d 980 (Okl.
1965); Porter v. Norton-Stuart PontiacCadillac of Enid, 405 P.2d 109 (Okl.
1965). As stated in Beesley v. United
States, supra:
"The Oklahoma Supreme Court has
developed a clear expression of the law
of proximate cause in Oklahoma. The
proximate cause of any injury must be
the efficient cause which sets in motion
the chain of circumstances leading to the
injury. * * * Where the negligence
complained of only creates a condition
which thereafter reacts with a subsequent, independent, unforeseeable, distinct agency and produces an injury, the
original negligence is the remote rather
than the proximate cause thereof. This,
is held to be true though injury would
not have occurred except for the original
act. * * * Thus the proximate cause
of an event must be that which in the
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any independent cause, produces
that event and without which that event
would not have occurred. * * * "
Is the Oklahoma view the law of New
Mexico ?
The Oklahoma rule, according to the
above quotation, includes the view that the
second accident was unforeseeable. W e
have held that foreseeability is an issue included within the factual issue of negligence.
Also, according to the above quotation,
the second accident was independent of the
asserted negligence of defendants even
though plaintiff's injury "* * * would
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not-have occurred except for the original
act * * * "
[7,8] A partial definition of proximate
cause is " * * * that which * * *
produces the injury, and without which the
injury would not have occurred. * * *"
Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400, 285
P.2d 507 (1955). For an intervening act
to be an independent cause, Thompson v.
Anderman, supra, states: "* * * Such
intervening cause must be sufficient in and
of itself to break the natural sequence of
the first negligence * * *."
If plaintiffs injuries would not have occurred except for the alleged negligence of
the defendants, their negligence is a proximate cause of the injuries. If, however,
the second accident broke the natural sequence of defendants' asserted negligence,
if the second accident is the one without
which the injuries would not have occurred, the second accident was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. If the
second accident did break the natural sequence of events resulting from the asserted negligence of defendants, the second
accident would be an independent intervening cause. If, however, plaintiff's injuries
"would not have occurred except for the
original act" of the defendants, the second
accident was not an independent intervening cause. New Mexico law on independent intervening cause is not the same as
the quoted statement of Oklahoma law.
[9] Nor is the Oklahoma view of remote cause the New Mexico law. The
proximate cause of an injury, in New
Mexico, need not be the last act, or the
nearest act to the injury, but may be one
which actually aided in producing the injury. Proximate cause need not be the sole
cause, but it must be a concurring cause.
Ortega v. Texas-New Mexico Railway
Company, 70 N.M. 58, 370 P.2d 201 (1962).
Thompson v. Anderman, supra, states:
"* * * Where a person by his own
negligence produces a dangerous condition of things, which does not become
active for mischief until another person
has operated upon it by the commission
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of another negligent act, which might
not unreasonably be foreseen to occur,
the original act of negligence is then regarded as the proximate cause of the injury which finally results."
Thus, if defendants' asserted negligence
became active by the negligence of another, their negligence has greater legal effect
than a "condition which made the second
accident possible." Their negligence may
be regarded as the proximate cause of the
injury which finally results.
Being contrary t o New Mexico law,
Oklahoma law is not authority for the
summary judgment.
Defendants rely on two other cases.
Bell v. Fore, 419 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.Civ.
App.1967) applies the "remote cause'' or
"condition" concept which is contrary to
New Mexico law. In Copple v. Warner,
260 N.C. 727, 133 S.E.2d 641 (1963), the
first collision between cars A and B, was
caused by car B. This collision blocked
the eastbound lane of the highway. Car C
was proceeding west in the unblocked
westbound lane. The second collision occurred when car C drove across the center
line and collided with cars A and B. It was
held that these facts were insufficient to
show any negligence on the part of car B
that was a proximate or concurring proximate cause of the second collision. The
factual situation here is different, there
being testimony that each of the defendants here, to some extent, was blocking the
lane of travel in which the second collision
in this case occurred. Neither case is authority for the summary judgment.
Was the asserted negligence of any, or
each, of the four defendants a proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries? W a s the second accident an independent intervening
cause? Did the alleged negligence of any
of the defendants concur with the alleged
negligence • of anyone else (Kenosha or
Baumer) in causing plaintiff's injuries? If
reasonable minds might differ on these issues, the matter is for the jury. Rivera v.
Ancient City Oil Corporation, 61 N.M. 473,
302P.2d953 (1956).
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Reasonable minds could differ on these
issues because there are disputed facts and
because the reasonable inferences from
those facts are contradictory. Harless V.
Ewing, supra. For example: If it were
practicable for each of the defendants to
have parked their vehicles off the road between the time of the first and second collisions, and they did not do so, did the second accident result because their vehicles
were on the pavement, or did it result
from the speed of the Baumer truck, or the
driver's failure to keep a proper lookout or
his failure to properly control his truck under the existing conditions of visibility?
If the Kenosha truck, with which the Baumer truck initially collided, was negligent
in blocking the highway, did the alleged
negligence of these defendants concur with
Kenosha? There are factual issues of
causation as to each of the four defendants.

would have us hold that plaintiff has failed}
to meet his burden without allowing him .a ;
trial.
/'*:
%
[10] The issues here were decided onja"
motion for summary judgment. "A party '•
moving for summary judgment has t h e '
burden of establishing that there is no material issue of fact to be determined by the *
fact finder and that he is entitled to judg- r
ment as a matter of law. * * * The s
burden is not on the opposing party', to
prove a prima iacie case. * * *'\ Barber's Super Markets, Inc. v. Stryker, r81
N.M. 227, 465 P.2d 284 (1970). Plaintiff
did not have the burden in the summary
judgment proceeding. O'Connor, and the
other three defendants, did. They failed to
meet it.
Reversed and remanded for trial.
It is so ordered.
••.'//

H E N D L E Y , J., concurs.
Burden of the party opposing
judgment.

,. .

summary

O'Connor reviews the testimony to show
that the presence of his vehicle had no
bearing on the accident. He ^asserts that
since our Supreme Court agreed with the
trial court in Gould v. Brown Construction
Company, supra, that the issue of causation
in that dust storm case was for the jury,
that here we should agree with the trial
court that the issue i_s one of -law^ He reminds us, relying on Seele v. Purcell, 45
N.M. 176, 113 P.2d 320 (1941), the plaintiffs have the burden of proof and that
where defendants have acted in an emergency, the burden on plaintiff "becomes
more burdensome." He asserts this case is
a similar situation and that plaintiff failed
to meet that burden.
1

._"

O'Connor's claims are without merit." In
Gould v. Brown Construction Company, supra, the issues were decided by the jury
after trial. Here, the trial judge decided
them as a matter of law. Since reasonable
minds might differ on these issues, they
are to be tried. In Seele v. Purcell, supra,
plaintiff was held to have failed in the
burden of proof after a trial. _ O'Connor

OMAN, Judge (dissenting).
I agree with the majority concerning the
law applicable in ruling on a motion, for
summary judgment. I also agree that in
the light of this law there are factual -is-t
sues as to whether the defendants here involved violated § 64-18-49(a), N.M.S.X.
1953 (Repl. 9, pt. 2). The essential portion
of this section of our statutes is quoted in ;
the majority opinion.
.. i"~5
I also agree "foreseeability" is one/jqf
the tests ordinarily to be considered and
applied in determining the factual question
of negligence, and that the violation of a
statutory rule of the road constitutes negli :
gence per se. However, I disagree with
the majority's disposition of the "foreseea^
bility" issue in this case, insofar as it relates to the questions of "proximate cause'*
and "independent intervening cause," and-I
disagree with the majority holding that
there is a question of fact as to whethe^
the negligence of these defendants was a
proximate cause of the second accident and
plaintiff's resulting injuries.
I agree with the following statements of
the majority concerning the law of "proxi-
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mate cause" and ''independent intervening
cause":
"A partial definition of proximate
cause is '* * * that which * * *
" produces the injury, and without which
the injury would not have occurred.
' * * *' Thompson v. Anderman, 59
N.M. 400, 285 P.2d 507 (1955). For an
intervening act to be an independent
cause, Thompson v. Anderman, supra,
states:
'* * *
Such intervening
cause must be sufficient in and of itself
to break the natural sequence of the first
negligence * * *.'
"If plaintiff's injuries would not have
occurred except for the alleged negligence of the defendants, their negligence
is a proximate cause of the injuries. If,
however, the second accident broke the
natural sequence of defendants' asserted
negligence, if the second accident is the
one without which the injuries would not
have occurred, the second accident was
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. If the second accident did break
the natural sequence of events resulting
from the asserted negligence of defendants, the second accident would be an independent intervening cause. If, however, plaintiff's injuries 'would not have
occurred except for the original act' of
the defendants, the second accident was
• not an independent intervening cause.
* * *»
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the Illinois court in Anderson v. Jones, supra, the negligence of Jones was conceded.
The concern of the Illinois court with
"foreseeability" was whether the second
accident, precipitated by the "intervening
cause"—the conduct of Zehr in running
into the rear of plaintiff's vehicle—could
have been reasonably foreseen as a result
of the original act of negligence—the
conduct of Jones in causing the first collision. If it could have been so reasonably
foreseen, then the negligence of Zehr was
not an "independent intervening cause,"
which could have broken the chain of causation between the negligence of Jones and
the injury to plaintiff. This is consistent
with the law of New Mexico. U.J.I. 13.15; Thompson v. Anderman, supra, cited
in the above quotation from the majority
opinion. See also, Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 270
(1958), and particularly § 2 [b] and cases
cited therein as showing that "foreseeability" is a test to be applied in determining
whether another's negligence constitutes an
"intervening cause" or merely a "concurring cause."
The majority "* * * agree that Anderson v. Jones, supra, is factually similar
to our case." However, they distinguish
the result reached therein from their result
in the present case on the basis that
"*_ * * the holding as to foreseeability
* * * " by the Illinois court * * *
does not state New Mexico law, and is not
applicable." As above stated, I disagree
with this and can see no reason to arrive
at a result directly opposite that reached by
the Illinois court in a concededly similar
factual situation now before us.

I disagree with the majority statement
that the opinion of the Illinois Court in
Anderson v. Jones, 66 Ill.App.2d 407, 213
N.E.2d 627 (1966) " * * * does not state
New Mexico law, and is not applicable,"
and with the majority conclusion that under New Mexico law, as above quoted
from the majority opinion, reasonable
minds could differ on the question of
whether the negligence of defendants could
have proximately concurred in causing the
second accident.

The majority, however, also seek to support their result by asserting that a factual
issue as to foreseeability is presented by
the statement of the State Police Officer
that "* * * there's a lot of them stops
on the roadway, and we have a lot of accidents the same way."

I have already stated I agree the evidence here is sufficient on the issue of the
defendants' negligence to avoid summary
judgment. As I understand the opinion of

In my opinion this statement by the
State Police Officer cannot reasonably be
said to raise a question on the issue of
proximate causation under the undisputed
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facts before us. It may possibly, as the
majority suggest, raise a question as to the
negligence of defendants in stopping on
the highway, but this is not the issue in the
case as I see it and as I have above stated.
An examination of the evidence, in the
light of the above quoted law from the majority opinion as to "proximate cause" and
"independent intervening cause," demonstrates clearly to me that the negligence of
the defendants in stopping or parking on
the main travelled portion of the highway
could not constitute a proximate cause of
the second collision from which plaintiff's
injuries resulted.
' Here the evidence is that Kenosha (Kenosha Auto Transport Corporation and its
driver Woodburn) brought its tractor and
trailer to rest on the highway behind the
O'Connor automobile.
Woodburn remained in the vehicle about 30 seconds,
and then got out, where he remained for
about another 30 seconds. He heard a vehicle approaching and started to get back
inside the cab of his vehicle when the
Baumer vehicle collided with the rear of
the Kenosha vehicle.
The Kenosha vehicle consisted of a tractor and a transport trailer on which were
loaded six automobiles. Across the rear of
this trailer there were a cluster of three
red lights in about the center thereof and
about four feet above the ground or road
surface, a red clearance light on each side
about 3 / 6 // above the road surface, and two
red flashing lights which were about 6"
from the top of the trailer. All of these
lights were burning and visible from the
rear, except as their visibility may have
been obscured by the dust.
Woodburn's visibility was about 200 feet
ahead as he approached the O'Connor
automobile, and during the time he remained stopped on the highway prior to
the accident. He saw the O'Connor automobile and the Richins truck ahead. H e
admitted he could probably have driven off
the highway.
The Baumer vehicle (driven by Logan),
which collided with the rear of the Keno-

sha vehicle, had a gross weight of between
60,000 and 65,000 lbs. Logan was familiar
with the highway and was driving at about
55 miles per hour. He saw the dust ahead,
but made no effort to slow down, other
than to take his foot off the accelerator,
until he was inside the dust and through
which he could not see. He then applied
his brakes and the collision with the rear
of the Kenosha vehicle occurred almost immediately.
He has no recollection of
seeing the Kenosha vehicle prior to the
collision. He alone i ailed to react as had
all those who preceded him, in that he did
not bring his vehicle to a stop before colliding with another vehicle.
Woodburn, driver of the Kenosha vehicle, admittedly had sufficient visibility and
sufficient time in which to remove his vehicle from the highway.
In my opinion, the negligence of these
two drivers was not only sufficient to
break the natural sequences of the negligence of the other defendants in stopping
on the highway, but in fact did so, and was
the proximate cause of the second collision.
If the negligence of Ihe remaining defendants could be said to have proximately
caused Woodburn to stop on the highway,
their negligence was at rest once Woodburn had stopped and had sufficient time
to remove his vehicle from the highway.
So long as he remained stopped or parked
on the highway, when he could admittedly
have gotten off the highway, the presence
of his vehicle prevented a direct collision
by an approaching vehicle with the vehicles ahead, and his negligence in so "remaining on the highway interrupted the
natural sequence of events which might
have followed from the negligence of those
stopped ahead of him. His negligence and
the negligence of Logan, which, as already
stated, consisted of conduct unlike that followed by all the other drivers in approaching the dust, produced a result different
than that which could reasonably have
been foreseen by the other defendants.
The negligence of Woodburn and Logan
was not only the immediate cause of the
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second collision, but was the efficient producing cause thereof, and without which
the plaintiff would not have been injured.
As already stated, I believe the New
Mexico law compels the same result
reached by the Illinois court in the factually similar case of Anderson v. Jones, supra. I agree with the majority that the
Oklahoma rule, as quoted from Beesley v.
United States, 364 F.2d 194 (10th Cir.
1966), appears to be somewhat different
from the New Mexico rule, in that it is
stated the original act is not a proximate
cause of the injury even though the injury
would not have occurred except for the
original act. However, the New Mexico
and Oklahoma definitions of proximate
cause are almost identical in their wording.
See U.J.I. 12.10; Haworth v. Mosher, 395
F.2d 566 (10th Cir. 1968); Beesley v.
United States, supra. Proximate cause is
defined in U.J.I. 12.10 as follows:
"The proximate cause of an injury is
that which in a natural and continuous
sequence [unbroken by any independent
intervening cause] produces the injury,
and without which the"injury would not
have occurred. [It need not be the only
cause, nor the last nor nearest cause. It
is sufficient if it occurs with some other
cause acting at the same time, which in
combination with it, causes the injury]."
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Regardless of whether negligently stopping on a highway be called "negligence"
or a "condition/* the stopping must be a
proximate cause of the resulting injuries
before there can be liability for the stopping. Here we are concerned only with
the issue of negligence in stopping on the
highway, when it was practicable to stop
off the highway. There are factual issues
as to whether the different defendants now
before us were on or off the highway, and,
if on the highway, whether it was practicable for them to have gotten off the highway. However, the negligence of Woodburn in not removing the Kenosha vehicle
from the highway, when it was practicable
for him to do so, and the negligence of Logan, in his operation of the Baumer vehicle, were the concurring proximate causes
of this second accident. This second accident would not otherwise have occurred.
The negligence of each of the defendants
in this appeal in stopping on the highway
was at most a remote cause, which in no
way proximately contributed to the second
accident and plaintiff's resulting injuries.
In addition to the foregoing cited cases,
compare § 4, and cases therein cited, of
Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 270 at 284.
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.
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exception to the hearsay rule. The statement was not an admission which could be
used against the defendant, but a self-serving statement made by the defendant long
after the crime was committed and of questionable reliability.
[3] Defendant also urges that the trial
court erred in failing to give a requested
instruction on criminal trespass as a lesser
included offense of burglary. The Court
has recently fully explored the lesser included offense doctrine in State v. Baker, Utah,
671 P.2d 152 (1983). Since all the evidence in this case is consistent only with
the burglary charge and there is no evidence consistent with criminal trespass, we
affirm on the basis of State v. Baker,
supra.
Affirmed.
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissenting):
I agree with the Per Curiam opinion as to
the exclusion of defendant's statement. I
cannot agree however that "all the evidence
in this case is consistent only with the burglary charge and there is no evidence consistent with criminal trespass." The only
evidence which the majority opinion relies
on is that a security box had been moved
from the head of a bed to the center and
the lock on the box was exposed. Nothing
was taken. I do not think that evidence
necessarily shows an attempt to commit
theft and excludes trespass. The instruction on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass should have been given.
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Matthew C. HARRIS and Gary C.
Harris, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
The UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY and
Lester Lorenzo Loosemore, Defendants
and Respondents.
No. 17042.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 7, 1983.
Action was brought against bus driver
and bus company for personal injuries sustained in collision between bus and another
vehicle. The Second District Court, Weber
County, Ronald 0. Hyde, J., entered judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held
that: (1) instruction to jury that driver of
other vehicle was negligent as a matter of
law and that if jury found that he saw bus
stopped on highway or if he negligently
failed to see bus, then his negligence was
sole proximate cause of collision, was erroneous; (2) exclusion of bus company maintenance records, made subsequent to accident, introduced to show that taillights.
were defective at time of accident was erroneous; and (3) combined errors warranted
reversal.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Negligence <s=>62(3)
A person's negligence is not superseded
by the negligence of another if the subsequent negligence of another is foreseeable.
2. Automobiles <@=>245(15, 50)
In action for injuries sustained by jeep
passenger in collision between jeep and rear
end of bus, issue of whether jeep driver was
negligent and issue of proximate cause of
the accident were for the jury.
3. Trial <s=>142, 143
Where evidence is in dispute, including
inferences from evidence, issue should be
subm ed to jury.
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4. Negligence <s=>136(25)
Whether the negligence of an actor
who observes, or negligently fails to observe, a dangerous condition created by a
prior actor's negligence and who negligently fails to avoid the dangerous condition
supersedes the negligence of the prior actor
is a question for the jury; overruling Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d
143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953); McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346 P.2d 711
(1959); Valesquez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
12 Utah 2d 379,366 P.2d 989 (1961); Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24
Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970).
5. Negligence <s=>131
Evidence of repairs made after an accident is inadmissible to prove negligence;
however, evidence of subsequent repairs is
admissible for other purposes, such as proving physical conditions that existed at time
of accident, if defendant disputes the earlier condition, and if only way of establishing
the earlier condition is by evidence of subsequent repairs.

Merlin R. Lybbert, Paul C. Droz, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Timothy R. Hanson, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and respondents.
STEWART, Justice:
Plaintiff Matthew Harris brought this action for personal injuries sustained in a
collision between a bus owned and operated
by defendant Utah Transit Authority
(UTA) and a jeep in which the plaintiff was
a passenger. The driver of the bus, Lester
Loosemore, is also a defendant. The trial
court ruled as a matter of law that Rodney
Talbot, the driver of the jeep, was negligent, and the jury found that UTA and
Loosemore were not negligent and that Talbot was the sole proximate cause of the
accident. Judgment was entered for the
defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.

The accident occurred on the morning of
March 7, 1977. Talbot, Harris, and Kevin
Lucia, another passenger of Talbot, were on
an errand for their high school teacher.
6. Evidence <^351
The
collision occurred at the "^-intersecBus maintenance records made subsetion
of
1700 North and Washington Boulequent to collision between another vehicle
vard
in
North Ogden, Utah. At the point
and rear end of bus were admissible to
of
the
collision,
Washington Boulevard Jias
show that bus taillights were defective prifour
traffic
lanes,
two north bound and two
or to accident.
south bound. The impact occurred in the
7. Appeal and Error e=»1027
outside south-bound lane. A bus of defendAn error is reversible if there is reasonant UTA stopped to pick up a passenger,
able likelihood that a more favorable result
and was positioned with its right rear outer
would have been obtained by complaining
wheel
four inches off the pavement and
party in the absence of the error.
was obstructing a portion of the outside
8. Appeal and Error <s=> 1056.1(3), 1064.1(3) travel lane. The day was dry and clear,
In action for injuries resulting from and the driving conditions were good. The
collision with bus based on theory that bus jeep was in good mechanical condition and
driver negligently drove bus and that bus traveling within the speed limit and with
company negligently maintained taillights, the flow of traffic at between 40 and 50
erroneous instruction to jury that driver of miles per hour.
jeep that collided with bus was negligent as
Talbot did not recall seeing the bus ahead
a matter of law and that, if jeep driver saw
bus or should have seen bus, his negligence of him until just before the collision ocwas superseding cause of accident, together curred. Upon seeing the bus, he glanced in
with erroneous exclusion of bus mainte- his rear-view mirror, swerved left and
nance record introduced to show defect in braked to avoid the bus. In the course »of
lights prior to accident, were sufficiently this maneuver, the right side of the jeep
prejudicial to warrant reversal.
struck the left rear corner of the bus and
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pinched Harris' right arm between the bus
and the jeep, effectively severing the arm
between the shoulder and the elbow.
I. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A. Proximate Cause and Superseding
Cause
Plaintiffs urge that the trial court erred
in directing the jury to find as a matter of
law that Talbot, the driver of the jeep^was
negligent and that if because of his negligence he failed to observe the bus, then he
was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Instruction no. 14 stated in part:
[Y]ou are instructed that the driver of
the Jeep, Rodney Talbot, was negligent
as a matter of law, and if you find that
he observed the bus stopped upon the
highway, or, under the circumstances
should have observed the bus, but because of his negligence failed to do so in
time to avoid the accident, then you are
instructed that the negligence on his part
was the sole proximate cause of the collision.
The instruction directed a verdict on two
crucial contested issues of fact and in addition was confusing. First, the instruction
directed the jury that Talbot was negligent
as a matter of law. In addition, even
though the instruction did not specify in
what manner Talbot was negligent as a
matter of law, it nevertheless stated that
if Talbot: (1) knew the bus had stopped or
(2) should have observed that the bus was
stopped and failed to do so in time to avoid
the accident, then Talbot's negligence was
the "sole proximate cause of the collision."
Second, the instruction in effect directed a
verdict on proximate cause, apparently on
the theory that Talbot's negligence was a
superseding cause.
'
[1] The law of superseding causation is,
as a general proposition, more easily stated
than applied. A person's negligence is not
superseded by the negligence of another if
the subsequent negligence of another is
foreseeable. This Court in Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph, Co,,
Utah, 611 P.2d 363 (1980), adopted the rule

stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 447 (1965):
The fact that an intervening act of a
third person is negligent in itself or is
done in a negligent manner does not
make it a superseding cause of harm to
another which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about, if
(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized that a
third person might so act, or
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of the third
person was done would not regard it as
highly extraordinary that the third person had so acted, or
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation created by the
actor's conduct and the manner in which
it is done is not extraordinarily negligent.
The same general rule is stated by Professor Prosser as follows:
The risk created by the defendant may
include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of o t h e r s . . . . [T)he standard of reasonable conduct may require
the defendant to protect the plaintiff
against 'that occasioned negligence which
is one of the ordinary incidents of human
life and therefore to be anticipated.'
Prosser, The Law of Torts § 44 at 274 (4th
ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
This Court has applied that rule on several occasions. E.g., Jensen v. Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph Co,, supra;
Watters v. Querry, Utah, 588 P.2d 702
(1978), appeal from proceedings after remand, 626 P.2d 455 (1981). See Skollingsberg v. Brookover, 26 Utah 2d 45, 484 P.2d
1177 (1971). Cf. Collier v. Frerichs, Utah,
626 P.2d 476 (1981). Accord Hennigan v.
Atlantic Refining Co., 282 F.Supp. 667 (E.D.
Pa.1967); Grainy v. Campbell, 493 Pa. 88,
425 A.2d 379 (1981); Strobel v, Chicago,
Rock Island & Pacific RR. Co,, 255 Minn.
201, 96 N.W.2d 195 (1959). See also Annot,
Negligence Causing Automobile Accident,
or Negligence of Driver Subsequently Approaching Scene of Accident, As Proximate
Cause of Injury by or to the Approaching
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Car or to Its Occupants, 58 A.L.R.2d 270,
§ 2[b] (1958).
In Watters v. Querry, supra, the defendant Hemingway slowed abruptly on the
freeway while changing lanes. Plaintiff
Watters slowed to avoid hitting Hemingway, and was in turn rear-ended by defendant Querry. On appeal, this Court held
that an instruction, essentially similar to
instruction 14 in the instant case, constituted reversible error. The instruction stated
that if the driver of a cr should have observed and avoided a dangerous condition
created by another car in front of him and
did not, that driver's negligence was an
" 'independent intervening cause, and,
therefore the first driver cannot be a proximate cause of the collision.'" 588 P.2d at
703 (emphasis in original). This Court held:
The more fundamental test is whether
under the particular circumstances he
should have foreseen that his conduct
would have exposed others to an unreasonable risk of harm; and this includes
situations where negligent or other
wrongful conduct of others should reasonably be anticipated.... The difficulty with the instruction about which plaintiff complains is that, as applied to the
instant situation, it would seem to exculpate defendant Hemingway (who created
a dangerous situation) if it is found that
the defendant Querry (the latter actor)
was negligent, whether or not the latter's
conduct was foreseeable. If the principle
of law just discussed is properly applied
to the evidence in this case, it appears to
us that there is a legitimate question as
to whether a jury could reasonably find
that defendant Hemingway, in making
the alleged abrupt stop, should have foreseen that, in traffic such as there was on
that highway, some momentarily inattentive driver following her would not have
been able to react and brake quick
enough to avoid collision with her car or
the car behind hers.
588 P.2d at 704.
Later, when Watters was again appealed
from an order entered after the remand in
the first case, we reaffirmed the rule. Cit-

ing Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Co., supra, this Court stated:
[T]he first actor cannot excuse himself
from liability arising from his negligent
acts merely because the later negligence
of another concurs to cause injury, if the
later act were a foreseeable event.
626 P.2d at 458.
[2] In the present case, the disputed instruction was erroneous because it failed to
submit the proximate cause issue to the
jury for determination. Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
supra. In other words, the jury should
have decided whether Loosemore stopped
the bus in such a way that it was foreseeable that "some momentarily inattentive
driver following [him] would not be able to
react and brake quick enough to avoid collision." Watters v. Querry, supra, 588 P.2d
at 704.
[3] Where the evidence is in dispute,
including the inferences from the evidence,
the issue should be submitted to the jury.
Little America Refining Co. v. Leyba, Utah,
641 P.2d 112 (1982); FMA Acceptance Co.
v. Leatherby Insurance Co., Utah, 594J?.2d
1332 (1979). See also Bowen v. Riverton
City, Utah, 656 P.2d 434 (1982); Jensen v.
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Co., Utah, 611 P.2d 363 (1980).
We do not mean to imply that rulings by
the trial court which decide a factual contention as a matter of law are never appropriate.
But the right to trial by jury is a basic
principle of our system that cannot be allowed to be eroded by improper intrusions
on the jury's prerogative. In the instant
case, the issue of Talbot's negligence and
proximate cause should have gone to the
jury. If, as plaintiff contends, Loosemore
stopped the bus too rapidly, or failed to
drive out of the lane of traffic, or had
faulty brake lights, he may have contributed to a rear-end collision by a momentarily
inattentive driver, which would not have
been so "extraordinary" as to be unforeseeable.
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B. The Rule in Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co.

becomes confronted with an emergency
situation.

[4] Instruction no. 14 appears to have
been based on the rule stated in Hillyard v.
Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 151,
263 P.2d 287, 292 (1953); and restated in
McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400,346
P.2d 711 (1959); Valesquez v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989
(1961); Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 2A Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970).
Hillyard, supra, stated the rule as follows:
In applying the test of foreseeability to
situations where a negligently created
pre-existing condition combines with a
later act of negligence causing an injury,
the courts have drawn a clear-cut distinction between two classes of cases. The
first situation is where one has negligently created a dangerous condition [such as
parking the truck] and a later actor observed, or circumstances are such that he
could not fail to observe, but negligently
failed to avoid it. The second situation
involves conduct of a later intervening
actor who negligently failed to observe
the dangerous condition until it is too late
to avoid it. In regard to the first situation it is held as a matter of law that the
later intervening act does interrupt the
natural sequence of events and cut off
the legal effect of the negligence of the
initial actor. This is based uponjthe reasoning that it is not reasonably to be
foreseen nor expected that one who actually becomes cognizant of a dangerous
condition in ample time to avert injury
will fail to do so.17 On the other hand,
with respect to the second situation,
where the second actor fails to see the
danger in time to avoid it, it is held that a
jury question exists, based on the rationale that it can reasonably be anticipated
that circumstances may arise wherein
others may not observe the dangerous
condition until too late to escape it.18
The distinction is basically one between a
situation in which the second actor has
sufficient time, after being charged with
knowledge of the hazard, to avoid it, and
one in which the second actor negligently

17Kline v. Moyer, 325 Pa. 357, 191 A. 43, 111
A.L.R. 406 (1937).
18 Ibid.

1 Utah 2d at 151, 263 P.2d at 292 (emphasis
in original). In other words, the test in
Hillyard is two-pronged: (1) where a motorist sees a stationary object in the road
and negligently fails to avoid it, his negligence is, as a matter of law, a superseding
cause, but (2) if the motorist negligently
fails to see the stationary object in time to
avoid it, the issue of whether the motorist's
negligence is a superseding cause is for the
jury.
The case most heavily relied on in Hillyard to support the first prong of the rule
there stated has been overruled. Kline v.
Moyer, 325 Pa. 357, 191 A. 43 (1937), was
expressly overruled by Grainy v. Campbell,
493 Pa. 88, 425 A.2d 379 (1981), which rejected the rule of superseding cause in
Kline and adopted the rule stated in § 447
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See
also Hennigan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 282
F.Supp. 667, 678-79 (E.D.Pa.1967) (explaining Pennsylvania's modifications to Kline v.
Moyer).
The strong drift away from deciding the
issue of superseding causation in automobile accidents as a matter of law is evident
in Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Co., Utah, 611 P.2d 363 (1980),
and Watters v. Querry, Utah, 588 P.2d 702
(1978). Indeed, Jensen all but overruled the
first prong of Hillyard sub silento. The
approach taken in Jensen and Watters is
also consistent with a number of other Utah
cases in which this Court has held that a
motorist who collides with a stationary vehicle on the highway is not guilty of negligence as a matter of law without respect to
the totality of the circumstances. See Collier v. Frerichs, Utah, 626 P.2d 476 (1981);
Fretz v. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 R2d
642 (1956); Nielsen v. Watanabe, 90 Utah
401, 62 P.2d 117 (1936).
Finally, the first prong of Hillyard cannot
stand analysis from a theoretical point of
view. There is no valid distinction between
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one who negligently fails to keep a proper
lookout and rear-ends another car and one
who keeps a proper lookout but negligently
fails to avoid a collision. The two situations
are similar to the doctrines of assumptions
of risk and contributory negligence—which
are now treated for the most part simply in
terms of whether a defendant failed to act
as a reasonably prudent person under the
circumstances. Moore v. Burton Lumber &
Hardware Co., Utah, 631 P.2d 865 (1981);
Jacobsen Construction Co. Inc. v. StructoLite Engineering, Inc., Utah, 619 P.2d 306
(1980). Although Moore and Jacobsen did
not deal with proximate cause, that is not
significant. What is significant is that the
distinction between the first and second
prongs of Hillyard is artificial and unjustifiable basically for the reasons stated in
Moore. In addition, whether a defendant's
conduct fits under the first or second prong
in Hillyard, conduct under either prong is
generally foreseeable from the point of
view of the person who first creates the
hazard.
Finally, the unsound distinction made in
Hillyard serves to frustrate the purpose of
the Comparative Negligence Statute by
precluding the kind of comparison of fault
that a jury ought to make. The allocationof liability should be made on the basis of
the relative culpability of both parties. To
do that the jury must assess the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the second driver's actions in light of all the circumstances,
including whatever action it takes to avoid
a collision, his initial speed, the initial spsed
of the first car, road conditions, traffic conditions, and the like.
To avoid further confusion in the doctrine
of superseding causation in cases such as
this, we hereby overrule the first prong of
the Hillyard test as stated in Hillyard,
McMurdie, Valesquez, and Anderson.
II. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
Plaintiffs also urge that the court erred
in excluding the bus maintenance records
made subsequent to the accident. The records were offered for the purpose of demonstrating that the tail lights of the bus

were not functioning at the time of the
accident and that UTA was therefore negligent.
[5] The law is well settled that evidence
of repairs made after an accident is inadmissible to prove negligence. Rule 51, Utah
R.Evid.; Potter v. Dr. W.H. Groves Latterday Saints Hospital, 99 Utah 71, 103 P.2d
280 (1940). However, evidence of subsequent repairs is admissible for other purposes, such as proving the physical conditions that existed at the time of an accident, if the defendant disputes the earlier
condition, and if the only way of establishing the earlier condition is by evidence of
subsequent repairs. Lawlor v. County of
Flathead, 177 Mont. 508, 582 P.2d 751
(1978); Heldman v. Uniroyal, Inc., 53 Ohio
App.2d 21, 371 N.E.2d 557 (1977); Leeth v.
Roberts, 295 Ala. 27, 322 So.2d 679 (1975)
(dictum); McCormick on Evidence § 295 at
668 & n. 23 (2d ed. 1972); Annot, Admissibility of Evidence of Repairs, Change of
Conditions, or Precautions Taken After Accident, 64 A.L.R.2d 1296, § 6[d] (1959). See
also 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 283 (Chadbourn rev. 1979)
[6] Although the alleged malfunctioning
of the brake lights of the bus might have
been caused by the accident itself, the
plaintiffs theory was that the lights were
defective prior to the accident and that that
defect was a causative factor. Under the
circumstances, whether the lights were malfunctioning and whether they contributed
to the accident were questions of fact for
the jury. In short, it was error to exclude
the proffered evidence.
III. REVERSIBLE ERROR
[7,8] Since instruction no. 14 and the
exclusion of UTA's maintenance records
were erroneous, the issue must be addressed
whether those errors were sufficiently prejudicial to constitute grounds for reversal.
An error is reversible if there is a reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result
would have been obtained by the complaining party in the absence of the error.
Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co.,
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Utah, 631 P.2d 865 (1981); Shurtleff v. Jay
Tuft & Co., Utah, 622 P.2d 1168 (1980);
Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Co., 26 Utah
2d 448,491 P.2d 1209 (1971). See also Rivas
v. Pacific Finance Co., 16 Utah 2d 183, 397
P.2d 990 (1964); Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah
2d 411, 360 P.2d 822 (1961).
Plaintiffs tried the case on the theory
that Loosemore was negligent in five different respects in the manner in which he
drove the bus. Plaintiff also contended
that UTA was negligent in its maintenance
of the bus* electrical system. The error in
instruction no. 14 in directing a verdict on
proximate cause combined with the exclusion of evidence was clearly prejudicial on
the theory based on improper maintenance
of the bus.
Furthermore, we cannot conclude that
the errors in instruction no. 14 relating to
Talbot's negligence and to proximate cause
and the error in the exclusion of evidence
were harmless in assessing whether there
was negligence in the operation of the bus,
even though the jury found Loosemore not
negligent. Absent those errors it is reasonably possible that the jury would have
found Loosemore's operation of the bus
negligent in view of instruction no. 11,
which is set out in the margin, and a proximate cause of the accident.1 Whether the
brake and turn lights were working clearly
bore on the reasonableness of-the mannerln
1. Instruction no. 11 stated:
It was the duty of the defendant, Lester
Lorenzo Loosemore, to use reasonable care,
under the circumstances, in driving the bus,
to avoid danger to himself and others, and to
observe and be aware of the condition of the
highway, including its width and shoulders,
the traffic thereon, and other existing conditions; in that regard, he was obligated to use
reasonable care in respect to:
(a) To use reasonable care to keep a lookout for persons, other vehicles and other conditions reasonably to be seen or anticipated;
(b) To keep the bus under reasonably safe
and proper control;
(c) Not to stop the bus upon the paved or
main traveled part of the highway when it is
practical to stop the bus off such paved or
main traveled part of the highway;
(d) Not to suddenly stop or decrease his
speed without first ascertaining that he could
do so with reasonable safety, and, if other

which Loosemore stopped the bus and
where he stopped.
Plaintiff adduced evidence which made
the reasonableness of Talbot's conduct and
that of defendants turn to a significant
degree upon whether the rear bus lights
were malfunctioning as well as upon whether Loosemore stopped too swiftly and failed
to pull completely out of the traffic lane
when he stopped.
Although there was much disputed testimony concerning the operation of the rear
signal and tail lights, no witness saw the
brake lights at the time of the accident or
immediately thereafter. The evidence revealed that the bus had experienced several
electrical failures in the lighting and related systems prior to the accident, and the
proffered evidence indicated that there had
been numerous and continued problems
with the electrical system after the accident.
One of Harris' witnesses, an expert in the
field of accident reconstruction, testified
that without functioning brake lights a
slowing or stopping maneuver is very difficult to perceive in the rear driver's "cone of
perception" until he is relatively close to the
stopping vehicle. The expert testified that
from the point Talbot perceived the bus and
reacted, he made the best possible effort to
avoid the accident. A driver of a vehicle
behind Talbot testified that she was not
vehicles are to be affected by such movement, not without first giving an appropriate
signal to the driver to the rear that such
movement is to be made; either by the extension of the hand and arm downward or by
appropriate signal lamps, either such signal
to be given continuously;
(e) Not to turn from a direct course or
from one lane to another without first ascertaining that such movement can be made
with reasonable safety, and, if other vehicles
are to be affected by such movement, not
without giving an appropriate signal continuously for at least the last three seconds preceding the beginning of the turn or change,
either by the appropriate extension of arm
and hand or by appropriate signal lamps.
Failure of the defendant, Loosemore, to operate the bus in accordance with any of the
foregoing requirements of law would constitute negligence on his part. [Emphasis added.]
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aware that the bus had stopped until "suddenly the space between the jeep and the
bus, and myself and the jeep was getting
narrow." Another driver of a vehicle behind Talbot stated, "I didn't realize the bus
was slowing down or stopping. We didn't
have any indication it was stopping."
In sum, the exclusion of the maintenance
records bore directly on whether the turn
and brake lights were properly functioning
and may have been of critical importance
with respect to plaintiff's theories of negligence, both as to maintenance and manner
of operation of the bus, and with respect to
proximate cause. The errors were not
harmless because there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdicts would have
been different in the absence of error.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Costs to appellants.
HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and
DURHAM, J.T., concur.

Calvin N. HALL and Rita M. Hall,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
- —
Perry C. FITZGERALD, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 18371.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 7, 1983.
Vendors brought action against purchasers to foreclose real estate contract.
The Fourth District Court, Utah County,
Allen B. Sorensen, J., granted summary
judgment in favor of vendors, and purchasers appealed. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J.,
held that: (1) vendors fulfilled their contractual responsibility to convey "title" to
purchasers by delivering warranty deed to

subject property, even though vendors were
themselves purchasing property under real
estate contract and therefore never possessed legal title; (2) denial of purchasers'
motion to set aside judgment on ground of
newly discovered evidence was not abuse of
discretion; and (3) questions as to whether
remand was required because, prior to foreclosure sale, trial court entered personal
judgment against purchasers for any deficiency owing after sale and whether vendors would be unjustly enriched if there
was deficiency judgment were moot and
would not be adjudicated.
Affirmed.

1. Judgment <s=>181(ll)
Allegations or denials m pleadings are
not sufficient basis for opposing summary
judgment.
2. Vendor and Purchaser <s=>128
Although, in real estate transaction,
"title" most often refers to estate in fee
simple, clear of all encumbrances or interests of any other person, contract by its
terms, or circumstances leading up to and
surrounding transaction, may show that
parties intended another meaning; under
such circumstances, "title" can refer to
wide array of estates or interests, including
legal title, equitable title, or mere right of
possession
3. Vendor and Purchaser <s=»128
Where, under uniform real estate contract, equitable title would have been
passed to purchasers when contract was
signed, "title" required to be passed to purchasers by paragraph of contract was not
usual unencumbered fee simple estate with
participation by no other person, inasmuch
as vendors would have no such title to give,
but would, at most, refer to legal title retained by vendor.
4. Vendor and Purchaser ®=> 129(1)
Although vendors, who were themselves purchasing property under real estate contract, never possessed legal title to
property sold to purchasers, vendors ful-
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panion were apprehended. The juvenile
was then taken to the Provo Police Station,
and his mother notified at 12:05 a. m. The
mother had no transportation and asked the
juvenile's aunt to go to the Police Station.
A Detective Baum investigated the circumstances at the school, and then interrogated the juvenile at the Police Station,
having arrived there at approximately 1:00
a. m. He there read the juvenile his "Miranda "2 rights, and wrote~down the juvenile's statement. The juvenile signed the
statement at 2:45 a. m., January 6, 1979,
and was released.
At the hearing in Juvenile Court, defense
counsel objected to the admission of the
written statement and to Detective Baum's
testimony concerning the juvenile's statement on the ground that a juvenile is incapable of voluntarily waiving his constitutional rights. The Court overruled this objection, saying:
Pending a ruling by the Appellate
Courts on this question in Utah, there has
been a fairly uniform position of the trial
courts of the juvenile system, so if the
evidence appears to show a knowledgeable understanding of the rights being
given and that there's no evidence showing involuntariness, that the simple fact
of minority, at least at the age of this
respondent, does not automatically incapacitate him from the legal waiver or a
separate waiver. So I will overrule your
objection, but note it for the record.
On appeal, the juvenile cites this ruling
as error, and urges this Court to adopt a
rule which would exclude a juvenile's admissions or confessions made without the
counsel of his attorney or his parents. In
addition, the juvenile contends that the police interrogation was in violation of Section 78-3a-29, and that such violation renders the juvenile's statements inadmissible.
[1] We have dealt with both of these
questions at length in State v. Hunt, 607
P.2d 297 (1980). We there held that the
purpose of Section 78-3a-29 was not to
govern police interrogation of juveniles, and

that the admissibility of the juvenile's confessions or admissions depends upon whether the juvenile made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights in
light of the total circumstances of his case.
[2] Here, the Judge determined that
this confession was voluntary, and that the
juvenile had waived his rights. The evidence supports this determination. The juvenile testified in his own behalf, but the
only evidence he gave of any "coercive"
tactics on the part of the police was that
the officer told him to sign the confession
because he (the officer) wanted to go home
and go to bed. The juvenile admitted, however, that he knew the statement would be
used against him in court. We do not believe any coercion existed here which would
render this confession involuntary. It was
given by a juvenile, 17 years of age, who,
according to the record was not unfamiliar
with the process of the criminal law.
Affirmed.
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN,
HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur.

Kerby R. ANDERTON, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Terry MONTGOMERY and Tom Montgomery, dba Vernal Hide & Fur Com- pany, Defendant and Respondents.. s
No. 15980.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Peb. 15, 1980.
Action was brought to recover against
owners and operators of business for injuries sustained when side of device, which

2. Miranda v Arizona, 384 U S 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966)
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was used to exhibit sheet metal samples,
collapsed and caused samples to crash down
on plaintiff. The Fourth District Court,
Uintah County, David Sam, J., dismissed
action, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that: (1) certain
instruction did not contradict res ipsa loquitur instructions given, but, rather, merely
constituted a clarification thereof; (2) instruction dealing with unavoidable accident
did not contradict the theory of res ipsa
loquitur; (3) unavoidable accident instruction was not superfluous, confusing, or misleading; and (4) fact that attorney-client
relationship existed between defense counsel and corporation, of which a juror had
once been an officer, and that such relationship was not disclosed at voir dire examination did not result in prejudicial error.
Affirmed.
1. Negligence <s=> 121.2(2)
Purpose of res ipsa loquitur is to permit
one suffering injury from something which
was under control of another and which
ordinarily would not cause injury except for
the other's negligence, to present grievance
to a court or jury on basis that an inference
of negligence may reasonably be drawn
from such facts, and cast the burden on the
other to make proof as to what happened.
2. Negligence <s=> 121.2(3)
Circumstances which, under doctrine~of
res ipsa loquitur, would permit trier of fact
to infer that defendant has engaged in negligent conduct to injury of the plaintiff,
are: that the accident was a kind which, in
the ordinary course of events, would not
have happened had due care been observed;
that plaintiff's own use or operation of the
agency or instrumentality was not primarily responsible for the injury; and that the
agency or instrumentality causing the injury was under exclusive management or control of the defendant
3. Negligence <s=> 136(6)
Weighing of evidence presented to establish the elements which must be established before doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
can be applied is within province of the
jury.

4. Negligence <s=> 136(6), 138(3)
Where trial court determines that the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to plaintiff, could have established prerequisites to the application of doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, an instruction to that effect is
proper, and it then becomes jury's responsibility to apply or refuse to apply the doctrine, based on its factual findings regarding the circumstantial prerequisites.
5. Negligence &=> 121.2(9)
Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine aiding in proof of negligence; it has
no bearing on issue of causation, which
must be separately and independently established.
6. Negligence <&=» 121.5
Res ipsa loquitur does not relieve plaintiff of his obligation of establishing causal
link between defendant's act or omission
and plaintiff's injury, but permits plaintiff,
in lieu of linking his injury to specific act on
defendant's part, to causally connect it with
agency or instrumentality, under exclusive
control of defendant, functioning in manner
which, under the circumstances, would produce no injury absent negligence; if agency
or instrumentality is not established to be
cause of plaintiff's injury or if it is not
shown to be under exclusive control of defendant, causal connection is not established, and inference of negligent conduct
giving rise thereto is nullified.
7. Trial <®=>243
In action to recover against owners and
operators of business for injuries sustained
when side of device, which was used to
exhibit sheet metal samples, collapsed and
caused samples to crash down on plaintiff,
certain instruction, by informing jury that
"where the precise cause of an accident on
the whole evidence is left to conjecture or
speculation, and may be attributed to causes over one or more of which the defendants have no control, as to a cause for which
the defendant would be responsible " liability should not be found, did not contradict
res ipsa loquitur instructions given by trial
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court, but, rather, merely constituted a clarification thereof.
8. Negligence <s=»63
Where injury arises from a set of circumstances which do not reflect a lack of
due care on anyone's part, the accident has
been "unavoidable" and no recovery may be
had under a theory of negligence.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions
9. Negligence <3=»140
In action to recover against owners and
operators of business for injuries sustained
when side of device, which was used to
exhibit sheet metal samples, collapsed and
caused samples to crash down on plaintiff,
instruction dealing with unavoidable accident did not contradict plaintiff's theory of
res ipsa loquitur.
10. Trial <s=>244(4)
Though an instruction on unavoidable
accident amounts to a reemphasis of principles implicit in other instructions, giving of
an unavoidable accident instruction is not
error if it clearly and concisely states the
principle involved and does not create an
imbalance in the jury instructions.
11. Negligence <s=>140
Trial <s=*229
In action to recover against owners and
operators of business for injuries sustained
when side of device, which was used to
exhibit sheet metal samples, collapsed and
caused samples to crash down on plaintiff,
giving of "unavoidable accident" instruction
was not superfluous, confusing or misleading under certain circumstances.
12y Appeal and Error <s=»233(2)
Where jury's question in regard to possibility of assessing 60% of injury to unavoidable accident and 40% to negligence
was answered to satisfaction of both parties, plaintiff could not complain on appeal
that the question posed remained as evidence of the inadequacy of trial court's
instruction on unavoidable accident.

13. Constitutional Law <s=>267
Requirements of due process dictate
that jury be impartial and unbiased. U.S.C.
A.Const. Amend. 14; Const, art. 1, §§ 7,10.
14. New Trial <s=>42(2)
Trial court may order new trial if it
appears that juror bias has crept into the
proceedings notwithstanding voir dire questioning. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; Const,
art. 1, §§ 7, 10; Rules of Civil Procedure,
rule 61.
15. Appeal and Error o=>1170.1
.,• {
Where, in sound discretion of trial
court, an infraction of a party's rights at
voir dire questioning has no material impact
on party's right to impartial jury trial, no
prejudicial error has occurred. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 14; Const, art. 1, §§ 7, 10;
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 61.
16. Appeal and Error <^=>1170.1
In action to recover against owners and
operators of business for injuries sustained
when side of device, which was used to
exhibit sheet metal samples, collapsed and
caused samples to crash down on plaintiff,
fact that attorney-client relationship existed between defendant's counsel and corporation, of which a juror had once been an
officer, and that such relationship was not
disclosed at voir dire examination did not
result in prejudicial error where neither
counsel nor juror were aware of such relationship until after the trial had finished.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 61.
George E. Mangan, Roosevelt, for plaintiff and appellant.
Stephen B. Nebeker and Paul S. Felt, of
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, Salt Lake City,
for defendants and respondents.
r^^
HALL, Justice:
yj
This appeal is taken from the dismissal ,of
a personal injury action pursued by plaintiff Kerby R. Anderton against defendants
Terry and Tom Montgomery, owners and
operators of the Vernal Hide and Fur Company.
,*
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Defendants' business, located in Vernal,
Utah, deals, among other things, in commercial sale of sheet metal. Plaintiff, a
part-time welder, visited defendants' place
of business on September 26, 1975, for the
purpose of purchasing sheet metal for the
construction of a metal box. Plaintiff was
conducted into defendants' business yard by
defendant Terry Montgomery, and shown a
display device used to exhibit sheet metal
samples. The display consisted of a rack,
set on a pipe frame and holding sheet metal
samples vertically, such that they could be
turned from one side to the other, like the
pages of a book. As plaintiff and another
individual who had accompanied him began
turning through the samples, defendant
Terry Montgomery was called away by a
telephone call. While plaintiff, assisted by
his friend and another employee of defendants, continued to examine the samples on
the rack, the right -side of the pipe frame
supporting the display collapsed, causing
the rack bearing the samples to crash down
onto plaintiff, driving the pipe through the
flesh of his right hip and buttock. The
accident resulted in partial, permanent impairment of plaintiff's right hip and leg.
Plaintiff thereupon instituted suit against
defendants. At trial, defendants asserted
that they had used the display device for
some six months without any prior difficulty, but were unable to point to any specific
factor which could have been responsible
for the frame's collapse. Plaintiff was likewise unable to establish any specific conduct on defendant's part giving rise to the
collapse. Consequently, plaintiff requested
that the court instruct the jury regarding
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which instruction was given, over defendants' objection. Defendants requested an instruction
explaining the nature of an "unavoidable
accident" under the law, which was also
given, over plaintiff's objection. The jury
found neither party negligent and plaintiff
was therefore denied recovery for his injuries.
Sometime subsequent to the entry of
judgment, Mr. Stephen B. Nebeker, counsel
for defendants, while preparing for the defense of a separate action involving a com-

pany by the name of H & S Trucking,
learned that a former owner of that company, one LeRoy Dean Huber, had served on
the jury in the instant case. Neither Mr.
Nebeker nor Mr. Huber had been aware of
their connection in this regard at the time
of the former trial; Mr. Huber had denied,
on voir dire, any connection or acquaintance
with either counsel, and Mr. Nebeker had
never dealt with Mr. Huber pursuant to his
dealings with H & S Trucking, as Huber
had sold his interest therein in 1973, while
the litigation involving the services of Mr.
Nebeker did not arise until 1974. Mr. Nebeker, however, notified the trial court immediately regarding the relationship thus
discovered, whereupon a hearing was held.
The trial court ruled that plaintiff's interests had not been prejudiced by reason of
the relationship since, at the time of the
trial, neither Mr. Nebeker nor Mr. Huber
was aware that it existed
On appeal, plaintiff first claims prejudice
by reason of conflict and inconsistency in
the jury instructions given by the trial
court below. As previously mentioned,
plaintiff requested and received instructions relating to the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, and to its application in the
present case. The instructions given were
as follows:
^
Instruction No. 4
Our law recognizes a doctrine known as
res ipsa loquitur which means: The thing
speaks for itself. By reason of it, under
certain circumstances, one who is injured
may hold another responsible without
showing the exact conduct of the other
party that caused or set in motion the act
that caused the injury. The doctrine of
law may be applied only under special
circumstances, they being as follows:
First: That the rack of sheet metal and
the stand pipe that broke and collapsed
upon the plaintiff, Kerby Anderton,
which proximately caused the injury to
him, was in the possession and exclusive
control of the defendants Terry Montgomery and Tom Montgomery at the
time the cause of injury was set in mo-
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plaintiff is not in a position to know what
r tion, and that it appears that the injury
was the specific reason for the breaking
resulted from some act or omission inciof the stand pipe and the collapse of the
dent to the manner in which the defendants maintained or constructed or exersheet metal, whereas the defendants as
cised due care in the use of the said rack
the possessors of said yard, and have the
of sheet metal. This does not mean that
exclusive right to the control of the same,
defendants had to be present at the time
may be reasonably expected to know the
of the injury or that the plaintiff could
reason for the same, and to thus explain
not be engaged in assisting the defendtheir lack of negligence; then upon your
ants agents in locating the desired piece
making such findings, there arises an inof .sheet metal.
ference that the proximate cause of the
Second: That the incident was one of
occurrence was some negligent conduct
such nature as does not or would not have
on the part of the defendants. The inferhappened in the ordinary course of
ence is a form of evidence, and if there is
things, if those who have control of or are
none other tending to overcome it, or if
responsible for the rack of sheet metal,
the inference, to your minds, preponderuse ordinary care.
ates over contrary evidence, it would
Third: That the circumstances surwarrant a verdict for the plaintiff.
rounding the causing of the occurrence
Therefore, you should consider this inferwere such that the plaintiff is not in a
ence together with all of the other eviposition to know what specific conduct or
dence in the case in determining your
act or omission or failure to act, was the
verdict.
cause, whereas the defendants, being
Defendants, over plaintiff's objection, sethose in charge of their yard and the rack
cured
the submission of an instruction relatof sheet metal, may be reasonably expecting
to
causation, which read as follows:
ed to know, and thus to be able to explain
their lack of negligence. (See Sanone v.
Instruction No. 17
J. C. Penny [sic] Company, 17 Utah 2d 46,
You are instructed that where the pre404 P.2d 248).
cise cause of an accident on the whole
If you find all of the above conditions
evidence is left to conjecture or speculato exist, they may give rise to an infertion, and may be as reasonably attributed
ence by you that the defendants were
to causes over one or more of which the
negligent, which inference will support a
defendants has no control, as to a cause
verdict for the plaintiff, in the absence of
for which the defendants would be reevidence of non-negligence on the part of
sponsible, then, and in that event, there
the defendants.
has been a failure in the required burden
of proof. If you find from the evidence
Instruction No. 4a
in this case that it is just as likely that
If you find from a preponderance of
the accident resulted from causes beyond
the evidence that the sheet metal which
the control of defendants as from neglicollapsed on Kerby Anderton when the
gence or fault, then the burden of proof
stand pipe holding the same broke, was in
as against such defendants have not been
the possession and exclusive control of
met, and such defendants are entitled to
the defendants, as I have explained the
your verdict in their favor, no cause of
* same to you; and, if you further find
action.
that the incident causing such an injury is
Defendants likewise requested and se-"
of such a nature as
. would [not]
have happened in the ordinary course of cured (again over plaintiff's objection) the
events if the rack of sheet metal had been reading of an instruction relating to the
properly constructed and or maintained; doctrine of "unavoidable or inevitable acciand, if you shall further find that the dent." The instruction stated that,
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Instruction No. 19 \ *
In law we recognize what we term as
unavoidable or inevitable accidents.
These terms do not mean literally that it
was not possible for such an accident to
be avoided. They simply denote an accident that occurred without having been
proximately caused by negligence. Even
if such an accident could have been avoided by the exercise of exceptional foresight, skill or caution, still no one may be
held liable for injuries resulting from it.
Both negligence and proximate cause, as
defined in these instructions, are requisites for [finding] liability. If you find
from the evidence in this case that the
accident occurred without negligence on
the part of defendants or was not proximately caused by any negligence on the
part of defendants, you should answer
interrogatory No. 3 "No".
It is plaintiff's contention that instructions 17 and 19 conflict with and contradict
instructions 4 and 4a, dealing with res ipsa
loquitur, in that they suggest the incumbency, upon plaintiff, of producing evidence of
specific acts of negligence on the part of
defendants, where res ipsa loquitur specifically obviates the necessity of doing so,
permitting plaintiff to establish negligence
on defendants' part by inference drawn
from circumstantial evidence.
[1-4] Turning first to plaintiff's contention that instruction 17 was inconsistent
with the application of res ipsa loquitur, we
note that he correctly characterizes the underlying function and purpose of that doctrine. As previously stated by this Court,
the purpose of res ipsa loquitur is "to per-

mit one who suffers injury from something
under the control of another, which ordinarily would not cause injury except for the
other's negligence, to present his grievance
to a court or jury on the basis that an
inference of negligence may reasonably be
drawn from such facts; and cast the burden
upon the other to make proof of what happened." l It is often the case that a plaintiff, while suffering injury which was
caused by a force or agency allegedly instigated by defendant's conduct, is .unable to
produce evidence pinpointing a given act or
omission on the part of defendant which
breached a legally imposed standard of
care. Where this is the case, the law permits plaintiff to withdraw from the specific
conduct constituting negligence, and concentrate upon presenting evidence probative of circumstances which would permit
the trier of fact to infer that defendant had
engaged in negligent conduct to the injury
of the plaintiff. Such circumstances, which
have been defined by law, are (1) that the
accident was of a kind which, in the ordinary course of events, would not have happened had due care been observed; (2) that
the plaintiff's own use or operation of the
agency or instrumentality was not primarily responsible for the injury; 2 and (3) that
the agency or instrumentality causing the
injury was under the exclusive management or control of the defendant.3 It is to
be noted that the weighing of evidence
presented to establish the above elements,
like all other questions of fact, is within the
province of the jury; where the trial court
determines that the evidence, viewed in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff, could
establish the prerequisites to the application

1. Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co, 10 Utah 2d
276, 351 P 2d 952 (1960), see also Joseph v. W.
H Groves Latter Day Saint Hospital, 10 Utah
2d 94, 348 P 2d 935 (1960), White v Pinney, 99
Utah 484, 108 P 2d 249 (1940)
2. This is not to say that any contributory negligence on plaintiff's part prevents the application of the doctrine, such that it may not be
used in those cases where plaintiff is seeking
partial recover/ under Utah's comparative negligence statute (U C A , 1953, 78-27-37) The
requirement here is that plaintiffs use of the
agency or instrumentality not be primarily re-

sponsible for the injury, not that his actions be
free from negligence of any kind (Note that
the comparative negligence provision bars partial recovery under any type of proof where
plaintiffs negligence equals oi exceeds that of
the defendant) See 58 Am.Jur 2d Negligence,
§ 481, p 58 3.

Wightman v Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 5
Utah 2d 373, 302 P 2d 471 (1956), Moore v
James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 297 P 2d 221 (1956), Loos
v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 99 Utah 496, 108
P.2d 254 (1940)
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of the doctrine, an instruction to that effect
is proper. It then becomes the jury's responsibility to apply, or refuse to apply, the
doctrine based on its factual findings regarding the circumstantial prerequisites.4
[5-7] With regard to instruction 17 in
the present case, however, we must observe
that res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine aiding in the proof of negligence; it
has no bearing on the issue of causation,
which must be separately and independently established.5 As in any negligence action, a legally-recognizable causal link must
be established between defendant's act or
omission and plaintiff's injury. Absent
such a causal relationship, defendant's conduct, negligent or otherwise, gives rise to
no liability.6 Res ipsa loquitur does not
relieve plaintiff of this obligation; rather,
it permits him, in lieu of linking his injury
to a specific act on defendant's part, to
causally connect it with an agency or instrumentality, under the exclusive control
of the defendant, functioning in a manner
which, under the circumstances, would produce no injury absent negligence. However, where the agency or instrumentality
is not established to be the cause of plaintiff's injury, or where it is not shown to be
under the exclusive control of the defendant, the causal connection is not established,
and the inference of negligent conduct, giving rise thereto is nullified. Instruction 17,
by informing the jury_that "where the precise cause of an accident on the whole evidence is left to conjecture j or speculation,
and may be attributed to causes over one or
more of which the defendants has no control, as to a cause for which the defendant
would be responsible," liability should not
be found, was simply specifying that, under
such circumstances, the prerequisites of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would thereby
be lacking. As such, instruction 17 does not
contradict the res ipsa loquitur instructions
4. Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra, footnote 1.
5. See Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability,
§ 12.03[1], p 284.
6. Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d
664 (1966).

given, but constitutes merely a clarification
thereof.
[8,9] For similar reasons, we are unpersuaded that jury instruction 19, dealing
with unavoidable accident, contradicts the
theory of res ipsa loquitur. Unavoidable
accident, rather than being a separate legal
doctrine, is simply a recognition of the fact
that an incident causing injury to the plaintiff does not necessarily give rise to liability
in the defendant. Where the injury arises
from a set of circumstances which do not
reflect a lack of due care on anyone's part,
no recovery may be had under a theory of
negligence, the accident having been "unavoidable."7
Instruction 19, therefore,
merely cautioned the jury that, absent persuasive proof presented by the plaintiff (by
use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or
otherwise) that defendant had engaged in
negligent conduct which resulted in an injury to the plaintiff, no liability was to be
found, the injury arising from an unavoidable accident.
;
Plaintiff next focuses on the allegedly
improper use of the "unavoidable accident"
instruction under any circumstances. It is
plaintiff's contention that the unavoidable
accident instruction, by expressly restating
what is no more than a legal truism implied
in instructions relating to negligence and
causation, is at best superfluous,jand at
worst confusing and misleading to the jury.
[10] As explained above, a properlydrafted unavoidable accident instruction
punctuates the necessity of finding both
negligence and causation prior to assigning
liability. It is true that such an instruction
amounts, in essence, to a reemphasis of
principles already implicit in other instructions. Such fact, in and of itself, is not
prejudicial, however, unless it results in the
instructions given being weighted, as a
7. Calahan v. Wood, 24 Utah 2d 8, 465 P.2d 169
(1970); Woodhouse v. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d
210, 436 P.2d 442 (1968); Porter vrPrice, 11
Utah 2d 80, 355 P.2d 66 (1960).
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whole, in favor of the defendant.8 As such,
an unavoidable accident instruction is not
error if it clearly and concisely states the
principle involved, and does not create an
imbalance in the jury instructions.9
[11,12] Instruction 19 adequately explains the concept of unavoidable accident.
The final sentence thereof, stating, "If you
find from the evidence in this case that the
accident occurred without negligence on the
part of defendants or was not proximately
caused by any negligence on the part of the
defendants, you should answer interrogatory No. 3 'No,'" sufficiently links the instruction to those other theories presented
to the jury to enable them to perceive its
significance in context.10 It is to be noted,
moreover, that the giving of instruction 19
in no way created an unfair imbalance of
the instructions given to the jury. In light
of the instructions already given regarding
the use of circumstantial evidence under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, we deem it
not only permissible but indeed proper that
the need to find negligence, by one means
or another, be reemphasized prior to the
beginning of deliberations.
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tunity to challenge Mr. Huber, either for
cause or peremptorily. As such, plaintiff
was denied the right of full information and
selective processes in jury selection, and
was therefore denied trial by an impartial
jury. We cannot agree with plaintiff's
analysis.
[13-15] Trial by jury in civil cases is
guaranteed under the Utah Constitution.11
Moreover, the requirements of due process
dictate that the jury be impartial and unbiased.12 It is in furtherance of these rights
that voir dire examination of prospective
jurors before the beginning of trial is engaged in. For the same reason, a trial
court may order a new trial should it appear that juror bias crept into the proceedings notwithstanding voir dire questioning.13 This is not to say, however, that it is
incumbent upon a trial court to order a new
trial whenever information is revealed
which was not discovered by voir dire questioning addressed thereto. It is impartial
jury trial, not complete voir dire questioning, that is the ultimate right involved.
Where, in the sound discretion of the trial
court, an infraction of the latter has no
material impact upon the former, no prejudicial error has occurred.14

Plaintiff's final point on appeal deals
with the relationship existing between juror
Huber and defense counsel Nebeker. Plaintiff's theory runs as follows: Mr. Huber's
[16] Given, in the present case, that an
failure to disclose his relationship with Mr. attorney-client relationship existed between
Nebeker, even though based on total igno- Mr. Nebeker and the corporation of which
ranee of that relationship, denied plaintiff's , Mr. Huber had at one time been an officer,
counsel full opportunity to question regard- and that such relationship was not disclosed
ing the matter during voir dire. As such, upon voir dire examination, we are noneplaintiff's right to voir dire was improperly theless constrained to agree with the trial
curtailed, resulting in an inadequate oppor- court that no prejudicial error resulted
8. Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073
(1955).
9. Calahan v. Wood, supra, footnote 7.
10. Plaintiff, attempting to show that the unavoidable accident instruction was confusing to
the jury, points to a note delivered to the court
inquiring after the possibility of assessing 60
percent of the injury to unavoidable accident
and 40 percent to negligence. Such evidence
would be more persuasive had not the trial
court, in concert with counsel of both parties
and by their express approval, submitted a
clarifying instruction to the jury regarding the
proper use of unavoidable accident. The jury's
question having been answered to the satisfac-

tion of both parties, plaintiff may not now be
heard to state that the question posed remains
as evidence of the inadequacy of the instruction.
11. See Article I, Section 10, Constitution of the
State of Utah.
12. See Article I, Section 7, Constitution of the
State of Utah; Amendment 14, Constitution of
the United States.
13. Rule 59(a)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
14. Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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therefrom. The evil to be avoided in any
relationship between juror and counsel is
that of improper bias or prejudice, which
arises, not from the fact of the relationship
itself, but only from an awareness thereof.
Mr. Huber can hardly be suspected of inclining toward the representations of Mr.
Nebeker due to a relationship existing between the two of them of which neither
was aware until after the trial had finished.
For this reason, impartiality of the jury was
undiminished by the relationship, and no
prejudicial error occurred.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
Costs awarded to defendants.
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN,
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., concur.
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Torval ALBRECHT, Sherwood Albrecht,
Maurice Albrecht, M. Steve Albrecht
and Carl Albrecht & Sons, Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
v.
URANIUM SERVICES, INC., a Utah
Corporation, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 15996.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 15, 1980.
Summary judgment entered by the
Seventh District Court, Emery County,
Boyd Bunnell, J., quieting title to certain
mining claims in plaintiffs was affirmed on
appeal, 596 P.2d 1025, and petition by defendants for rehearing was granted. The
Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that a
dispute of material facts was presented so
as to preclude entry of summary judgment
in case.
Reversed and remanded.
Maughan, J., dissented.

Judgment <s=> 181(15)
A dispute of material facts on issue of
whether mining operations had been conducted on mining claims was presented so
as to preclude entry of summary judgment
in suit to quiet title to certain mining
claims.

Leonard W. Burningham, Salt Lake City,
for defendant and appellant.
Tex R. Olsen, Richfield, for plaintiffs and
respondents.
WILKINS, Justice:
A petition for rehearing was granted by
this Court after its opinion, Utah, 596 P.2d
1025 (1979), was rendered on May 29, 1979.
Petitioner, Uranium Services, Inc. asserts
the same point on rehearing as it asserted
on appeal; to wit: that genuine issues of
material facts have been raised by the
pleadings including affidavits filed by both
parties, and that the District Court erred in
granting summary judgment. Respondents
Albrecht again contend that the appeal was
not timely filed.
This Court is still of the opinion that the
appeal was timely filed, as discussed by Mr.
Justice Maughan in the original opinion.
Upon reconsideration, however, this
Court is of the view that a dispute of material facts has been presented and on that
issue we adopt the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Stewart, concurred in by Mr. Chief
Justice Crockett, in the original decision of
this case, Albrecht, ante, 596 P.2d at 102728.
The summary judgment entered by the
District Court of Emery County is therefore
reversed and this case is remanded for trial
on the merits. Costs to defendant, Uranium Services, Inc.
CROCKETT, C. J., and HALL and
STEWART, JJ., concur.
MAUGHAN, J., dissents.
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Elsa H. NIXDOBF, Plaintiff
"'• ' • and Appellant,
^ ', '

N I rederick.HICKEN and A. Ja
McAllister, Defendants and
.Respondents.
No. 16151
('-our

M

2. Physicians • and Surgeons <s=> 18.6(1 11.-,;: >
":iln 'Order for plaintiff to prevail, in-a
medical malpractice action, plaintiff must
establish both the standard of care require*1
of the defendant as a practicing physicia
in the community and that, the defenda;
did not employ ..that standard, •
3. Physicians and Surgeons '<s=» 18.80(9)
Although, in the majority of medk
malpractice cases, the plaintiff must introduce expert testimony to establish the standard of care, such testimony is unnecessary
to establish the standard of care when the
propriety of the treatment received is within the common knowledge and exp<
of the layman; the loss of a surgical instr
ment or other paraphernalia in the opert
ing site exemplifies such treatment.

Patient brought medical malpractice
i '" i\ based on allegatior that surgeon
•ned his duty when h<- left a surgical
15* needle in the patient's body and
1
omitted to inform the patient
,..«- . , xieedle "had been left in "her body.
4. Phy sicians and. Surgeons <s=» 18.80(8)
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
W here surgeon lost a curved cutting
James S. Sawaya, J.,, granted a directed
verdict in favor of defendants, and the needle in the operating site while repairing
patient. appealed. The Supreme Court, "patient's rectocele, patient-was not required,'
Maughan, J., held that: (1) while the Su^ to introduce expert testimony to establish?
preme Court would not say that the sur- the applicable professional standard of care?
geon's initial loss of the needle was negligent 5. Physicians and Surgeons *s=> 15(12)
as a matter of law, the patient was not reWhere curved cutting needle became^
quired to present expert testimony to estab- disengaged from needle holder while'$ur|
lish that the continued presence of the needle geon was repairing a rectocele, the fact that|
in the patient's body more probably than not the' surgeon realized that the needle waS
resulted from negligence; (2) under the cir- lost arid attempted to locate it by palr»Qfl'n°"
cumstances, the application of the doctrine the suspect area did not obviate the
of res ipsa loquitur created a rebuttable quences of the loss or relieve the surg
inference of negligence sufficient to carry liability for any breach of duty arising
the patient's case past the motion for non- the initial loss of the needle.
-oifc
suit; (3) the evidence presented a question
6.
Phj
sicians
and,"Surgeons
<
s
=
>
15(14)^
for the jury as to whether the defendants
Whether or not surgeon acted rieglig
were negligent in failing to disclose the
presence of the needle; and (4) the trial gently in leaving lost surgical needled
court erred in granting a directed verdict patients body after unsuccessfully attemp
ing to locate the needle was a separ^
against the patient.
question from the question whether theffin
Reversed and remanded,
tial loss of the needle was a breach of du|
Stewart, J., dissented in part and con7. Physicians and Surgeons «=» 18.60 ?•*?«
curred in part and filed opinion.- .
When the appropriate evidentiarjMja^
is presented, a patient may employ t h e m
I I' itysidans and. Surgeons. <e=» 14(4)
trine of res ipsa loquitur in order-to'm|
his burden to prove that a physician|
In malpractice actions generally, a ph>
sit'ian is held to the standard of skill that is surgeon did not exercise the level of sK
employed by his contemporaries in the same required by the applicable community, st|
dard of care.
or similar communities.
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8. Negligence <s=> 121.2(2)
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a
procedural rather than a substantive rule! of
law which carries the plaintiff past a motion for nonsuit when the circumstantial
evidence presented by the plaintiff is sufficient to support the application of the doctrine and the inference of negligence.

was more probably than not the result of
negligence and, therefore, expert testimony
was not required to establish that element
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

13. Physicians and Surgeons <s=> 18.60
Evidence that cutting needle became
disengaged from needle holder while surgeon was repairing patient's rectocele, that
9. Physicians and Surgeons <s=> 18.60
Generally, utilization of the doctrine oL__ the needle thereafter remained present in
f res ipsa loquitur in a medical malpractice the patient's body, that the instrumientality
| case requires introduction of expert medical which caused the ultimate bad result was in
""testimonyto establish that the outcome the exclusive control of the surgeon and
I "more likely resulted from negligence than that the patient was under a general anes^from some other cause.
thetic and could not participate in or con; 10. Physicians and Surgeons &=> 18.80(9) tribute in the act causing the injury provid. {* In certain situations, a medical proce- ed a sufficient evidentiary foundation for
? '(lure is so common or the outcome to the applying the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and
patient so affronts notions of medical pro- created a rebuttable inference of negligence
priety that expert testimony is not required sufficient to carry patient's case against
Ho establish what would occur in the ordi- surgeon past motion for nonsuit.
n a r y course of events and, in this type of
[Situation, the patient can rely on the com- 14. Physicians and Surgeons <&=> 18.60
| mon knowledge and understanding of layIn a medical malpractice action, the
~;;inen to establish that the outcome would defendant may introduce evidence to rebut
ynot have happened had the physician or an inference of negligence arising from the
^urgeon utilized due care.
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
1}K Negligence <s=> 121.2(8)
pCu When the instrumentality which caused 15. Physicians and Surgeons <s=» 18.90
While the defendant may introduce
Ih©} injury was in the exclusive control of
pendant and plaintiff did not participate conflicting medical testimony on the cause
Ifthe acts causing the injury, negligence of the injury after the patient has presentfiy be inferred from the injury alone if the ed evidence creating a rebuttable inference
l&U8e of injury is so obviously negligent of negligence, this conflicting medical testi&t negligence may be inferred as a matter mony should not be relied on by the tnal
^ law or if people would know from com- judge to remove the case from the jury;
mon experience that the result would not rather, such testimony establishes a conflict
*Ve happened without negligence or if in the evidence which it is the jury's duty to
|Cfe..is expert testimony that the injury resolve.
|£Ujd not have occurred if proper care had
"Bri^used.
16. Physicians and Surgeons <s=> 18.60
In a medical malpractice action, the
^Physicians and Surgeons <s=> 18.60
plaintiff
has the burden to prove that the
^Though the Supreme Court declined to
JUhat surgeon was negligent as a matter negligence of defendant proximately caused
|yaw when he allowed a needle to become the injury.
^gaged from its needle holder during
er
y, the ultimate fact that the needle 17. Physicians and Surgeons <e» 18.80(7)
Proof that the negligence of defendant
gained present in the body of the patient
' r 8Uc " that laymen could know from proximately caused the patient's injury ream
on knowledge and experience that it quires some expert testimony.
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. * * *! *' *<t 11 > a rid Surgeons *=> 18.90
• -nony of defendant surgeon, an acj>A expert, that needle that was
*^^ aw F.ain tiff's body after surgical procedure was in a position such that it could
- " • ice pain was sufficient to render causaquestion of fact for the jury,'even
h there was conflicting evidence that
patient's pain was due to other medical
abnormalities.

24. phy 8 i c i a n 8 a n d Surgeons -<8=> 18.90
In a medical malpractice action wherein plaintiff alleges that physician was negligent'in failing to disclose certain material
information to the patient, it is for the jury
to determine what a reasonable 'person
would consider material information in"*>a
decision concerning his well being. "'•'<•}
25. Physicians and Surgeons «=» 18.90
^
Once the duty to disclose certain info
mation to the patient is est
the physician's total breach
presents a jury question as to whai dar
ages were proximately cause-1 ^ 4h,
breach.

19. 'Physicians and Surgeons <e=> 18.90
• In : a medical .malpractice action, it Is
not necessary that the proximate cause of
injury sustained through a physician's negligence be proved with exactitude; if the
injury could be attributed to two or more
causes, one of which was the negligence of .26. Physicians and Surgeons «=»ll
a doctor, it is for the jury to determine
When a physician fails to disclose to his
which was the proximate cause of the inju- <^ieni any information concerns
ry
fa*, i, there is no question ^
judgment and no question of practue J>
20. Physicians and Surgeons <s=» 18.90
Evidence in medical malpractice action yond the knowledge of laymen which mm
presented a jury question whether surgeon be established through expert testimony i
^ _ ::V
was negligent in failing to disclose to pa- .order to prove liability
tient that a needle had been left in the
":w^
.patient's body during a surgical procedure. 27. Evidence <s=»574
In determining the existence an^
21. Ph.) sicians and. Surgeons .<s=»15(8)
tent of a physician's duty to disclose in
Relationship between a doctor and a particular situation, the jury need not d<
patient creates a duty in the physician to pend solely on expert testimony
,:
•disclose to the patient'any .material information concerning -the ,patient's, physical, 28. Physicians and Surgeons 0=^15(8) A>K3
condition.
When a physician has knowledgej.ofj'B/
fact'concerning
the patient's physical condi22. Physicians and Surgeons • <3=>15(8)
tion
which
is
material
to that; patient-an/
• The physician's duty to disclose to his
when
the
physician
fails
to disclose the fact,
patient any material information concernthe
relationship
between
the physician:and
ing the patient's physical condition stems
patient
may
render
the
physician's
silenc
from the fiduciary nature of the physicianpatient relationship and from the patient's fraudulent.
right to determine what shall or shall not 29.' Physicians and Surgeon** <s=> 18.110 >
be done with his body.
Damages which may u sh«>wn tcrfig
-

•

;

:

.

'

•

'

_

;

.

,

•

>

&

.

23. Physicians and Surgeons <@»15(8)
low as a proximate result of physician*
Scope of a'" physician's duty to inform nondisclosure to patient of material -fact
the patient is defined by the materiality of concerning patient's condition include res
the information in the decisional process of sonable charges for discovery and r e p a i r ^
an ordinary individual; if a reasonable per- any resultant injury and monetary compejg
son in the position of the patient would ' sation for mental anguish
' **" - :1£ ""§|
consider the information important in
'••''"
- * '-rfitfwSI
choosing a course of treatment, then the
information is material and disclosure is
Edward M. Garrett, Salt Lake City;'^|
;;
required.
plaintiff and appellant
. - •:';"lr;!0?I
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. John H. Snow, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
MAUGHAN, Justice:
? The plaintiff appeals the district court's
granting of a directed verdict in favor of
the defendants. Following the preservation
of the plaintiff's case the defendants moved
pursuant to Rule 50 for a directed verdict.
The court granted the motion and entered
its judgment thereon. We reverse and remand the action for a new trial. All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
For a period of approximately ten years,
the plaintiff, Elsa H. Nixdorf, suffered
-from a cystocele and rectocele.1 In June
1964 she contacted the defendant, Dr. N.
Frederick Hicken, concerning the alleviation of these problems.2 Although Dr.
Hicken initially counseled the plaintiff on
the necessity of a hysterectomy, during the
subsequent operation which he performed
'on June 5, 1964, he elected instead to merely repair the cystocele and rectocele and
amputate a portion of the plaintiff's cervix.
The repair of the cystocele was completed
\ without incident. However, during the repair of the rectocele one of the curved
; cutting needles used to suture the torn diaphragm became disengaged from the nee: dleholder. Although the doctor realized the
^needle remained in the operating site, his
j attempts to locate it by palpating the sus~peet area were unsuccessful and the operation was completed without recovery of the
''lost needle.

the plaintiff as his patient.3 Notwithstanding the plaintiff's repeated complaints of
pain in the pelvic-abdominal area, Dr. Hicken and Dr. McAllister never informed her
of the presence of the needle. In fact, the
plaintiff had no knowledge of the presence
of the needle until 1976 when Dr. Robert
Maddock, who she consulted because of lower abdominal pain, revealed its presence to
her.4
At trial the plaintiff averred the defendant Hicken was negligent in the performance of the 1964 operation and because of
his negligence, she has incurred certain
damages, e. g., pain and suffering and related medical expenses. Plaintiff also averred the defendants acted negligently in not
informing her of the presence of the needle.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case,
the defendants moved pursuant to Rule 50,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for a directed verdict on the grounds the evidence
presented by the plaintiff was insufficient
as a matter of law to create a jury question
on the defendants' negligence. The trial
judge granted this motion on the basis of
the plaintiff's failure to introduce expert
testimony to establish the applicable standards of care.

[1,2] In malpractice actions generally
the physician is held to the standard of skill
employed by his contemporaries in the same
or similar communities. Therefore, before
the plaintiff can prevail in a medical malpractice action, he must establish both the
^ Following the operation, the plaintiff re- standard of care required of the defendant
* mained under the care of Dr. Hicken until as a practicing physician in the community
and the defendant's failure to employ that
t'his retirement on July 1, 1970, when his
^partner, Dr. A. James McAllister, assumed standard.

1

!• These terms refer to the bladder and rectum
^ respectively and denominate a condition in
which these organs protrude from the abdominal cavity through a rupture in the pelvic diaxbs ^ a&m and into the vaginal area
3

t *• The other defendant, Dr James McAllister,
ft£ W a s a Partner of Dr Hicken at the time of the
J * operation and following Dr Hicken's retire1
ment
assumed the plaintiff as a patient

3. Although Dr McAllister was not present at
the original operation, the plaintiffs files contain the Operation Report which under jthe
heading "Complications" states "A small
curved cutting needle was broken while repairing the rectocele and is apparently lying in the
levator am or the gluteus muscle or fascia on
the left side
4. Dr Maddock became aware of the needle
from x-rays taken of the area for use in his care
of the plaintiff
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In the majority of medical malpractice
cases the plaintiff must introduce expert
testimony to establish this standard of care.
Expert testimony is required because the
nature of the profession removes the particularities of its practice from the knowledge
and understanding of the average citizen.

rule. The guidance provided by expert *
timony is unnecessary in this situation "B
therefore, expert testimony should not h
been required to establish the professionals
standard of care under the facts ofuthe*'.
present case.7
:•.--•
ustr

[3] However, this Court has recognized
certain exceptions to the general rule requiring expert testimony.5 Specifically, expert testimony is unnecessary to establish
the standard of care owed : the plaintiff
where the propriety of the treatment received is within the common knowledge and
experience of the layman. The loss of a
surgical instrument or. other paraphernalia,
in the operating site, exemplifies this type
of treatment. We explained in Fredrickson
v. Maw:B
Whether'" a surgical operation, was unskillfully or skillfully performed is a scientific question. If, however, a surgeon
should lose the instrument with which he
operates in the incision
' ;
, it
would seem as a matter of common sense
that scientific opinion could throw little
light on the subject.
'-''""
[4-6] The loss of the surgical cutting
needle by Hickeri falls squarely within the
perimeters of this exception to the general

the community standard is the plaintiffs*
proof that the defendant failed to exercisej
the level • of skill this standard requires^
[7,8] When the appropriate evidentiary^
basis is presented a plaintiff may ampler
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to a~
this burden.8 This doctrine establishes, ai
inference of negligence from the circumstances incident to the operation.9 It fs"
procedural rather than substantive ruleipi
law which carries the plaintiff past a'rric:
tion for nonsuit where the circumstahtii.,
evidence introduced by the plaintiff is suffiS
cient to support the application of tbe'di
t:i ine and its inference of negligence.10 ?

5.

9. Joseph v.-Dr. W H Groves' JL
Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, " "
(1960). In Joseph, this Court
basis for the application of p
malpractice actions when w*
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur spnngs Trcm.fi
very practical process of drawing logicaljp
elusions from circumstantial evidence. Jtgp,
pose is to permit one who suffers injuring
something under the control of anothencmlifc
ordinarily would not cause the injury excep
the other's negligence, to present his griek
to a court or jury on the basis of the reasbj
inferences to be drawn from such factsjfc
th9ugh he may be unable to presented
.evidence of the other's negligence.'^^348^
at 936.
'J'tr-*\t

'

See Marsh v, Pemberton,
P.2d 1108 (1959).

10 Utah 2d 40, 347

6.

Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 388, 227
P.2d 772, 773 (1951); quoting from Wharton v.
Warner, 75 Wash." 470, 135 P.-. 235, 237 (1913);
.. see also Lipman v. Lustig, 346. Mass. 182, 190
N.E.2d 675 (1963); Taylor v. Milton, 353 Mich.
421, 92N.W.2d57(1958); Ballance v. Dunnington, 241 Mich. 383, 217 N.W. 329 (1928).

'

7. The trial court appeared to have overlooked
the initial breach of the defendant's duty, i. e.,
the loss of the needle. The defendant's realization of the absence of the needle and his attempt to retrieve it does not obviate the consequences of its loss. Whether or not the defendant acted negligently in leaving the needle in
the person of the plaintiff represents a separate
issue. The plaintiffs failure to present a prima
facie case on that issue does not eliminate the
defendant's responsibility for the initial loss.
8.

See Talbot V. Dr. W. H. Groves' Latter-Day
Saints Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872
(1968).

Concomitant with the establishment 0 ^
• - *- -

*4

'fa

.KC-JB0'

delineated the evidentiary foundati
hi :!:li the plaintiff must establish befoj
emr. I : •} ing th E d : 2ti ine of res, ipsa loquit.
in M ooi e i , J am ssl:l t ; hen we s t « ^ *
The rule
is appli<
. (1) The accident v. as of'a kir
* the ordinary eour^ of events,
«have" happened had the defendant* us

10. 1 urnei v. Willis, M Hawaii ciiy, 5b26
710 (1978). . . . . . . .
. «^rl
11. Moore v. James,
221, 224 (1956). •

:> i t a r

2d ^

9*>
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due care, (2) the instrument or thing
causing the injury was at the time of the
accident under the management and control of the defendant, and (3) the accident
happened irrespective of any participation at the time by the plaintiff.
[9] The establishment of this evidentiary basis presents a peculiar problem to a
plaintiff in a medical malpractice case because of the necessity of showing what the
usual outcome of a medical procedure would
be when the required due care is employed.
Generally, this requires the introduction of
expert medical testimony to establish the
fact the outcome is more likely the result of
negligence than some other cause. This
testimony would be necessary to provide
the evidentiary basis from which the jury
could conclude the result is more probably
than not due to the negligence of the attending physician.12
[101 However, in certain situations, the
medical procedure is so common or the outcome so affronts our notions of medical
propriety that expert testimony is not required to establish what would occur in the
ordinary course of events. In this type of
situation the plaintiff can rely on the common knowledge and understanding of lay,men to establish this element.13
[11] Therefore, when the instrumentality causing the injury is in the exclusive

c
-i

_

control of the defendant, and the plaintiff
does not participate in the acts causing the
injury, then negligence may be inferred
from the injury alone if: (1) the cause of
injury is so obviously negligent that negligence may be inferred as a matter of law;
(2) people would know from common experience the result would not have happened
without negligence; or (3) when a physician
testifies bad results would not have occurred if proper care had been used.14
[12] While we will not say the act of the
defendant in losing the needle from the
needleholder was negligent as a matter of
law, the bad result, i. e., the needle present
in the body of the plaintiff, is such that
people would know from common knowledge and experience it is more probably
than not the result of negligence.15 Therefore, in the present case, expert testimony
was not required to establish this element
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
[13-15] The evidence presented at trial
indicates the instrumentality which caused
the bad result was in the exclusive control
of the defendant at the time of the accident. Furthermore, the plaintiff was under
a general anesthetic and could not participate or'contribute to the act causing the
injury. These facts when combined with
the nature of the accident provide a sufficient evidentiary foundation for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in

__

-12. See Talbot, supra note 8, 440 P 2d at 873
"513. This Court has previously recognized this
exception in Frednckson v Maw, supra note 6,
* 227 P 2d at 773, where we quoted "So, in this
p
case, where a surgeon loses a metallic spnng
in the body of his patient, and fails to
_ discover and remove it, it would seem that a
K
jury would have abundant justification for inferring negligence without the aid of expert
' -testimony " (Quoting from Wharton v Warner, supra note 6, 135 P at 237) Some courts
hmit the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur exclusively to this type of situation
'See Swanson v Hill, 166 F Supp 296 (N D N D
1958) This appears to be a strict application
°f the doctrine requiring the result to "speak
for itself without the aid of any other proof
*hus, the application of the doctrine has sometimes been explained by courts as eliminating
the necessity of the plaintiffs procurement of
expert testimony in the initial stages of proof

See Dietze v King, 184 F Supp. 944, 946 (E D
Va 1960)
14. See Tomei v Hennmg, 67 Cal2d 319, 62
Cai Rptr 9, 431 P 2d 633 (1967)
15. See Miller v. Kennedy, 11 W a s h A p p 272,
522 P 2 d 852 (1974), approved and adapted, 85
Wash 2d 151, 530 P 2d 334 (1975), This case
must be distinguished from the situations in
which the needle is broken during the suturing
The malfunctioning of the surgical instruments
presents an intervening cause for the accident
beyond the control of the physician In that
situation the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may
still be applicable because the result is more
probably than not the result of negligence, but
the intervening cause may be used as a defense
against the plaintiffs proof of proximate causation The present situation is more analogous
to the loss of whole instruments and other
paraphernalia in the course of the operation
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this' case. The application of the' doctrine tion concerning" the -patient's' physical condiprovides a rebuttable inference of negli- tion. This duty to inform stems from .the
gence which will carry the plaintiffs case fiduciary nature of the relationship18, and
past the motion for nonsuit.16 •• ' •'•:. ••• •• the
' patient's right to determine what shall
or
shall, not. be done with his bod} 1" "49] Therefore, under the facts of
- •.
-w»ny was not required
[23, 24] The scope of the duty is defined\ce of the defendant
by the materiality of the information in the
aim me Li'iai ^K
in granting a
decisional process of an ordinary individual!
directed verdict af
*e plaintiff beIf a reasonable person in the position of the;
17
cause of the lack r»f that testimony.
plaintiff would consider the information im-;
[20—22] The trial court also erred in not portant in choosing a course of treatment
submitting to the jury the plaintiff's second then the information is material and disclo-1
:,r :
cause of action, concerning the doctor's fail- sure required.20
" _ :•
ure to disclose the presence of the needle.
[25-28] Once the duty to dist, ose certa
The relationship between a doctor and his
patient creates a duty "in the physician to information is established, then the phys
disclose to his patient any material informa- cian's total breach of that dut\ 2I a^ foundj
16 See Moore v. James, supra note 11, 297 P.2d
at 224; • The defendant may introduce evidence
to rebut the inference of negligence established
by the application of the doctrine. While the
defendant may introduce conflicting medical
testimony on the cause of the accident this
should not be relied upon by the trial judge to
remove the case from the jury's consideration.
Rather, this establishes a conflict in the evi~
dence which it is the jury's duty to resolve
17.. The plaintiff also has the burden of proving
the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of. the injury. This proof requires
some expert testimony in medical malpractice
cases. Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139
P.2d 216 (1943). In the present case the de. fendant, an acknowledged expert, testified the
position of,the needle was such that it could
produce pain. Although there is contradictory
evidence that the pain the plaintiff suffered was
due to other medical abnormalities the testimony of the defendant is sufficient to render causation a question of fact to be determined by
the jury. As we explained in
Anderson,
it is not necessary that the proximate cause of an injury sustained through the
negligence of a doctor be proved with exactitude. . . .", and "If the injury sustained
could be attributed to two or more causes, one
of which was the negligence of the doctor, it
would be a question for the jury to determine
which was the proximate cause of the injury."
Id. 139 P.2d at 220. See also Forrest v. Eason,
123 Utah 610, 261 P.2d 178 (1953); 13 A.L.
R.2d, Proximate Causation—Malpractice, Ac•"' tions, Section .2, page 22."' •' '••'•'•:;
18. Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary and Casualty
Hospital, 396 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("We
find in the fiducial qualities of that relationship
[between physician and patient] the physician's
duty to reveal to the patient that which in his

best interests it is important UM- IK should j
know." 396 F.2d at 935.)
19. Schioendorff v. Society of New York Hospl4
tal, 211 NY. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914); see a^so|
Miller v, Kennedy, supra note 15, 522 P.2d af
860. In Miller the court explained, "The<paj«
tient is entitled to rely upon the physician Ifo
tell him what he needs to know ab<
r
condition of his own h ( - ! v
"• " v , p n *
i ight'to chart his ov
must supply the patiLi» ..... .•«
il
the patient will need in order i<
K
chart that destiny wit ^:pr'*v "
2*!

I h( m< -iibers of the jury can discern <wh|S
• >uA)U man would consider material infj
r.i >h in i decision concerning his weU.rbgi
->\ l^h i lere may be certain situations;)sijg
as the patient's incompetence or specific .me
cal reasons for withholding material "infpn
tion where expert testimony may estabhsn
defense for nondisclosure, it is not e s s e n t i a ^
the plaintiffs establishment of a prim&flffl
case. See Wilkinson v. Vesey^llO R.I. 606JT
A.2d 676 (1972). ("The decision as t o ; w M |
or is not material is a human judgment,. inX
opinion, which does not necessarily requl«£l
assistance of the medical profession.;"/;,!.
A.2d at 688.) This objective approach[.liasaccepted by* some courts in the context
formed, consent malpractice actions, ij^f
ler v. Kennedy, supra note 15, 522 P.2cj$$t
While analogy to the informed consent ,dqc|
is helpful it is not dispositive. The PI]
situation differs from that *
formed consent context and c
must reflect this difference. See L
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C

21 • In Wilkinson, supra, note 2U 295
686, the court, explained: "As explK
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in the present case, presents to the jury the
question of what damages were proximately caused by the breach. Where the physician fails to disclose to his patient any information concerning a material fact, there
is no question of skill and judgment, no
question of practice beyond the knowledge
of laymen which must be established
through expert testimony22. To borrow
justice Wiest's much quoted phrase from
j?a/iance,23 even the "merest tyro" would
-know the nondisclosure was improper.24
"^ [29] Damages which may be shown to
follow as a proximate cause of the nondisclosure include reasonable charges for discovery and removal of the needle and monetary compensation for the mental anguish
'following the realization of the needle's
presence.'25
CROCKETT, WILKINS and HALL, JJ.,
*
'concur.
f

' STEWART, Justice (dissenting in part
and concurring in part):
;« I respectfully dissent.
* The majority, in my view, misapplies a
[^common sense rule, applicable in simple
^malpractice fact situations, and arrives at a
f^esult which would allow the jury to find
^egligence in total ignorance of whether
m Collins v. Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 424 P.2d 488
1^(1967), the Natanson [Natanson v. Kline, 186
f Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (I960)] rule provides
. that where a physician is silent "and
pTmakes no disclosure whatever, he has failed in
^the duty owed to the patient and the patient is
|flot required to produce expert testimony to
show that the doctor's failure was contrary to
g accepted medical practice
In determining the existence and the extent
of a physician's duty to disclose in each particu l a r situation, the jury need not depend exclusively on expert testimony. In nondisclosure
t^cases the jury is not invariably functioning m
&}H **** 0 f s u c h t e c n n i c a l complexity that it is
bound to medical custom, as established
pnrough expert testimony, as an inexorable apfPJJ^ion of the community standard of reasonv
5 7filf C a r e ' Canterbury
- Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
h\ dP'C- C i r - 1 9 7 2 >- I n Canterbury the court
1 discussing the basis of disclosure required m
/*e informed consent context explained: "Nor
*is W e ! 8 n o r e t h e f a c t t h a t t o b i n d t h e discloLv, r e °bligation to medical usage is to abrogate
decision on revelation to the physician
s

Dr. Hicken's conduct violated the applicable
standard of care. Clearly this case falls
within the scope of the rule that expert
testimony in a medical malpractice case is
necessary to establish proper standards of
medical performance. In particular, the
majority misapplies the rule that "loss of a
surgical instrument or other paraphernalia,
in the operating site, exemplifies [the] type
of treatment" that is "within the common
knowledge and experience of the layman."
Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347
P.2d 1108 (1959). In short, the plaintiff's
failure to produce expert testimony as to
the standard of care will necessarily mean
that a verdict is based on speculation.
It is an unrealistic rule that holds in all
cases abandonment of a surgical instrument
or other paraphernalia in a person during
the course of an operation can be considered
negligence by a lay person without regard
for the nature of the surgical procedures
involved. It need hardly be reiterated that
a physician is not a guarantor of the results
of an operation. Marsh v. Pemberton, supra. Nor does he warrant against all accidents which may occur during surgical procedures. The basis for fastening liability on
a defendant in a malpractice suit is negligence, not the occurrence of an untov/ard
circumstance. In the instant case, the suralone. Respect for the patient's right of self
determination on particular therapy demands a
standard set by law for physicians rather than
one which the physicians may or may not impose upon themselves." 464 F.2d at 784.
23. Ballance v. Dunmngton, supra note 6, 217
N.W. at 330.
24. See Taylor v. Milton, supra note 6; the
present factual situation could also be used to
establish a cause of action in fraudulent
concealment. Where a physician has knowledge of a fact concerning the patient's physical
condition which is material to that patient and
he fails to disclose it the confidence relationship between them creates a duty to disclose
which may render his silence fraudulent. See
Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 194 So. 147
(1940).
25. See Jackson v. United States, 182 F.Supp.
907 (D.C.Md.1960), Houston Clinic v. Busch,
64 S.W.2d 1103 (Tex.Civ.App. 1933).
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gical operation was not perhaps as unusual
and complex as some of the advanced procedures now being used, but it clearly was of
such a nature that application of the Marsh
rule is inappropriate, and there is no evidence in the record which indicates that Dr.
Hicken was negligent at all. There is even
evidence that Dr. Hicken's conduct may not
have been the actual cause of the loss of the
cutting instrument in the plaintiff. He testified that in operations of the type he
performed on the plaintiff the surgical instrument sometimes breaks just below the
eye through which the catgut thread is
passed and that, given the nature of the
operation, sound medical judgment often
dictates leaving the instrument in the body
if it cannot be readily located.
The inappropriateness of the legal rule
applied by the majority is demonstrated by
the testimony of Dr. Hicken. Operating
inside a body cavity, he could not see what
he was doing and had to orient his actions
primarily by touch. He described the problems relating to the loss of the needle as
follows:
A. Well, you are working down there,
[inside the vagina], you have the retractors in and you have—you're bringing
this [i. e., the needle] around on one side
of the tissue and trying to bring it around
and all at once you don't have ahold of
the needle and then the thing you do, you
have to bring your forceps back but, then
you poke—use your lights and you look in
there to see if you can see it. You put
your glove finger in and you try to palpate it to see if you can feel it and as a
general rule one can feel and in knowing
the exact area in which you were working, one can generally feel where the
suture is or the needle is. In this case,
we did not find it.
Q. All right. Now, for that needle to
become loose from the holder that ratchet
could be disengaged, did it not?
A. Well, the ratchet could be disengaged but the needle—by far the more
common way of losing a needle in this
operation is, you are working up in there
—see, I told you, you put your finger
here as a guide to exert a little pressure

as you bring it around. You are working
in a zone that has blood. There is fati
That means there is oils and itfs possible
for this to just rotate and slip out of the
needle holder. That's the usual thing
s
that happens.
~ si
The needle may also break off because of
a defect in the needle itself or because^ipf
the forceps or other holding implement!
Dr. Hicken stated:
, &!
For instance, we have no way of know
ing whether the needle was whole or br<F
t<v|
ken. From experience in handling these
things, where the thread goes throuj"1
the needle it is very thin and frequently
needle will break at that part but—anj
you have a little—just a splinter of "tl
eye of the needle left and separates frbij
the main shaft of the needle and whe]
you pull your hemostat back you Jiaj
nothing. Both the eye of the needle >ai
the main curved needle still remains*il
situ. That means in position in the
in which you are working.
Loss of the needle could also occur for ottij
reasons.
You are getting a bite of t i s s u e ^
are coming down and getting a bit4|
tissue—you see, here's a ratchet JTt
locks it. I showed you yesterday,
when you are sewing, you do nottdj|
your fingers in these openings^ of
ratchet. You take your hand out and|
it against the palm here using this/in
to give you a little force and a directw
mechanism for the point of the ne|
and you come around like this..,
sometimes you hit heavy muscles, sg|
times you have thinner muscles,^
times you have scar tissue. If the^
der and things have been outftqjo$
that tissue has been irritated arid tip
a lot of scar tissue until you getl
resistance in bringing the needle ti
and it's very easy for the—possible
the needle, being in oil and bio
fatty tissue down there, too, ttfaS
needle could rotate and slip out.;^
we bring the needle—when we b^
the needle holder out it was stilH§
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. and the needle wasn't in it so that's why
.you assume that the needle was broken or
, lost.
The doctor was well aware of the relative
hazards of searching further for the lost
needle as opposed to leaving it within the
body cavity. He consciously made a medical judgment as to which course of action
would result in the least risks to the patient. He testified:
Well, because this woman was elderly.
She was not in the best physical condition. We had had her on the operating
table for one hour and to get X-ray machines at that time—we are talking about
fourteen years ago—at that time we had
to get X-ray machines from the basement
up into the operating room and it would
take too much time to complete that sort
• of a procedure and the second thing is
that from my experience in such cases
' and from being very conversant with lit\ erature on this subject, as I was a Profes» sor and teacher in medical schools, I knew
3
Uhat a needle left in this particular area
1 was not particularly harmful to the pa.» tient. It is common knowledge that we
l leave metal in the pelvic area very fre~r quently. Now, for example, in some of
our operations instead of using sutures
„ . and ties to tie around bleeding blood vesrfcsels, we have an instrument that we go in
r^ there and we put a metal clip on that
^ blood vessel because it's easier to do, it's
V quicker to do and it is innocuous
Jr^JThis testimony, in my view, destroys the
^necessary foundation for application of the
>*rule that loss of a surgical instrument in a
!
J ^ y establishes, without more, an inference of negligence. Nor do the facts provide a foundation for application of the
J^trine of res ipsa loquitur. As this Court
Stated in Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter$*y Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348
* M 935 (1960):
^y.UJt is realized that res ipsa loquitur has
gfekPeen. applied in various fields where an
injury occurs which is not to be expected
J; tf Proper standards of care and skill are
^-observed. But this is done only with
^caution, particularly in the medical field

because of the realization that many aspects of the treatment of human ills cannot yet be regarded as exact science and
a bad result may obtain even though recognized standards of care and skill are
employed. [10 Utah 2d at 99, 348 P.2d at
938.] [Emphasis added.]
I recognize that there is a ring of common sense to the proposition that leaving
foreign objects in a person constitutes negligence, see Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah
385, 227 P.2d 772 (1951), but neither justice
nor common sense are enhanced by the mechanistic application of a rule of law to a
fact situation that is only superficially related to the type of situation the rule was
intended to govern. In this case, I cannot
see how a jury could possibly find negligence in light of Dr. Hicken's testimony and
in the absence of any contrary expert testimony. I think the trial judge was right in
directing a verdict on this issue.
I concur, however, with the majority that
the defendants had a duty to inform the
plaintiff of the fact that a foreign object
had been left in her body.

In the Matter of the GUARDIANSHIP
of Alice KESLER.
No. 15960.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 28, 1980.
Appeal was taken from an order of the
District Court, Millard County, D. Christian
Ronnow, J. pro tern., declaring ward an
incompetent and appointing a guardian for
her estate. The Supreme Court, Maughan,
J., held that trial court should not have
proceeded under repealed guardianship
statutes merely because petition was filed
one day prior to time statutes became a
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nation, (2) has not been emphasized by either counsel or the court, and (3) has not
been elicited by the prosecution.6
Affirmed.
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., concur.

Arthur Dennis KUSY, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
K-MART APPAREL FASHION CORP., a
Delaware corporation, and John Doe,
an individual, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 18360.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 24, 1984.

Action was brought in which plaintiff
sought to recover for personal injuries he
sustained when pallet on which he was
standing allegedly "broke and he fell to
ground. The District Court, Salt Lake
County, G. Hal Taylor, J., entered judgment in favor of defendant, and plaintiff
appealed. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J.,
held that* (1) admission in answers to interrogatories that pallet board where plaintiff
stepped broke off and plaintiff fell to
ground should have been admitted for impeachment purposes, even though interrogatories were signed by someone other than
testifying witness, and (2) plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence at trial to entitle
him to a res ipsa loquitur instruction.
Reversed and remanded.
6. Id at 223

1. Evidence <S=>222(1)
Pretrial Procedure <s=*307
Admission in answers to interrogatories, which were signed by general manager of store, on behalf of corporate defendant, that pallet board where plaintiff
stepped broke and plaintiff fell to ground
should have been admitted for impeachment purposes in personal injury action,
even though answers to interrogatories
were signed by someone other than the
testifying witness who implied that plaintiff had merely fallen off-pallet and that
pallet had not broken. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 33(b); Rules of Evid., Rule 63(7).
2. Negligence <s=138(2)
Before being entitled to jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur, plaintiff must
show that accident was of a kind which, in
ordinary course of events, would not have
happened if due care had been observed,
the plaintiffs own use or operation of
agency or instrumentality was not primarily responsible for injury, and that agency
or instrumentality causing injury was under the exclusive management or control of
defendant.
3. Negligence <s=>138(2)
Once plaintiff makes a prima facie
showing of elements, he is entitled to a res
ipsa loquitur instruction.
4. Negligence ®=>138(2)
In order to determine appropriateness
of res ipsa loquitur instruction, court must
view evidence in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff.
5. Negligence <^138(2)
Res ipsa loquitur instruction should
have been given in action in which plaintiff
sought to recover for his personal injuries
sustained when he fell to the ground from
pallet which broke under hjm, in light of
plaintiffs testimony which would support
an inference that pallet would not have
broken if due care had been observed,"
plaintiffs testimony that he unloaded truck
in usual manner, consistent with directions
of manager of garden department, and fact
that defendant retrieved pallets in its own
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yard and brought them to truck for plaintiffs use.
6. Negligence <&=>121.2(8)
Control necessary for a res ipsa instruction is control exercised at time of
negligent act.
7. Negligence <s=»138(2)
A res ipsa loquitur instruction would
not be appropriate as to theory of negligent
failure to inspect.
8. Negligence <s=>138(2)
Res ipsa loquitur instruction may be
appropriate as to theory of negligent maintenance.
9. Negligence ^121.2(11)
Where res ipsa loquitur has been properly brought into a case, it will not be
removed by mere prima facie showing of
specific negligence, but under such circumstances the case should be submitted on
both the theory of specific negligence and
res ipsa loquitur.
10. Negligence <s=>121.2(ll)
Res ipsa loquitur should not be removed by proof of specific negligence unless proof goes so far as to fully explain
the cause of injury by positive evidence
revealing of the facts and circumstances.
11. Negligence @=>140
Unavoidable
accident
instruction
should be given on remand of personal
injury action only if evidence showed that
this was an unusual and unexpected occurrence which resulted in injury and which
happened without anyone failing to exercise reasonable care.

Wilford A. Beesley, Jack Fairclough, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Alan L. Larson, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
1. For cases declaring the proprietor's duty to
use reasonable care to maintain premises in
safe condition for business invitees, see Walker
v. Union Oil Mill, Inc., La., 369 So.2d 1043
(1979); Husketh v. Convenient Systems, Inc., 295

OAKS, Justice:
In this personal injury action, the jury
found no negligence on the part of defendant K-Mart. On appeal, plaintiff claims
that the trial court erred by refusing to
admit into evidence defendant's answer to
an interrogatory. He also cites error in the
failure to give his proffered jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur and in the instruction given on avoidable accident. We reverse.
Plaintiff was employed as a truck driver.
In May 1976, he delivered a load of trees
and shrubbery to one of defendant's stores
in Murray. In the unloading process, plaintiff requested assistance from the garden
shop manager, Hunt. Hunt designated his
employee, Coupe, to deliver pallets by forklift to the door of plaintiffs truck. Coupe
selected pallets from a pile on the store's
premises and raised them to the level of
the truck's bed, approximately five feet
from the ground. Plaintiff then placed
from twenty-five to thirty trees on each
pallet.
Plaintiff's injury occurred after he successfully unloaded two pallets of trees. He
contends that he noticed some damaged
boards toward the back of the third pallet
Coupe delivered. Fearing that the boards
might break and spill some of the trees, he
requested a new pallet. Coupe refused.
After plaintiff unloaded six or eight trees
onto this pallet, some of its boards (not
those he had originally noticed) broke under plaintiff's foot, causing him to lose his
balance, fall to the ground, and break his
wrist. Plaintiff alleged that defendant
negligently maintained or negligently
failed to inspect the pallets to insure their
safety.1
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF ANSWERS TO
INTERROGATORIES
Plaintiff was the only eyewitness to testify about the accident. Coupe, the other
N.C. 459, 245 S.E.2d 507 (1978). See also DiMare v. Cresci, 58 Cal.2d 292, 373 P.2d 860, 23
Cal.Rptr. 772 (1962) (duty to inspect for latent
defect).
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eyewitness, was apparently out of the
country. Defendant presented only one
witness, Hunt. He was on the premises
when the accident occurred and approached
the scene immediately thereafter. Hunt
testified that he did not know whether the
pallet broke or whether plaintiff merely fell
from the pallet. He testified that he observed no broken boards or debris on the
ground when he first walked up to the
scene. Thus, Hunt's testimony at least to
some degree refuted plaintiff's version of
the'accident and implied that plaintiff had
merely slipped from the pallet.
[1] While cross-examining Hunt, plaintiffs attorney sought to read one of defendant's answers to interrogatories. (The
answers were signed by Michael Street,
general manager of the K-Mart store, on
behalf of the corporate defendant.) In that
answer, defendant admitted that "the pallet board where [plaintiff] stepped broke
off and plaintiff fell to the ground." The
trial judge refused to allow counsel to read
this answer, ruling that since the interrogatories were signed by someone other than
the testifying witness, they could not be
used for impeachment. This was reversible error.
Rule 33(b), Utah R.Civ.P., allows answers to interrogatories to be used at trial
"to the extent permitted by the rules of
evidence." Utah Rules of Evidence 63(7),
in effect at the time of trial, provided that
a statement made by a party would not be
excluded under the hearsay rule when the
statement was offered against him. See
Terry v. Panek, Utah, 631 P.2d 896, 898
(1981).2 An admission of a party, when
offered against him, comes in as substantive evidence of the facts stated. Geldert
v. State, 3 Haw.App. 259, 649 P.2d 1165,
1172 (1982). This is especially appropriate
when the evidence is embodied in answers
to interrogatories, since a declarant has
ample time to consider such a statement
and submits it under oath.

propriately used to impeach Hunt, since
Hunt did not sign it. We disagree. Hunt
was the only witness who testified on behalf of defendant. Through his testimony,
Hunt gave the impression that the boards
on the pallet did not break and that plaintiff had merely fallen off the pallet. Plaintiff was then entitled to introduce whatever
substantive evidence he had to contradict
the witness and support his own version of
the facts. Specifically, "answers to interrogatories can be used by an adverse party
for any purpose, including attacking the
credibility of a party as a witness." Farkas v. Sadler, R.I., 375 A.2d 960, 964
(1977). That rule covers the proposed use
of the answer to the interrogatory to impeach the witness in the circumstances of
this case.
We are unable to say that the error in
excluding the answer to the interrogatory
was harmless in this case. Hunt's testimony implied that plaintiff had merely fallen
off the pallet and that the pallet had not
broken. The only evidence that the pallet
had in fact broken was plaintiff's own testimony, which the jury could have viewed as
self-serving. Plaintiff's credibility would
have been greatly enhanced if the jury had
been informed that defendant, in sworn
answers to interrogatories, had given the
same rendition of the facts. Failure to
allow the evidence was prejudicial to plaintiff's case. We must therefore reverse and
remand the case for a new trial.
For the guidance of the district court on
remand, we proceed to address the issues
regarding jury instructions.

Defendant argues that the admission in
the answer to the interrogatory was inap-

II. RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Plaintiff requested jury instructions on
res ipsa loquitur. For reasons that do not
appear in the record, the trial court refused
to give them. On appeal, defendant argues
that plaintiff failed to make out the elements that are necessary before such an
instruction is given.

2. We note that our new evidence rules are to the
same effect an admission of a party-opponent,

offered against that party, is not hearsay. Utah
Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)
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[2] Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary
rule that permits an inference of negligence on the part of a defendant under
well-defined circumstances. Before being
entitled to such a jury instruction, a plaintiff must show:
(1) [T]hat the accident was of a kind
which, in the ordinary course of events,
would not have happened had due care
been observed; (2) that the plaintiffs
own use or operation of the agency or
instrumentality was not primarily responsible for the injury; and (3) that the
agency or instrumentality causing the injury was under the exclusive management or control of the defendant.
Anderton v. Montgomery, Utah, 607 P.2d
828, 833 (1980) (citations omitted). One of
the purposes of the res ipsa instruction is
to "cast the burden upon [the person who
controlled the agency or instrumentality
causing the injury] to make proof of what
happened/' Id. at 833, quoting Lund v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 Utah 2d 276,
280, 351 P.2d 952, 954 (1960). It should be
noted, however, that "[o]nce the elements
of res ipsa loquitur have been established,
it merely permits and does not compel the
inference of negligence by the fact finder."
Archibeque v. Homrich, 88 N.M. 527, 532,
543 P.2d 820, 825 (1975). See also Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation District, 97 Idaho 580, 585, 548 P.2d 80, 85
(1976).
[3,4] Once the plaintiff makes a prima
facie showing of the elements, he is entitled to a res ipsa instruction. The trial
court should not weigh conflicting evidence
of the elements; this is the jury's function.
In order to determine the appropriateness
of a res ipsa instruction, the court must
view the evidence "in a light most favorable to the plaintiff
" iAnderton v.
Montgomery, 607 P.2d at 833.
[5] Under the standard discussed
above, this plaintiff introduced sufficient
evidence at the trial to entitle him to a res
ipsa loquitur instruction. There was a prima facie showing of each of the three
elements. First, plaintiff testified about
his extensive experience utilizing pallets

during the course of his work. He testified
that pallets are able to bear far greater
weight than was placed on the pallet that
broke here. This testimony would support
an inference that the pallet would not have
broken if due care had been observed, as
discussed below. E.g., DiMare u Cresci,
23 Cal.Rptr. at 776, 373 P.2d at 864 ("[ordinarily steps which are part of a common
stairway do not collapse when used by a
tenant in a normal manner unless the landlord who has had the duty to maintain and
inspect them was negligent"). Second,
plaintiff testified that he unloaded the
truck in the usual manner, consistent with
the directions of the manager of the garden
department. Third, defendant retrieved
the pallets from its own yard and brought
them to the truck for plaintiffs use.
Defendant argues that the first element
("kind of accident") was lacking because
the jury found that neither party was negligent. This begs the question. Plaintiffs
evidence entitled him to the res ipsa instruction, and he does not lose that entitlement because of what the jury found without the instruction.
[6] Defendant further argues that the
third element ("exclusive management or
control") was lacking, since there was testimony that some of the pallets were not
owned by defendant and that pallets were
always being delivered and picked up from
defendant's premises. However, the issue
is not ownership but control. The control
necessary for a res ipsa instruction is control exercised at the time of the negligent
act. Town of Reasnor v. Pyland Construction Co., Iowa, 229 N.W.2d 269
(1975); Birmingham v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
Tex., 516 S.W.2d 914, 918 (1974). It is clear
from uncontradicted evidence that defendant had exclusive control of the instrumentality that caused the injury as of the time
the alleged negligent act occurred.t
In this case, we know from defendant's
admission in its answer to the interrogatory that plaintiffs injury was caused by his
fall and that his fall was caused by the
breaking of the pallet. We do not know
what caused the pallet to break. Similarly,
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in Kitto v. Gilbert, 39 Colo.App. 374, 570
P.2d 544, 548-49 (1977), it was clear that
plaintiffs injury resulted from inadequate
anesthetization when tubing connecting
him to the anesthesiology apparatus became dislodged, but it was unclear what
caused the tubing to be dislodged. On
those facts, it was held error to refuse a
res ipsa instruction.
In this case, plaintiff alleged and sought
to prove two different theories under which
defendant would be responsible for the defective condition of the pallet that caused
the injury: negligent failure to inspect and
negligent maintenance. In support of the
first theory, plaintiff elicited from Hunt an
admission that the pallets were not inspected before they were provided for use by
plaintiff. In support of the second theory,
Hunt admitted that the pallets were
stacked in an unprotected area where they
were sometimes run over by motor vehicles.
At the second trial, the court must decide
if a res ipsa instruction is appropriate on
the basis of the evidence submitted there.
Assuming plaintiff can prove that the pallet broke and caused his fall, but cannot
point to the specific act that caused the
pallet to break, a res ipsa instruction could
be appropriate. However, if the evidence
goes so far as to explain the precise cause
of the „ break, res ipsa is no longer necessary and therefore would be inappropriate.
Crawford v. Rogers, Alaska, 406 P.2d 189,
193 (1965); Hugo v. Manning, 201 Kan.
391, 395-98, 441 P.2d 145, 149-51 (1968);
Dabroe v. Rhodes Go., 64 Wash. 431, 392
P.2d 317, 322 (1964). See generally Webb
v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 9 Utah
2d 275, 285, 342 P.2d 1094, 1101 (1959).
[7] A res ipsa instruction would not be
appropriate as to the theory of negligent
failure to inspect. Defendant admitted at
trial that it failed to inspect the pallets
before providing them for plaintiff's use.
This admission leaves nothing to infer
about the cause of the accident so far as it
pertains to this theory of responsibility.
The only remaining issue is whether failure
to inspect (assuming inspection would have

revealed the defect) constitutes a breach of
defendant's duty to provide a safe working
place for its business invitees. The res
ipsa instruction has no function under this
issue.
[8] A res ipsa instruction may be appropriate as to the theory of negligent maintenance of the pallets. There was evidence
at trial that pallets on defendant's premises
were stacked in an unprotected area where
they were sometimes run over by motor
vehicles. At the same time, plaintiff cannot point to an individual event or practice
of defendant's that produced the defective
condition in the particular pallet that broke
and caused this accident. Thus, under this
theory of responsibility, we have evidence
of specific acts of negligent maintenance
by defendant, but no clear demonstration
of the cause of the defect in the pallet that
broke.
[9,10] The rule we choose to follow in
this circumstance is the rule articulated by
the Kansas Supreme Court in Ballhorst v.
Hahner-Foreman-Cale, Inc., 207 Kan. 89,
99, 484 P.2d 38, 46 (1971):
[W]here res ipsa loquitur has been properly brought into a case it will not be
removed by a mere prima facie showing
of specific negligence, but under such
circumstances the case should be submitted on both the theory of specific
negligence and res ipsa loquitur We
further [hold] that res ipsa loquitur
should not be removed by proof of specific negligence unless the proof goes so far
as to fully explain the cause of the injury
by positive evidence revealing all of the
facts and circumstances.
(Italics in original.) Accord Hugo v. Manning, supra; Fields v. Berry, Mo.App., 549
S.W.2d 122, 124-25 (1977). See also Harper v. Hoffman, 95 Idaho 933, 935-36, 523
P.2d 536, 538-39 (1974) (pleading).
In the second trial of this case, plaintiff
may be able (by proof of specific acts or
practices of defendant) to make a prima
facie showing that the defective condition,
of the pallet that broke was caused by
defendant's maintenance (or lack of mainte-
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nance). If so, the jury might find defendant negligent on that theory even without a
; res ipsa instruction. But under the rule in
Ballhorst, the prima facie showing of specific acts of negligence in respect to maintenance would not preclude an otherwise
appropriate res ipsa instruction, so long as
the specific evidence of negligence does not
"fully explain the cause of the injury by
positive evidence revealing all of the facts
and circumstances." Consequently, a res
ipsa instruction may be available on this
theory.
On remand, the district court will determine on the evidence at the second trial
whether plaintiff has made a prima facie
showing of the elements necessary for the
res ipsa instruction and, if so, whether the
evidence of specific acts of defendant's
negligence so clearly explain the cause of
the accident that res ipsa loquitur is not
appropriate.
III. UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT
The trial court gave defendant's proposed jury instruction on unavoidable accident. Plaintiff argues on this appeal that
the instruction should not have been given.
Courts in other jurisdictions have disapproved such an instruction, see, e.g., Lewis
v. Buckskin Joe's, Inc., 156 Colo. 46, 61,
396 P.2d 933, 941 (1964), and we have said
that it is 'Only to be used "in_a rare
case
" Stringham v. Broderick, Utah,
529 P.2d 425, 426 (1974). Nevertheless, we
have approved unavoidable accident instructions in two recent cases. Anderson
v. Toone, Utah, 671 P.2d 170, 174 (1983);
Anderton D. Montgomery, 607 P.2d at 83435 (case involving res ipsa loquitur). "Such
an instruction should be given with caution
and only where the evidence would justify
it." Woodhouse v. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d
210, 213, 436 P.2d 442, 445 (1968) (emphasis
in original).
[11] It will be up to the district court on
remand to determine whether the facts
presented at the second trial warrant an
unavoidable accident instruction. The instruction should only be given if the evidence could be interpreted as showing that

this was an unusual and unexpected occurrence "which result[s] in injury and which
happenfs] without anyone failing to exercise reasonable care
" Id.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new
trial consistent with this opinion. Each
party to bear own costs.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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Investment broker dealer brought action to obtain declaration that it was not
subject to sales taxes for sale of rare United States coins, foreign coins, and precious
metals. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Philip R. Fishier, J., held sale
of such items subject to state sales tax, and
broker dealer appealed. The Supreme
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) rare United States coins, foreign coins, and precious
metals sold by broker dealer for their extrinsic value, and not for use as currency,
were "tangible personal property" subject
to state sales tax, and (2) sales taxation of
such items did not impinge upon federal
government's exclusive rights with regard
to coinage of money.
Affirmed.

